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I. NET NEUTRALITY REPEAL CREATES A “ZERO-DAY” VULNERABILITY 
FOR THE ENERGY SECTOR THAT UNDERMINES ENERGY
RELIABILITY AND CYBERSECURITY 
A. The Cybersecurity Hacker-Paradigm Obscures Systemic Threats to 
Energy Reliability from Internet Service Provider Network 
Management after Net Neutrality Repeal 
This Article contends that the Federal Communications Commission’s 
(FCC) January 2018 repeal of net neutrality rules created a “zero-day” 
cybersecurity vulnerability for the energy sector and other critical
infrastructure.1 “A zero-day cybersecurity vulnerability is a previously
unknown flaw in a computer program that exposes the program to external
manipulation.”2 Theflaw may also reside in compromised hardware that creates
a “back door” into the internet-connected device.3 This Article argues that 
cybersecurity has been primarily viewed from a “hacker paradigm” that obscures
systemic threats an Internet Service Provider (ISP) can create to energy
reliability and cybersecurity through paid priority and other ISP practices.
The FCC’s January 2018 Internet Freedom Order4 repealed net neutrality
rules the FCC adopted through its 2015 Open Internet Order that prohibited 
ISPs from blocking, throttling, and paid prioritization of internet traffic—
“with some limited exceptions for reasonable network management.”5 
Unbridling ISPs from enforceable net neutrality rules triggers energy sector 
cybersecurity risks. These supply chain risks become systemic risks as the 
energy sector becomes increasingly intertwined with the internet throughout 
the energy sector’s distributed ecosystem. To protect energy reliability, safety,
resiliency, renewable integration, just and reasonable rates, and the environment, 
 1.  See Critical Infrastructures Protection Act of 2001 (CIPA), Pub. L. 107-56, tit. 
X, § 1016, 115 Stat. 272, 400 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5195) (designating 
sectors including energy, water, and communications as “critical infrastructure,” vital to
the nation’s economy, national security, and well-being).
2.  Mailyn Fidler, Regulating the Zero-Day Vulnerability Trade: A Preliminary 
Analysis, 11 I/S: J. L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 405, 408 (2015). 
3. Alexandre Vernotte et al., Load Balancing of Renewable Energy: A Cyber Security
Analysis, 1:5 ENERGY INFOMATICS 29 (2018), https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1186%
2Fs42162-018-0010-x.pdf [https://perma.cc/2M6U-3NDN] (“Supply chain attacks are also 
of great concern, i.e., the compromising of the software/hardware vendor with the objective
of feeding rogue updates to assets, typically to install a backdoor.”). 
 4.  In the Matter of Restoring Internet Freedom, 33 F.C.C. Rcd. 311, at ¶¶ 2–4, 220 
(2018) (adopted Dec. 14, 2017, released Jan. 4, 2018) [hereinafter FCC, Internet Freedom 
Order].
 5.  In the Matter of Protecting & Promoting the Open Internet, 30 F.C.C. Rcd.
5601, at ¶¶ 114, 126, 150 (2015), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-15-24A1.docx 
[hereinafter FCC, 2015 Open Internet Order].
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the energy sector and its regulators must address cybersecurity risks including 
those created by ISPs and FCC regulatory decisions. 
Cybersecurity and reliability are mandatory standards under federal law 
for energy sector facilities and services that participate in federal wholesale
energy markets and for transmission facilities and services.6  The Federal 
Power Act (FPA) delegates to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC) responsibility for reliability including cybersecurity and just and
reasonable rates,7 but the Act does not delegate safety authority to FERC—a
gap Congress should address. To fill this gap in the critical safety function, 
states such as California exercise jurisdiction over electric transmission facilities 
(whether overhead or underground), for the “limited purpose of protecting
the safety of employees and the general public.”8 Distribution system energy
utilities must also comply with duties imposed by state law requiring safe, 
reliable service at just and reasonable rates.9 In twenty-nine states and three
territories, state-regulated energy utilities must comply with renewable energy
goals.10 
The Critical Infrastructures Protection Act of 2001 (CIPA) designated the
energy sector as “critical infrastructure” vital to the nation’s economy, national 
security, and well-being.11 The Electricity Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct) amended
6.  Catherine J.K. Sandoval, Net Neutrality Powers Energy and Forestalls Climate
Change, 9 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 1, at 9–10. 
 7.  See 16 U.S.C. § 824(d) (2005); 16 U.S.C. § 824o (2005). See also Steven
Ferrey, Pentagon Preemption: The 5-Sided Loss of State Energy and Power, 2014 U. ILL.
J.L.TECH.&POL’Y 393, 404 (2014) (discussing FERC jurisdiction over electricity transmission 
reliability and just and reasonable rates).
 8.  See e.g., CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 8037 (electric overhead facilities), 8056 
(electric underground facilities); Decision Adopting Regulations to Reduce Fire Hazards 
Associated with Overhead Power Lines and Communication Facilities (D.12-01-032), 
CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, at 11, App. B2 (Jan. 12, 2012) (adopting amendments to CPUC
General Order 95, Sec. 11, “to formulate, for the State of California, requirements for
overhead line design, construction, and maintenance, the application of which will ensure 
adequate service and secure safety to persons engaged in the construction, maintenance, 
operation or use of overhead lines and to the public in general.”). 
 9.  See, e.g., CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 451 (2019) (“Every public utility shall furnish 
and maintain such adequate, efficient, just, and reasonable service, instrumentalities,
equipment, and facilities, including telephone facilities, as defined in Section 54.1 of the
Civil Code, as are necessary to promote the safety, health, comfort, and convenience of its 
patrons, employees, and the public.”). 
10. State Renewable Portfolio Standards and Goals, NAT’L CONF. OF  ST. LEGISLATURES
(Jan. 20, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/energy/renewable-portfolio-standards.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/6TW9-TZES].
11. See Critical Infrastructures Protection Act of 2001 (CIPA), Pub. L. 107-56, tit. 
X, § 1016, 115 Stat. 272, 400 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5195) (designating
 95  
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the FPA to require electric power grid operators to ensure grid reliability.12 
The EPAct defined reliable operation of the “bulk-power system” (BPS) to
ensure, “uncontrolled separation, or cascading failures of such system will not 
occur as a result of a sudden disturbance, including a cybersecurity incident,
or unanticipated failure of system elements.”13 
The bulk-power system is composed of: “(A) facilities and control systems
necessary for operating an interconnected electric energy transmission
network (or any portion thereof); and (B) electric energy from generation 
facilities needed to maintain transmission system reliability,” but it, “does 
not include facilities used in the local distribution of electric energy.”14 
The EPAct delegated to FERC the authority to create mandatory cybersecurity 
standards for the entities under its jurisdiction. Under FERC Critical
Infrastructure Protection (CIP) rules, “responsible entities” under FERC 
jurisdiction must observe FERC cybersecurity standards and are subject
to penalties for their violation.15 “All bulk power system owners, operators,
and users are required to register with [the North American Electric Reliability
Organization (NERC)].”16 A “responsible entity” is a Registered Entity subject
to the CIP mandatory standards.”17 
Local energy distribution systems are under the jurisdiction of state public
utility or public service commissions, or local municipal power or irrigation 
district authorities. In 2012, it was estimated that, “from 80 percent to over 
90 percent of grid assets are outside NERC-CIP’s scope today.”18 States also
have a duty to ensure energy utilities under their jurisdiction provide safe, 
reliable service, at just and reasonable rates.19 Illinois Public Utilities 
Commissioner Sherina Maye Edwards observed that, “[a]s utility infrastructure 
sectors including energy, water, and communications as “critical infrastructure,” vital to the 
nation’s economy, national security, and well-being). 
12. Sandoval, supra note 6, at 9–10 (citing Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109– 
58, 119 Stat. 594 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. 824o, § 215(b) [hereinafter EPAct).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Susan J. Court, Role of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, A Paper
Prepared for the 2014 Law + Informatics Symposium on Cyber Defense Strategies and 
Responsibilities for Industry, at 8 n.29 (Feb. 7, 2014), http://courtenergy.com/articles/Court_ 
Working%20Paper_Federal%20Cybersecurity%20Law%20and%20Policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/
UEZ2-VH47] [hereinafter Court]. 
16. NERC CIP Compliance, N. AM.ELEC.RELIABILITY COUNCIL (Oct. 26, 2018), http://
www.complianceguidelines.com/nerc-compliance.htm [https://perma.cc/3W9T-3VT3]
[hereinafter NERC, NERC CIP Compliance]. 
17. Court, supra note 15.
18. ELIZAVETA MALASHENKO, CHRIS VILLAREAL, & J. DAVID ERICKSON, CAL. PUB.
UTIL. COMM’M, CYBERSECURITY AND THE EVOLVING ROLE OF STATE REGULATION; HOW
IT IMPACTS THE CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION iii (2012) [hereinafter CPUC
Staff Report, Cybersecurity and the Evolving Role of the States].
19. See, e.g., CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 451 (2019). 
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becomes increasingly automated, ensuring the security of critical energy 
infrastructure is becoming a major concern.”20 Further, companies that “own
and operate such assets,” must address these risks, as well as, “local, state
and federal regulators tasked with ensuring the safety, reliability and cost-
effectiveness of the services delivered.”21 Ephram Glass and Victor Glass 
argued that to make the electric grid more resilient against unforeseen attacks 
on the electric grid’s cyber and physical infrastructure, “the [United States] 
needs to increase distributed generation to ensure no substations are critical
to the stability of the electric grid.”22 To protect American energy reliability 
and safety, FERC, state, and municipal energy sector regulators must address 
risks to energy sector reliability, cybersecurity, and public safety triggered by
the FCC’s repeal of net neutrality rules in the 2018 Internet Freedom Order. 
FERC’s review of energy grid resiliency and reliability, Grid Resilience 
Order, 162 FERC ¶ 61,012 (2018) (“Resilience Order”) AD18-7-000, must 
consider harms to grid resiliency and reliability that flow from the FCC’s 
removal of legal bars to ISP paid priority, blocking, throttling, and unreasonable 
interference with traffic.
The internet is increasingly critical for energy sector management and
dispatch of distributed energy resources (DERs) necessary to achieve 
environmental goals and combat climate change. The electric grid and 
its changing energy generation mix rely on information and communications 
platforms, including the internet, for grid planning and operation. While 
a variety of communications services and facilities can be used to plan,
manage, and monitor the electric grid and distributed energy ecosystem, the 
internet creates important tools for grid visibility and control.  The internet
also exposes the electric grid to cybersecurity vulnerabilities which the
energy sector and regulators must address. 
State and federal decisions over the past twenty-five years fostered the
creation a “smart grid” that uses information and communications technology
(ICT), including the internet, to better manage the electric grid and create
20. Commissioner Sherina Maye Edwards et al., Opportunities and Challenges for 




22. Ephram Glass & Victor Glass, Are We One Terrorist Attack Away from a Major 
Nationwide Blackout, What Should We Do?, RUTGERS BUS. REV. 8 (2018), https://www.
rbusinessreview.org/rbr030204 [https://perma.cc/7AAK-SVR6].
 97  
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new opportunities for energy users and suppliers.23 Regulatory and private
sector investment decisions have embedded the internet into the energy system, 
just as electricity is embedded into and required for the functioning of the
internet. The “Energy-Internet nexus” enables new energy grid management 
methods that harness communications and information technology to spur
reliability, affordability, safety, and climate change solutions. The Energy- 
Internet nexus fosters integration of DERs such as solar photovoltaic (PV) 
systems, energy storage, and demand response supported by smart thermostats
and other devices connected through the Internet of Things (IoT). 
The California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) decision in the Water- 
Energy Nexus proceeding recognized the growing importance of 
communications, including the internet, for the management of energy,
water, and renewable energy integration.24  The CPUC’s 2015 Water-Energy
Nexus decision recognizes that “access to reliable communications is 
increasingly critical to optimize water and energy facility operations and
management as our state works to forestall climate change, mitigate or adapt 
to climate change, and to reduce [greenhouse gas] emissions associated with 
the electric, natural gas, and water sectors.”25  The following  year,  CPUC  
observed that the, “[i]nfrastructure and services to provide both voice 
and internet communications for data management, transportation, and 
analysis, including narrowband and broadband signals, are critical to 
water and energy management, the use of resources, and public safety.”26 
Regulatory and investment decisions that fostered the Energy-Internet
nexus created path-dependencies that shape grid investments and operation.
Smart grid and other state and federal policies created an Energy-Internet
nexus that has become central to energy management, resource integration, 
reliability, and public safety. These policies and investments embed technology, 
function, and governance systems for the internet and communications 
technology into the energy sector. This path-dependence creates new
opportunities for grid management and integration, but also makes the energy 
23. Cyber and Grid Security, FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N (FERC), https://www. 
ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/reliability/cybersecurity.asp [https://perma.cc/MCQ9- 
28N7] (“the electric industry is incorporating information technology (IT) systems into its 
operations–commonly referred to as smart grid–as part of nationwide efforts to improve 
reliability and efficiency.”).
24. Decision Regarding Tools for Calculating the Embedded Energy in Water and 
An Avoided Capacity Cost Associated with Water Savings (D.15-09-023), CAL. PUB. UTIL.
COMM’N, at 4–5 (Sept. 25, 2015) [hereinafter CPUC D.15-09-023]. I served as the CPUC’s
Assigned Commissioner for the Water-Energy Nexus proceeding from 2014-2016 while 
serving as a CPUC Commissioner, from 2011 to 2017. 
25. Id.
26. Decision Updating the Water Energy Nexus Cost Calculator, Proposing Future 
Inquiry, and Next Steps (D.16-12-047), CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, at 27 (Dec. 15, 2016)
[hereinafter CPUC D.16-12-047]. 
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sector vulnerable to ISP and communications network management practices 
and governance. 
Smart grid architecture increasingly depends on the internet as, “the 
main intermediary to the different stakeholders (along with fiber, GPRS
[Ground penetrating radar systems] networks from telecom operators).”27 
Internet governance is crucial to the Energy-Internet nexus. Once data 
traffic crosses from the network of the energy operator or resource across the 
firewall to the ISP, the traffic is under ISP control.28  The ISP controls the 
user’s traffic as it crosses the ISP-controlled gateway to the internet.29  No
software patch or firewall protects a user from an ISP whose job it is to
transit that user’s content to and from the internet.30 The “hacker paradigm” 
predominant in the cybersecurity framework obscures risks from ISP network
management practices.  The FCC’s net neutrality repeal allows ISPs to 
make deals for traffic priority (i.e., paid priority) even if those transactions 
slow other internet traffic. An ISP’s deals with third parties, including 
parties the ISP does not recognize to have nefarious motives, could slow or
stymieenergy sector traffic, portionsof whichdependon public, non-commercial 
internet access. Cybersecurity strategies to date focused on firewalls, intrusion 
detection, and other strategies to keep hackers out. Users cannot throw a
firewall over their own ISP. The “hacker paradigm” fails to see ISP-induced
risks that traditional cybersecurity strategies leave unmitigated. 
This Article contends that federal regulators, responsible entities under 
the FPA, and state energy sector regulators must act to identify and mitigate 
risks triggered by the FCC’s repeal of net neutrality rules. The energy sector’s 
27. Vernotte et al., supra note 3, at 18. 
28. Cf. Charles Kelly & Philip Carden, Firewalls: Securing NT Networks from Internet
Intruders, IT PRO TODAY (Oct. 31, 1996), https://www.itprotoday.com/security/firewalls-
securing-nt-networks-internet-intruders [https://perma.cc/53J6-XG7C] (“[A] network firewall 
is a hardware/software barrier between a corporate network and the Internet.”). 
29. Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 646 (“[T]here appears little dispute that broadband
providers have the technological ability to distinguish between and discriminate against 
certain types of Internet traffic.”).
30. Jeff Tyson, How Internet Infrastructure Works, HOWSTUFF WORKS (Oct. 21,  
2018), http://web.stanford.edu/class/msande91si/www-spr04/readings/week1/Howstuff
works.htm [https://perma.cc/2TNA-AV2J] (“Every computer that is connected to the Internet
is part of a network, even the one in your home. For example, you may use a modem and
dial a local number to connect to an Internet Service Provider (ISP). At work, you may be 
part of a local area network (LAN), but you most likely still connect to the Internet using an ISP
that your company has contracted with.”). Cf. Vernotte et al., supra note 3, at 20 (noting that
an energy smart grid cybersecurity, “mechanism can be structural/physical, e.g., a more
advanced network segregation, and/or software based, e.g., a more frequent patching strategy.”).
 99  





      
   
 
    
 
     
      
     
    
    
   
     
 
 
   
   
     






    
 
           





state and federal legal duties do not allow it to rely on the market and 
unenforceable ISP promises to protect reliability, cybersecurity, and public 
safety. An open and neutral internet—the goal of net neutrality—is necessary 
to protect energy reliability crucial to America’s economy, public safety,
national security, and deployment of climate change solutions. 
B. Article Overview
Following this introduction, section two of this Article discusses the 
ISP’s gatekeeper position on the internet and introduces the “hacker paradigm”
and “cat video paradigm” that pervade internet and cybersecurity regulation.
Section three provides an overview of federal energy sector reliability standards,
highlighting the states’ role in energy reliability for the distribution segment
of the energy grid. Section four discusses models for energy sector and
critical infrastructure cybersecurity governance. Section five provides an
overview of mandatory federal cybersecurity standards for the energy sector’s
BPS. Section six explores the “hacker-focused” paradigm of many cybersecurity
standards including the NERC standards FERC enforces for the energy
sector. Section seven examines the Energy-Internet nexus, emphasizing 
the internet’s increasing integration into the energy sector. Section eight 
discusses simulations that test the electric grid for communications-induced 
faults and cascading failures. Section nine analyzes the consequences of
FERC’s net neutrality repeal on energy sector reliability, cybersecurity,
renewable energy deployment, and public safety.
Finally, section ten recommends that FERC and state public utility 
commissions conduct grid simulations to test the effect of ISP-induced 
communications delays on grid reliability and renewable integration. It
recommends that state energy regulators initiate proceedings to examine
cybersecurity requirements for distribution-level energy resources. Those
proceedings should request data from energy sector jurisdictional entities 
about ISP contracts and conduct, and then consider whether to limit contracts
with such entities to ISPs that observe net neutrality. FERC should examine
net neutrality repeal as a cybersecurity, reliability and resiliency risk in its 
Grid Resiliency and Reliability docket.  Federal and state law require energy 
sector participants and regulators to ensure ISPs do not degrade Energy-Internet 
traffic or violate market manipulation rules and thereby compromise reliability,
public safety, just and reasonable rates, the environment, and realization
of climate change solutions. 
100
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II. ISPS AS GATEKEEPERS TO THE ENERGY-INTERNET NEXUS: THE 
HACKER PARADIGM AND THE CAT VIDEO PARADIGM FOR 
INTERNET REGULATION AND CYBERSECURITY 
In the internet’s ecosystem, an ISP has “gatekeeper” power to control 
traffic crossing its network.  ISPs that provide “last-mile” access to the internet
serve as gatekeepers to the internet for subscribers who use the ISP to send 
traffic through the internet. The D.C. Circuit observed in Verizon v. FCC, 
“[i]nternet users generally connect to these networks [i]nternet “backhaul” 
networks composed of long-haul fiber-optic links and high-speed routers 
capable of transmitting vast amounts of data]—and, ultimately, to one another 
—through local access providers like petitioner Verizon, who operate the
‘last-mile’ transmission lines.”31 ISPs operate those “last-mile” networks 
that provide access to the internet, a network of networks. Further, “[w]hen
you connect to your ISP, you become part of their network. The ISP may
then connect to a larger network and become part of their network. The 
[i]nternet is simply a network of networks.”32 
The ISP gatekeeper role underscores the importance of governance structures
including enforceable legal rules to cabin internet user vulnerabilities to
ISP conduct and contracts. The D.C. Circuit in Verizon v. FCC described 
the internet’s process:
To pull the whole picture together with a slightly oversimplified example: when
an edge provider such as YouTube transmits some sort of content—say, a video
of a cat—to an end user, that content is broken down into packets of information,
which are carried by the edge provider’s local access provider to the backbone 
network, which transmits these packets to the end user’s local access provider, 
which, in turn, transmits the information to the end user, who then views and
hopefully enjoys the cat.33 
The D.C. Circuit’s cat video example demonstrates how internet 
communications travel, but does not capture the increasing use of the internet
for critical infrastructure communications including energy sector signals 
necessary for energy reliability. The “cat video paradigm” obscures the
internet’s importance to energy, public safety, and democracy.  The cat video
paradigm creates a frame for viewing internet content that diminishes the 
importance of communications that rely on public internet access. Likewise, 
the “hacker paradigm” identified above focuses on the cybersecurity dangers 
31. Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 628–29 (2014). 
32. Tyson, supra note 30. 
33. Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 629 (2014). 
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hackers pose, but it obscures other risks such as those arising from ISP
network management. 
The D.C. Circuit’s 2014 decision in Verizon v. FCC recognized the 
gatekeeper function ISPs occupy: “Because all end users generally access
the Internet through a single broadband provider, that provider functions 
as a ‘terminating monopolist,’ with power to act as a ‘gatekeeper’ with respect
to edge providers that might seek to reach its end-user subscribers.”34 Verizon 
v. FCC establishes that, “this ability to act as a ‘gatekeeper’ distinguishes
broadband providers from other participants in the internet marketplace—
including prominent and potentially powerful edge providers such as 
Google and Apple—who have no similar “control [over] access to the Internet 
for their subscribers and for anyone wishing to reach those subscribers.”35 
The FCC’s 2015 Open Internet Order prohibited ISP practices that took 
advantage of the ISP’s position on the internet as the gatekeeper of traffic 
that crosses an ISP’s network as it transits to and from subscribers and other 
internet endpoints. The California Independent System Operator (CAISO)
which oversees large parts of California’s grid under FERC jurisdiction
observed, “[t]he same companies that support the retail Internet support 
the increasingly digitally interconnected North American reliability and 
energy infrastructure.36 
As the Energy-Internet nexus grows, the risks ISP priority sales have 
commensurately grown.  Paid priority preference for a video game provider, 
energy sector participant, or third party could delay or degrade other internet
signals—including those used for energy management, operations, and  
recovery. The 2018 net neutrality repeal, the Internet Freedom Order, 
“imposes no eligibility requirements for paid priority buyers—whether foreign 
or domestic—and fails to analyze public safety and national security
consequences of authorizing paid priority without restriction or FCC
jurisdiction.37 
Federal and state regulators and energy operators with cybersecurity 
obligations must address these risks to protect energy reliability and 
cybersecurity. Doing so requires recognition of, and attention to, the power
34. Id. at 646. 
35. Id.
36. CAL. INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, 11 BUSINESS PRACTICE MANUAL FOR DIRECT
TELEMETRY 31–32 (2018), https://bpmcm.caiso.com/BPM%20Document%20Library/Direct
%20Telemetry/BPM_for_Direct_Telemetry_V11_clean.docx [hereinafter BUSINESS PRACTICE
MANUAL FOR DIRECT TELEMETRY].
37. Brief of Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 10, Mozilla Corp., et al. v. FCC, 
No. 18-1051 (D.C. Cir. 2018) [hereinafter Amicus Brief] (citing FCC, Internet Freedom 
Order, supra note 4, ¶¶ 2–4; Catherine Sandoval, Reply Comments, In the Matter of Restoring 
Internet Freedom, WC Docket No. 17-108, Aug. 30, 2017, at 4, 25, 27, 46 [hereinafter Sandoval, 
Internet Freedom Reply Comments].
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of ISPs to undermine energy sector statutory reliability and cybersecurity
requirements, as well as state law safety, reliability, and environmental goals.
III. ENERGY RELIABILITY, RESILIENCY, AND STATE
ENVIRONMENTAL GOALS 
A. Energy Sector Reliability Protects Public Safety, Interconnected 
Infrastructure, and Achievement of Environmental Objectives 
The Energy Sector, constituting a mix of privately owned and public entities,
is the only sector that must comply with mandatory federal reliability and 
cybersecurity duties. In addition, many operators of energy resources and 
facilities must comply with state law duties requiring safe, reliable service, at
just and reasonable rates such as California Public Utility Code 451.38  The
FPA delegates to FERC jurisdiction over interstate electric and natural gas
facilities and services, mandating FERC ensure reliability including cybersecurity, 
and just and reasonable rates.39 The FPA does not specifically delegate
safety duties to FERC, a gap in federal jurisdiction filled in part by other federal 
agencies and in part by the states. California regulates electric transmission
and distribution facilities to ensure public and worker safety.40 
The energy sector’s role as a key enabler of the economy, public safety,
and national security animate federal energy sector reliability laws adopted in
the 2005 EPAct.41  Using the police power of the state inherent in America’s
federalist system, many states impose reliability and safety standards on 
electric utilities to protect and promote the population’s well-being and 
38. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 451 (2019); State ex rel. Utils. Comm’n v. Carolina
Power & Light Co., 174 N.C. App. 681, 684-85 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (noting that North
Carolina’s Supreme Court “stated that the Utility Commission’s purpose [of this regulation]
‘was to provide a mechanism through which [the Utility Commission] meaningfully could’ . . . .
‘take appropriate action . . . to secure and protect reliable service to retail customers in
North Carolina.’” North Carolina General Statutes §§ 62–30 and 62–32(b) “give the Utility 
Commission ‘all powers necessary’ to regulate public utilities to ensure the citizens of this 
State are provided with reasonable service.”); Rochester v. People’s Coop. Power Ass’n,
483 N.W.2d 477, 479 (Minn. 1992) (“In 1974 the legislature enacted what is now chapter
216B, entitled ‘Public Utilities,’ prefacing the chapter with a ‘legislative finding,’ announcing
its statement of purpose—to provide the retail consumers of natural gas and electric service 
in this state with adequate and reliable services at reasonable rates. . . .”); MINN. STAT. 
§ 216B.01 (1990)). 
39. 16 U.S.C. § 824(d) (2005); 16 U.S.C. § 824 (2005). 
40. CAL.PUB.UTIL.CODE §§ 8037 (electric overhead facilities), 8056 (electric underground 
facilities); CPUC D.12-01-032, supra note 8, at 11, App. B2. 
41. EPAct, supra note 12. 
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the state’s economic, health, educational, and other interests.42 The 2017-
2018 blackout in Puerto Rico left many parts of the island without power 
for many months and with sporadic power even after repairs were attempted. 
“The failures of water treatment and delivery following the loss of power 
in Puerto Rico, illustrate the interconnection between electricity and other 
critical infrastructure services.”43 Such significant utility failures after a 
destructive hurricane highlight the societal and economic consequences of
power loss over an extended period of time, as well as the imperative of
energy sector reliability and safety. Climate change analysis predicts storm 
intensity will increase as waters warm while drought conditions raise wildfire 
risk,44 underscoring the imperative of energy reliability to forestall and address 
disaster risk.
The electric grid’s interconnected design enables its reach to customers
and dispatch of distributed energy resources, but also makes it vulnerable 
to local or even cascading outages. Water systems, gas pipelines, and related 
infrastructure are interdependent with the electric grid and the energy services 
it provides. Each of these utility infrastructure systems increasingly depend
on the internet for system function and reliability. Mackinnon Lawrence 
& Jan Vrins observed that “one-off technologies are recombining into 
42. See, e.g., Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 307 (1989) (“‘[e]very
public utility shall furnish and maintain adequate, efficient, safe, and reasonable service and
facilities’” and “‘[s]uch service also shall be reasonably continuous and without unreasonable 
interruptions or delay.’”) (quoting 66 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1501 (1986)). 
43. Sandoval, Net Neutrality Powers Energy and Forestalls Climate Change, supra
note 6, at 12; U.S. GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE RES. PROGRAM, Fourth National Climate
Assessment, Vol. II, 47 (2018), https://nca2018.globalchange.gov/ [https://perma.cc/MR44-
3M8C] (“In the U.S. Caribbean, Hurricanes Irma and Maria caused catastrophic damage to
infrastructure, including the complete failure of Puerto Rico’s power grid and the loss 
of power throughout the U.S. Virgin Islands, as well as extensive damage to the region’s 
agricultural industry.”).
44. U.S. GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE RES. PROGRAM, supra note 43, at 74 (“Increases 
in greenhouse gases and decreases in air pollution have contributed to increases in Atlantic
hurricane activity since 1970. In the future, Atlantic and eastern North Pacific hurricane 
rainfall and intensity are projected to increase, as are the frequency and severity of
landfalling ‘atmospheric rivers’ on the West Coast.”); id. at 91 (“conditions conducive to 
the very large wildfires that have already increased in frequency across the western United 
States and Alaska since the 1980s.”); Terry Dinan, Projected Increases in Hurricane 
Damage in the United States: The Role of Climate Change and Coastal Development, 138
ECOLOGICAL ECON. 186, 186 (2017) (“Climate change is likely to increase the frequency
of the most intense categories of hurricanes in some parts of the world, including the North
Atlantic Basin, and is expected to increase sea levels, leading to more destructive storm
surges when hurricanes occur.”). See also GOVERNOR NEWSOM’S STRIKE FORCE, WILDFIRES
AND CLIMATE CHANGE, CALIFORNIA’S ENERGY FUTURE (Apr. 12, 2019), https://www.gov. 
ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Wildfires-and-Climate-Change-California%E2%80 
%99s-Energy-Future.pdf [https://perma.cc/ELN3-MX2B] (“Warmer temperatures, variable
snowpack, and earlier snowmelt caused by climate change make for longer and more intense
dry seasons, leaving forests more susceptible to severe fire.”). 
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complex hybrid energy ecosystems supported by rapidly evolving technology 
platforms: integrated DER, transportation-grid nexus, buildings-to-grid, 
smart cities, energy Internet of Things, and transactive energy, for example.”45 
The Energy-Internet nexus exemplifies infrastructure interdependence 
that creates new opportunities for grid and resource management as well
as new vulnerabilities. The stakes of ISP governance and net neutrality
policies are highlighted by policy and management decisions designed to
embed the internet into the distributed energy ecosystem’s processes and 
function. The FCC’s changes in ISP governance through its 2018 net neutrality
repeal also created new cybersecurity, reliability, and safety vulnerabilities 
for critical infrastructure including the electric, natural gas, and water sectors. 
B. Critical Infrastructure; Reliability, Physical Security, and 
Cybersecurity Regulations 
President Clinton’s 1996 Executive Order 13010 recognized the need 
to protect the nation from physical and cyber threats to “critical infrastructure”
sectors including energy.46 Executive Order No. 13010 recognized that,
“[c]ertain national infrastructures are so vital that their incapacity or
destruction would have a debilitating impact on the defense or economic 
security of the United States.”47 This Executive Order designated as critical
infrastructure sectors, “telecommunications, electrical power systems, gas 
and oil storage and transportation, banking and finance, transportation, 
water supply systems, emergency services (including medical, police, fire,
and rescue), and continuity of government.”48 
The Critical Infrastructures Protection Act of 2001 (CIPA) was adopted
as part of the U.S.A. Patriot Act following the September 11, 2001, terrorist 
attack on America.49 CIPA defines critical infrastructure as those, “systems
and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the 
incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating
impact on security, national economic security, national public health or
45. Mackinnon Lawrence & Jan Vrins, Unleashing Utility Innovation, PUB. UTIL.
FORT. 56, 58 (July 2017). 
46. Sandoval, Net Neutrality Powers Energy and Forestalls Climate Change, supra note
6, at 7. 
47. Id. (citing Exec. Order No. 13010, 61 Fed. Reg. 37347, 1996 WL 33673768 (July
15, 1996)).
48. Id.
49. See Critical Infrastructures Protection Act of 2001 (CIPA), Pub. L. 107-56, tit. 
X, § 1016, 115 Stat. 272, 400 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5195). 
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safety, or any combination of those matters.”50 Specifically, CIPA, “defines
critical infrastructure not with reference to the identity of the target, but 
by the consequences of an attack on it.”51 
In 2005 President George W. Bush signed the Energy Policy Act (EPAct) to
promote, “dependable, affordable, and environmentally sound production
and distribution of energy for America’s future.”52  EPAct amended the
FPA to require electric power grid operators to ensure grid reliability and
cybersecurity.53 
Under the FPA, “reliable operation” means, “‘operating the elements of
the bulk-power system within equipment and electric system thermal,
voltage, and stability limits so that instability, uncontrolled separation, or 
cascading failures of such system will not occur as a result of a sudden 
disturbance, including a cybersecurity incident, or unanticipated failure of
system elements,’ articulating resilience concepts.”54 Section 215 of the
FPA requires FERC to certify an Electric Reliability Organization (ERO) 
to develop mandatory and enforceable Reliability Standards, subject to
Commission review and approval. In July 2006, FERC certified the North
American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) as the ERO authorized 
to establish bulk transmission system standards for planning, preparation, 
contingency, and operations.55  Susan Court, former Director of FERC’s
Office of Enforcement, noted that since the EPAct’s passage, FERC “has 
approved over 100 mandatory Reliability Standards,” including “over 1,000 
separate requirements,” and NERC, “has registered 1,646 users, owners, and
operators for a total of 4,782 functions.”56 FERC may enforce reliability 
standards, as may NERC, subject to FERC oversight.57 
50. Id. 
51. Sandoval, Net Neutrality Powers Energy and Forestalls Climate Change, supra
note 6, at 8 (citing Nicholas Bagley, Benchmarking, Critical Infrastructure Security, and the
Regulatory War on Terror, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 47, 51 (2006)). 
52. George W. Bush, Statement on Signing the Energy Policy Act of 2005, THE AM.
PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Aug. 8, 2005), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=64861 [https://
perma.cc/QP9A-UB75].
53. Sandoval, Net Neutrality Powers Energy and Forestalls Climate Change, supra
note 6, at 9–10 (citing EPAct, supra note 12). 
54. Comments and Responses of PJM Interconnection L.C.C., Grid Resilience in
Regional Transmission Organizations and Independent System Operators, F.E.R.C. Docket
No. AD-18-7-000 (Mar. 9, 2018) at 11 (citing FPA § 215, U.S.C. § 824o(a)(4)), https:// 
pjm.com/-/media/documents/ferc/filings/2018/20180309-ad18-7-000.ashx [https://perma.cc/
YX2N-T482] [hereinafter PJM, FERC Grid Resilience Comments].
55. Amy L. Stein, Regulating Reliability, 54 HOUS. L. REV. 1191, 1217 (2017). 
56. Court, supra note 15, at 6. 
57. Order No. 843, Revised Critical Infrastructure Protection Reliability Standard
CIP-003-7 — Cyber Security — Security Management Controls, 163 F.E.R.C ¶ 61,032 (2018)
[hereinafter FERC Order No. 843].
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NERC developed “Adequate Level of Reliability” standards for design,
planning, and operation of the Bulk Electric System (BES). These standards 
address “Reliable Operation of the BES” over four time frames:
(1) steady state (the period before a disturbance and after restoration has achieved
normal operating conditions); (2) transient (the transitional period after a disturbance 
and during high-speed automatic actions in response); (3) operations response 
(the period after the disturbance where some automatic actions occur and operators 
act to respond); and (4) recovery and system restoration (the time period after a
widespread outage through initial restoration to a sustainable operating state and 
recovery to a new steady state).58 
These time periods “correspond to the four outcome-based abilities of both 
the [National Infrastructure Advisory Council] NIAC resilience framework
and the [FERC] Commission proposed definition of resilience: (1) robustness; 
(2) resourcefulness; (3) rapid recovery; and (4) adaptability.”59 
These mandatory federal BES reliability standards complement state 
reliability standards for the electric grid distribution network. Further, reliability
and cybersecurity are critical to achievement of environmental goals and 
climate change solutions. It is key to keep these frameworks in mind, as 
energy development, dispatch, and grid management techniques increasingly 
rely on the open internet to harness renewable resources and minimize the
need for fossil-fuels. 
C. Energy Sector Environmental Goals Promote Reliability 
and Resilience 
Fossil fuel consumption has been identified as major contributor to CO2
emissions that contribute to climate change.60 The United Nations
58. Comments and Responses of North American Electric Reliability Corporation 
(NERC), Grid Resilience in Regional Transmission Organizations and Independent System 
Operators, F.E.R.C. Docket No. AD-18-7-000 (Mar. 9, 2018) at 5–6, https://pjm.com/-
/media/documents/ferc/filings/2018/20180309-ad18-7-000.ashx [https://perma.cc/ESM3-
SWAN] [hereinafter NERC Grid Resilience Comments].
59. Comments of the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC),
Grid Resilience in Regional Transmission Organization and Independent System Operators, 
F.E.R.C. Docket No. AD18-7-000 (May 9, 2018), at 5–6, https://www.nerc.com/FilingsOrders/ 
us/NERC%20Filings%20to%20FERC%20DL/Resilience%20Proceeding%20Comments
%20(AD18-7).pdf [https://perma.cc/JG5U-HC3D]. 
60. See e.g., What Is Climate Change, ENERGY UPGRADE CAL., https://www.energy
upgradeca.org/climate-change/ [https://perma.cc/PP6E-WP2D] (“When fossil fuels are burned, 
carbon dioxide, methane and other greenhouse gases are released into the air. These greenhouse 
gases, such as methane, are also released during fossil fuel extraction and transportation.
107





   










     
    
 
    
  
      
    
   
  
   
 
    
       
       
   
 
   
 
   
    
     
      
 
  
          
    
 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) issued a report in
October 2018 that recommended dramatic efforts to limit global warming
to 1.5 degrees over pre-industrial levels, as opposed to the 2 degree
warming goal set in the Paris Climate Accord.61 The IPPC report contends
“the consequences of 1°C of global warming through more extreme weather, 
rising sea levels and diminishing Arctic sea ice, among other changes”
highlight the need for swift action to slow global warming and climate 
change.62 
Likewise, the State of Massachusetts found that, “the electric sector accounts 
for approximately twenty percent of [s]tatewide greenhouse gas emissions.”63 
By Executive Order, the Governor of Massachusetts in 2017 established, 
“annually declining aggregate carbon dioxide emissions limits on electricity
generating facilities located in the Commonwealth, pursuant to § 3(d).”64 
Further, “[t]wenty-nine states, Washington, D.C., and three territories have 
adopted [Renewable Portfolio standards (RPS)], while eight states and one 
territory have set renewable energy goals.”65 Iowa was the first state to 
establish an RPS, and Hawaii and California have adopted 100% renewable 
energy standards to be achieved by 2045.66 
California’s energy sector RPS began in 2002 when California Governor
Davis signed SB 1078, requiring the state to achieve a twenty percent RPS 
by 2017.67 In 2006, Governor Schwarzenegger required twenty percent
of electricity retail sales to be fulfilled by renewable energy resources by
2020.68 Then, in 2011, Governor Brown signed SB X1-2, requiring that 
thirty-three percent of all electricity come from renewable energy generation
resources by 2020. In 2015, California adopted SB 350 which increased
Carbon dioxide isn’t harmful at natural levels, but too much can act like a layer of plastic 
wrap around the Earth that lets in heat from the sun but doesn’t let it escape. The atmosphere 
acts like a greenhouse, which is why these emissions are called greenhouse gases.”); California
Greenhouse Gas Inventory, 2018 Edition, CAL. AIR RES. BD., https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/ 
inventory/data/data.htm [https://perma.cc/B5PU-PYMV].
61. Summary for Policymakers of IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C
Approved by Governments, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE  (Oct. 6, 
2018), http://www.ipcc.ch/ [https://perma.cc/Z42A-HAJM]. 
62. Id.
63. New England Power Generators Ass’n, Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 480 Mass. 
398, 405–06 (2018). 
64. Id. at 403–04 (citing 310 MASS. CODE REGS. § 7.74(1)).
65. State Renewable Portfolio Standards and Goals, NAT’L CONF. OF ST.LEGISLATURES
(Jan. 20, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/energy/renewable-portfolio-standards.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/SWC3-BBKB].
66. Id.; S.B. 100, ch. 312 (Cal. 2018). 
67. S.B. 1078, ch. 516 (Cal. 2002) (amending CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 399.12(b) 
(Deering 2003)). 
68. S.B. 107, ch. 464 (Cal. 2006), http://www.energy.ca.gov/portfolio/documents/
documents/sb_107_bill_20060926_chaptered.pdf [https://perma.cc/WM9L-7R4D].
108
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the energy RPS requirements to fifty percent by 2030 to reduce energy 
sector Greenhouse gas emissions.69 SB 350 emphasized the integration of 
demand-side tools to reduce the need to build and run fossil-fueled plants, 
and it required strategies to reduce the environmental burden of energy on 
disadvantaged communities.70 Most recently, in 2018, Governor Brown 
signed SB 100 which set a goal of one hundred percent renewable energy 
for all of California’s electric generation by 2045.71 
Climate change also poses threats to the energy sector as a whole, including
its infrastructure, reliability, safety, and its ability to ensure just and reasonable 
rates. In 2014, the Union of Concerned Scientists identified several consequences
of climate change for the energy sector including: accelerating sea level 
rise; increasing wildfires; more frequent and intense heat waves; droughts 
and reduced water supplies; and elevated water temperatures.72 
D. Resilience as a Component of Reliability under the 
Federal Power Act 
As the authority over matters of reliability and adequacy, and, “[w]ith
the asserted goal of improving electric grid resiliency and reliability,
FERC issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR) on October 10,
2017, proposing a Grid Resiliency Pricing Rule.”73 The “Grid Reliability 
NOPR cited the ‘premature’ retirement of several coal-fired and nuclear
plants as the basis for its concerns that grid resiliency is threatened.”74  In 
69. S.B. 350, ch. 547 (Cal. 2015). 
70. Id. (citing CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 39711 (Deering 2014)). The term 
disadvantaged communities, “refers to the areas throughout California which most suffer 
from a combination of economic, health, and environmental burdens. These burdens include
poverty, high unemployment, health conditions like asthma and heart disease, as well as
air and water pollution, and hazardous wastes.” DISADVANTAGED COMMUNITIES, CAL. PUB. 
UTIL. COMM’N, https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/discom/ [https://perma.cc/CC6P-43HS].
71. S.B. 100, ch. 312 (Cal. 2018). 
72. How Climate Change Puts Our Electricity at Risk, UNION OF CONCERNED
SCIENTISTS (Apr. 2014), https://www.ucsusa.org/global_warming/science_and_impacts/impacts/
effects-of-climate-change-risks-on-our-electricity-system.html [https://perma.cc/GK2K-
VBZL]. See also, U.S. GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE RES. PROGRAM, supra note 43, at 30
(“Climate change and extreme weather events are expected to increasingly disrupt our Nation’s
energy and transportation systems, threatening more frequent and longer-lasting power outages, 
fuel shortages, and service disruptions, with cascading impacts on other critical sectors.”)
73. Sandoval, Net Neutrality Powers Energy and Forestalls Climate Change, supra
note 6, at 28 (citing Grid Resiliency Pricing Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 46,940, 46,941–42 (proposed
Oct. 10, 2017) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35)). 
74. Id.
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January 2018, FERC rejected the United States Department of Energy’s 
(DOE) proposal to divert more funds to coal, nuclear, and other fossil fuel 
power plants with ninety days fuel on-hand—a proposal that argued adopting 
such policies would promote grid resiliency and reliability.75 FERC concluded
DOE’s proposal was inconsistent with the FPA’s threshold requirement 
for, “a showing that the existing RTO/ISO tariffs are unjust, unreasonable, 
unduly discriminatory or preferential.”76 Any remedy proposed after such 
a showing is made must, “be shown to be just, reasonable, and not unduly
discriminatory or preferential.”77 DOE’s proposal addressed neither of 
these required legal prongs of FPA analysis. 
After rejecting the DOE’s proposal, FERC initiated a new proceeding,
Docket No. AD18-7-000, “to take additional steps to explore resilience issues
in the [Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs)]/[Independent System
Operators (ISOs)].”78  FERC explained the proceeding aimed:
(1) to develop a common understanding among the Commission, industry, and
others of what resilience of the bulk power system means and requires; (2) to
understand how each RTO and ISO assesses resilience in its geographic footprint; 
and (3) to use this information to evaluate whether additional Commission action 
regarding resilience is appropriate at this time.79 
FERC also asked ISOs and RTOs to report on reliability concerns and
resilience concepts.80 
FERC proposed to define resilience as the, “ability to withstand and 
reduce the magnitude and/or duration of disruptive events, which includes 
the capability to anticipate, absorb, adapt to, and/or rapidly recover from 
such an event.”81 PJM, a Mid-Atlantic RTO, offered an alternative definition 
of resilience: the “ability of the system to withstand or quickly recover 
from events that pose operational risks.”82 
PJM’s comments on FERC’s resiliency docket asked FERC to clarify 
whether resilience is anchored in the Congressional definition of reliable 
operations and just and reasonable rates set forth in FPA section 215.83 
75. Order Terminating Rulemaking Proceeding, Initiating New Proceeding, and
Establishing New Procedures, 162 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,020, at ¶¶ 2, 14 (2018). 
76. Id. at ¶ 14 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a) (2012)); see also, e.g., Emera Maine v. 
FERC, 854 F.3d 9, 25 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“Without a showing that the existing rate is unlawful, 
FERC has no authority to impose a new rate.”)). 
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at ¶ 18.
80. Id. at ¶¶ 23–27. 
81. Id. at ¶ 23.
82. FERC Grid Resilience Comments, supra note 54, at 12 (citing FPA, section 217, 
16 U.S.C. § 824q(b)(3)(B)(4)). 
83. Id.
110
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NERC argued that resilience is a component of reliability in relation to an 
event and is thus an implicit feature of NERC’s activities under FERC 
jurisdiction.84 
This Article agrees with NERC and PJM that resilience, as defined in 
FERC’s proposal, should be interpreted as a component of reliability under 
FPA section 215.85 This Article will thus analyze resiliency as a component 
of FPA and state utility reliability duties.
IV. ENERGY SECTOR CYBERSECURITY GOVERNANCE PROTECTS
ENERGY RELIABILITY AND SAFETY 
A. Defining Cybersecurity for the Energy-Internet Ecosystem
Federal, state, public, and private sector decisions to integrate the internet
into the energy system’s operation have enabled new energy resources 
and opportunities. David M. Driesen observed that, “decisionmaking by
institutions is ‘path dependent.’ Past actions and decisions tend to constrain
the range of attractive future decisions.”86 Energy-Internet development 
and investment reflect path-dependent decisions that embed technologies, 
governance, and vulnerabilities into the grid, while infusing new grid 
management options.
The path-dependency of Energy-Internet nexus investments increases
ISP incentives to exploit their position at the internet’s gateway. The
mandatory nature of energy cybersecurity and reliability highlights the need
to address vulnerabilities that may compromise reliability, resiliency, just
and reasonable rates, and climate change solutions. According to Jeff
Kosseff, “[c]ybersecurity focuses not only on the protection of data, but also
on the systems and networks of the public and private sector.”87  Kosseff
identifies confidentiality, integrity, and availability as the “CIA Triad”—
the industry’s frame for categorizing cyberattacks: 
Confidentiality refers to the “the prevention of unauthorized disclosure of information.”
Confidentiality often is associated with data breaches because attackers seek to
obtain information without proper authorization. Integrity refers to “the guarantee 
that the message that is sent is the same as the message received and that the message 
is not altered in transit” . . . . Availability refers to “the guarantee that information 
84. NERC Grid Resilience Comments, supra note 58, at 5–6. 
85. The appropriate definition of energy sector resiliency is beyond this Article’s scope.
86. David M. Driesen, The Economic Dynamics of Environmental Law: Cost-Benefit
Analysis, Emissions Trading, and Priority-Setting, 31 B.C. ENVTL. AFF.L. REV. 501, 510 (2004). 
87. Jeff Kosseff, Defining Cybersecurity Law, 103 IOWA L. REV. 985, 995 (2018). 
111
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will be available to the consumer in a timely and uninterrupted manner when it is
needed regardless of [the] location of the user.” A [Distributed Denial of Service]
attack that knocks a popular website offline, for example, is an attack on that site’s 
availability.88 
The “CIA Triad” forms a lens through which cybersecurity risks and goals 
are viewed. This lens, like glasses that need a prescription update, embeds
a hacker focus that underplays risks from parties who operate the communications 
systems upon which the organization depends.  The hacker focus is a crucial
component of this framework. It becomes evident in cybersecurity tests,
such as the DOE’s Idaho National Laboratory 2007 simulation of a cyber-
attack on an energy facility which, “exploited a vulnerability at the facility
by altering the timing of a diesel generator’s circuit breakers, causing thick
smoke to rise from the plant.”89 
Cybersecurity strategies to date sought to prevent cyber-attacks by
disconnecting, “critical elements of the electricity industry’s infrastructure” 
through air-gaps and isolation.90  Amy Stein argues that internet isolation 
strategies are, “a problematic suggestion as the smart grid initiatives seek
to further interconnect the grid.”91  Over the past decade, Energy-Internet 
integration has gone beyond smart meters and extended the smart grid to
behind the meter customer-side resources such as thermostats, batteries,
and solar systems. Such integration enables new modes of planning, operating, 
and repairing the electric grid. It necessarily enables DER visibility that
facilities grid operation, dispatch, and adjustments to maintain voltage, frequency,
and other grid services. Visibility and control are critical to the energy sector
as failures in one part of the energy system can lead to cascading energy
reliability issues and blackout.92 Energy-Internet integration is imperative
for the vigilant and adaptive cybersecurity necessary to protect grid reliability
and safety.
B. Cybersecurity Governance: Mandates, Cooperation, and 
Incentive/Risk-Based Models 
Cybersecurity governance debates have focused on whether incentive 
and risk-based cooperative models are preferable to government mandates. 
Jeff Kosseff argues for a cybersecurity legal framework that combines
penalties and incentives to encourage companies to adopt cybersecurity
safeguards, rather than one based, “entirely of coercion or entirely of 
88. Id. (footnotes omitted).
89. Stein, supra note 55, at 1230–31. 
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See, e.g., Chih-Che Sun, Adam Hahn, & Chen-Ching Liu, Cyber Security of a Power 
Grid: State-of-the-Art, 99 ELEC. POWER & ENERGY SYS. 45, 45–56 (2018). 
112
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cooperation.”93 Kosseff observed that a “regulatory model based on coercion
and deterrence” assumes robust government oversight through, “extensive
government monitoring and inspections coupled with penalties for observed 
violations.”94 Such a system requires penalties for noncompliance sufficient
to encourage investment in compliance, even when doing so required firms 
to “forego potential revenue.”95 
John J. Chung characterizes cybersecurity protection of Critical Infrastructure 
as a “public good,” observing that, “[i]n general, public goods are things
or situations that provide a widespread benefit available to all,” but “a 
market economy faces inherent barriers to providing public goods.”96  “[A]ny
person providing a public good is unable to capture the full economic benefit 
or profit of providing the good,” creating, “little economic or profit incentive 
to do so, which results in the less than optimal supply of such goods.”97 
Chung argues, “[m]any companies that operate critical infrastructure
tend to underinvest in cyber-defense because of negative externalities,
positive externalities, free riding, and public goods problems—the same 
sorts of challenges the modern administrative state encounters in a variety
of other contexts.”98 He further contends that, “[t]he market, by itself, is 
unable to provide sufficient incentives for an optimal amount of spending 
on cybersecurity.”99  Notably, Chung is not alone in his contentions.
Michael Garcia, David Forscey, and Timothy Blute contend, “the core 
challenge for state cybersecurity professionals today is not technical; the 
cutting edge of cybersecurity is governance.”100  They define governance
as the, “formal and informal institutions that [influence how] a group of people 
determine what to decide, how to decide, and who shall decide.”101 They
further note that in, “academic literature and corporate guidelines, cybersecurity
governance is commonly described as the process through which humans
understand organizational risk, prioritize resources, and establish procedures
93. Kosseff, supra note 87, at 1006. 
94. Id. at 1001–02. 
95. Id. at 1002. 
96. John J. Chung, Critical Infrastructure, Cybersecurity, and Market Failure, 96 OR.
L. REV. 441, 451 (2018). 
97. Id.
98. Id. at 470. 
99. Id. 
100. Michael Garcia, David Forscey, Timothy Blute, Beyond the Network: A Holistic 
Perspective on State Cybersecurity Governance, 96 NEB. L. REV. 252, 253–54 (2017). 
101. Id. at 257. 
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to erect technical defenses against computer-based attacks.”102  However, 
cybersecurity governance policies must also resist silos and repetition of 
paradigms tailored to past risks. Adaptive cybersecurity governance must
further consider risks introduced by governance of other sectors. Regulation or
forbearance from regulation of ISPs who transmit data critical infrastructure
uses to execute its functions introduces cybersecurity risks that should be 
considered in regulatory decision-making and energy system governance 
and operation.
Beyond those mentioned above, Garcia, Forscey, and Blute argue for 
an, “expansive role for states in the broader cybersecurity ecosystem, one
that obligates state officials to do more than defend state networks.”103 
They contend, “[s]tates have a fundamental responsibility to protect constituents, 
including interstate businesses, from day-to-day cyber attacks and to prepare 
public and private institutions for a widespread cyber disruption.”104 
The CPUC’s 2012 staff report, Cybersecurity and the Evolving Role of 
State Regulation; How it Impacts the California Public Utilities Commission,
observed that, “[a]s the State moves forward with grid modernization, utilities
must design and implement both cyber and physical security policies that
protect public safety, enhance the reliability and resiliency of the grid and 
protect customer privacy from cyber threats, and do so cost-effectively.”105 
In 2016, the CPUC and the California Governor’s Office of Emergency 
Services (Cal OES), “entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) . . .
to coordinate agency efforts in assuring the safety and reliability of utility 
systems from cyber security threats.”106 This level of state coordination,
“requires [CPUC] to focus not just on physical security and system resiliency/
safety of the utility system, but also on cyber threats, because, as reliance
on digital technology in utility systems continues to increase, the cyber  
security of network assets is more critical than ever.”107 In 2017, the CPUC
committed to implementing a Staff Cybersecurity Group strategy designed to
address the Risk Management pillar of its safety action plan.108 
States are increasingly recognizing the importance of cybersecurity to 
energy and other utilities under their jurisdiction. The federalist system 
102. Id. at 254. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. 
105. CPUC Staff Report, Cybersecurity and the Evolving Role of the States, supra note
18, at iv.
106. Id. at 5. 
107. Id.
108. CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, 2017 UPDATE, SAFETY ACTION PLAN AND REGULATORY
STRATEGY, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SAFETY POLICY STATEMENT 2 (2017), http://www.
cpuc.ca.gov/uploadedFiles/CPUCWebsite/Content/Safety/Other/2017_Safety_Action_Plan.pdf
[https://perma.cc/27GM-VH7E] [hereinafter CPUC, 2017 Safety Action Plan Update].
114
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of the United States reserves police power to the states to, “legislate with
regard to protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all
persons.”109 The CPUC’s comments opposing net neutrality’s repeal stressed 
the statutory obligations of CPUC and California’s utilities, “to protect 
the safety and health of the public. Protection of public safety is a core
exercise of a state’s police power.”110 States, the federal government, and
the energy sector must analyze cybersecurity threats to energy and other 
critical infrastructure posed by FCC’s repeal of net neutrality rules. 
V. FEDERAL CYBERSECURITY MANDATES FOR THE ENERGY SECTOR 
AND STATE LAW ENERGY SECTOR RELIABILITY AND 
SAFETY DUTIES 
A. Recognizing and Protecting Critical Infrastructure 
Laws recognizing the importance of critical infrastructure—including 
energy, water, communications, national security, health care, and other
economic sectors—served as the foundation for mandatory energy sector
cybersecurity rules. Congress’ 2001 adoption of CIPA expressed United
States policy, “that any physical or virtual disruption of the operation of the
critical infrastructures of the United States be rare, brief, geographically
limited in effect, manageable, and minimally detrimental to the economy,
human and government services, and national security of the United States.”111 
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 established the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) as the coordinator to protect computer systems
that support critical infrastructure.112  The Act tasks DHS with: (1) developing
a comprehensive national plan for securing the key resources and critical
infrastructure of the United States; (2) recommending measures to protect
109. Sandoval, supra note 6, at 68 (citing Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006)). 
110. CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, Comments, In the Matter of Restoring Internet
Freedom, WC Docket No. 17-108, at 5, https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/107172199528427/WC%
20Docket%20No.%2017-108%20CPUC%20Comments%20on%20Restoring%20Internet
%20Freedom.pdf [https://perma.cc/52QC-MVA9] [hereinafter CPUC, Comments, In the
Matter of Restoring Internet Freedom]. Police power is an attribute of a state’s sovereignty 
and is an essential element of the power to govern, which is reserved to the states. 72 AM.
JUR. 2d States, etc. § 21.
111. Sandoval, supra note 6, at 8 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 5195c(e)). 
112. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296 (2002); GOV’T ACCT. OFF. 
(GAO), CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 
FACES CHALLENGES IN FULFILLING CYBERSECURITY RESPONSIBILITIES (2005) [hereinafter,
GAO, Critical Infrastructure Protection].
115
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key resources and critical infrastructure of the United States; and (3)
disseminating, as appropriate, information to assist in the deterrence, prevention, 
preemption of, or response to terrorist attacks.113 Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7) designates federal agencies as lead points
for critical infrastructure sectors, and designates the DOE as the lead for 
the energy sector including electricity and oil and natural gas.114 
President George W. Bush’s 2003 report, The National Strategy to
Secure Cyberspace, built on CIPA’s requirements to protect the cyber and
physical security of critical infrastructure.115  Per the report, American,  
“critical infrastructures are composed of public and private institutions in
the sectors of agriculture, food, water, public health, emergency services,
government, defense industrial base, information and telecommunications, 
energy, transportation, banking and finance, chemicals and hazardous 
materials, and postal and shipping.”116 The report further observed that,
“[c]yberspace is their nervous system—the control system of our country.”117 
The report recommended public-private partnerships to foster cybersecurity,
specifically arguing, “[i]n general, the private sector is best equipped and
structured to respond to an evolving cyber threat.”118 
Private sector initiatives, public-private partnerships, and market driven
approaches to cybersecurity leave incentive and investment gaps in cyber 
protection. Market participants, suppliers, insiders, or third parties (including
nation-states and adversaries with different incentives or regulatory constructs)
may seek to exploit these gaps to increase profits or for ulterior motives.
Scholars Eldar Haber and Tal Zarsky argue, “it is undisputable that [critical
infrastructures] require proactive protection from cyber attacks” and that 
“a market-based approach, which has many advantages, cannot provide 
adequate protection on its own. Providing mere ex post incentives are also 
insufficient.”119 Haber and Zarsky describe, “three central failings of the
market-based approach: inadequate information sharing, lack of knowledge
transfers, and underinvestment.”120 They contend, “the current U.S. CIP 
approach is misguided and should be thoroughly reexamined,” arguing for 
113. GAO, Critical Infrastructure Protection, supra note 112, at 18–19. 
114. Id. at 20. 
115. The White House, NATIONAL STRATEGY TO SECURE CYBERSPACE 1 (2003) https://
www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/National%20Strategy%20to%20Secure%20Cyberspace
.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ZMC-55NE].
116. Id. at vii. 
117. Id.
118. Id. at ix.
119. Eldar Haber & Tal Zarsky, Cybersecurity for Infrastructure: A Critical Analysis, 44 
FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 516, 573 (2018). 
120. Id. (emphasis in original). 
116
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a larger role of the states in CIP protection, and a centralized agency for CIP
protection.”121 
Despite such consequential effects of lackluster cybersecurity frameworks, 
cybersecurity remains voluntary for all critical infrastructure sectors except 
for the FERC-jurisdictional energy sector. This Article recommends that the 
energy sector, state public utility commissions and legislatures evaluate
whether cybersecurity should be mandatory for the portions of the energy 
sector under state jurisdiction.  Such a review should also examine state 
cybersecurity governance to achieve safe and reliable utility service. For the
FERC-jurisdictional energy sector, the EPAct of 2005 made cyber security 
mandatory and subject to FERC enforcement. 
B. Mandatory Cybersecurity for the Energy Sector 
Integration of communications and information technology, including
the internet, into the electric sector renders cybersecurity crucial to public 
safety, energy reliability, and national security. The Government Accounting 
Office observed in 2005 that, “[s]ince September 11, 2001, the critical link 
between cyberspace and physical space has been increasingly recognized.”122 
In March 2005, “security consultants within the electric industry reported
that hackers were targeting the U.S. electric power grid and had gained access
to U.S. utilities’ electronic control systems.”123 Nonetheless, thirteen years
later, the energy sector is still fending off hackers. 
Mandatory reliability and cybersecurity rules were spurred in large part 
by the 2003 Eastern blackout that left over 50 million Americans and
portions of Ontario Canada without electricity for up to four days, with 
rolling blackouts for one week in Ontario.124  Authorities identified a tree 
which hit a line in Ohio as the initial cause of the blackout.125 Lack of system
and resource visibility, grid operator situational awareness, and control 
capabilities allowed a local outage to transform into a cascading outage that
121. Id.
122. GAO, Critical Infrastructure Protection, supra note 112, at 14. 
123.  Id. at 11. 
124. U.S.CANADAPOWER OUTAGE TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT ON THEAUGUST 14,2003
BLACKOUT IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA, CAUSES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1 (2004),
http://eta-publications.lbl.gov/sites/default/files/2003-blackout-us-canada.pdf [http://perma.cc/
E28P-BFFF].
125. Id. at 107–08. 
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blacked out power to millions.126 Such incidents are precisely the type that
necessitate stronger cybersecurity standards, oversight, and enforcement. 
Aptly, the EPAct charged FERC with establishing and enforcing mandatory 
cybersecurity and reliability standards.127 EPAct defines “reliability standard”
as a requirement, approved by FERC under the Act, “to provide for reliable 
operation of the bulk-power system,” including, “requirements for the
operation of existing bulk-power system facilities, including cybersecurity 
protection.”128 FERC-jurisdictional responsible entities may be ordered to
pay fines up to $1 million per day per violation.129 NERC CIP rules hold
responsible entities accountable for supply chain cybersecurity. 
EPAct defines a “cybersecurity incident” as, “a malicious act or suspicious
event that disrupts, or was an attempt to disrupt, the operation of those 
programmable electronic devices and communication networks including
hardware, software and data that are essential to the reliable operation of 
the bulk power system.”130 This definition does not limit cybersecurity incidents
to those done maliciously, but focuses on the operational consequences of
disruption to reliable BES operation like, for example, the 2003 mass blackout 
in the United States and Canada. 
Federal and state regulatory decisions to invest billions to make the
energy grid smart through ICT, including the internet, raised the imperative
of energy sector cybersecurity. The Energy Independence and Security Act
of 2007 (EISA) signed by President George W. Bush spurred federal “smart
grid” policies.131 NIST defined the smart grid as the, “two-way flow of 
electricity and information to create an automated, widely distributed energy
delivery network.”132  The FCC’s 2010 National Broadband Plan emphasized,
“[c]ommunications are fundamental to all aspects of the smart grid, including
generation, transmission, distribution and consumption.”133  ICT including
the internet infuses visibility and control into the energy ecosystem, thereby
unlocking new energy management and resource options. 
126. Id.
127. EPAct, supra note 12. 
128.  Id. 
129. NERC, NERC CIP Compliance, supra note 16; Zhen Zhang, Cybersecurity 
Policy for the Electricity Sector: The First Step to Protecting Our Critical Infrastructure from
Cyber Threats, 19 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 319, 345 (2013). 
130. EPAct, supra note 12. 
131. Sandoval, supra note 6, at 16 (citing Pub. L. No. 110-140, 121 Stat. 1492 (2007) 
(The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA)). 
132. Id. (citing FCC, CONNECTING AMERICA, THE NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN 249 
(2010), https://transition.fcc.gov/national-broadband-plan/national-broadband-plan.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/43RZ-6PRX] (citing ELEC. POWER RES. INST. (EPRI), REPORT TO NIST ON THE
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FERC-jurisdictional energy is the only critical infrastructure sector subject 
to mandatory federal cybersecurity standards. Other sectors may voluntarily
adopt cybersecurity standards.134 Statutory mandates for cybersecurity are a
necessary correlate to federal and state reliability duties. To reap the benefits 
of ICT investment in energy systems, cybersecurity vulnerabilities must 
address the changing nature and face of cyber-threats. 
C. NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP)
Cybersecurity Standards 
Following NERC’s formation in 2006, NERC developed proposals and 
convened workshops that led to the CIP series of standards. In January
2008, FERC Order 706 approved CIP version I which also directed NERC 
to develop new CIP rules not subject to “reasonable business judgment” 
and “acceptance of risk” standards.135 FERC required removal of “reasonable
business judgment” and “acceptance of risk” standards recognizing, “the
risk involved in the CIP standards, as well as all NERC standards, is risk 
to the Bulk Electric System, not to the organization itself. No organization 
can decide to accept risk on behalf of the whole BES.”136 This standard 
shift recognized the societal values CIP rules seek to protect. Those values 
take precedence over reasonable business judgment or firm risk-assessment
and risk-taking behavior. Regulated entities may not prioritize return-
on-investment or assess electric reliability risks as a cost of doing business in
place of complying with CIP rules and standards. 
The electric grid’s interconnected nature and need for balance between
energy demand and supply render cybersecurity risks a threat to the entire
electric grid, including the people it serves. The electric system is
“interconnected and dynamic,” and the physics of energy distribution require 
observance of electrical stability limits.137 The United States-Canadian
report on the 2003 blackout observed that electric grid, “[s]tability problems
134. Zhang, supra note 129, at 366 (citing U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO
08-1075R, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY: FEDERAL LAWS, REGULATIONS, AND MANDATORY 
STANDARDS FOR SECURING PRIVATE SECTOR INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SYSTEMS AND
DATA IN CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECTORS 2 (2008)). 
135. Order No. 706, Mandatory Reliability Standards for Critical Infrastructure
Protection, 122 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,040 (2008) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. Pt. 40).
136. TOM ALRICH’S BLOG, An (Impressionistic) History of NERC CIP (Jan. 1, 2018), 
http://tomalrichblog.blogspot.com/2018/01/an-impressionistic-history-of-nerc-cip.html
[https://perma.cc/E28P-BFFF].
137. U.S. CANADA POWER OUTAGE TASK FORCE, supra note 124, at 8.
119
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can develop very quickly—in just a few cycles (a cycle is 1/60th of a second)
—or more slowly, over seconds or minutes.”138 The 2003 outage report further
emphasized “[t]he main concern is to ensure that generation dispatch and
the resulting power flows and voltages are such that the system is stable at all
times” that energy load (demand) matches energy supply.139 
Under NERC CIP-002, a responsible operator must, “identify critical cyber 
assets.”140 NERC CIP-003 requires power system operators to, “create security 
policies to protect all critical cyber assets.”141 CIP-004 requires employee
management and training, CIP-005 requires Electronic Security Perimeters, 
and CIP-006 requires physical security of BES assets.142  NERC CIP-007 
requires, “a network administrator or a responsible entity to ensure that any
changes which might occur during a software update or installation of a
security patch doesn’t affect the overall operations and performance of the 
critical cyber assets.”143 CIP-008 requires responsible entities to report a
cybersecurity incident to the Electricity Sector Information Sharing and 
Analysis Center,144 and CIP-009, “requires a recovery plan, the goal of which
is to ensure the least possible impact and interruption on system performance.”145 
Additionally, “CIP-005 (Electronic Security Perimeters) and CIP-006
(Physical Security) protect cyber assets from unauthorized intrusions with
electronic and physical tools.”146  These NERC rules ultimately require 
responsible entities to, “control access to critical assets via monitoring
devices to detect and alert personnel of attempted or actual unauthorized 
access.”147 Responsible entities must also conduct an annual vulnerability 
assessment, including reviewing passwords and network management, 
and card keys or special locks to protect physical security.148 
In 2014, NERC promulgated, “[CIP] guidelines referred to as CIP V5,
which became binding in July 2016.”149 The standards apply to registered
entities according to the function they perform within that system.150  These
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. BEYOND SECURITY, NERC-CIP Network Security Requirements, https://www.
beyondsecurity.com/vulnerability_assessment_requirements_nerc-cip.html [https://perma.cc/
QK23-FSZ9] [hereinafter NERC-CIP, BEYOND SECURITY].
141. Id.
142. Zhang, supra note 129, at 347. 
143. BEYOND SECURITY, supra note 140. 
144. Zhang, supra note 129, at 349. 
145. Id.
146. Id. at 348. 
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Stein, supra note 55, at 1232; Richard Raysman et al., The NIST Cybersecurity 
Framework, PRAC. L. PRAC. NOTE 5-599-6825 [hereinafter NIST Cybersecurity Framework].
150. Susan J. Court, Federal Cyber-Security Law and Policy: The Role of the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission A Paper Prepared for the 2014 Law + Informatics Symposium
120
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referenced, “functions include: Balancing Authority, Distribution Provider,
Generator Owner, Generator Operator, Interchange Authority, Load Serving
Entity, Planning Authority, Purchasing Selling Entity, Reliability Coordinator,
Resource Planner, Reserve Sharing Group, Transmission Owner, Transmission
Operator, Transmission Planner, and Transmission Service Provider.”151 
On January 21, 2016, FERC Order No. 822 approved seven CIP Reliability 
Standards: CIP-003-6 (Security Management Controls), CIP-004-6 (Personnel 
and Training), CIP-006-6 (Physical Security of BES Cyber Systems),
CIP-007-6 (Systems Security Management), CIP-009-6 (Recovery Plans
for BES Cyber Systems), CIP-010-2 (Configuration Change Management 
and Vulnerability Assessments), and CIP-011-2 (Information Protection).152 
FERC Order No. 829, adopted on July 21, 2016, directed NERC, “to 
develop a new or modified Reliability Standard that addresses supply chain
risk management for industrial control system hardware, software, and 
computing and networking services associated with bulk electric system
operations.”153 The new standard aimed to, “mitigate the risk of a cybersecurity 
incident affecting the reliable operation of the Bulk-Power System.” 
NERC CIP-013-1 is software and vendor equipment-focused, a cybersecurity 
lens that may obscure risks from ISPs and the communications system
which supplies the electric sector. CIP-013-1 requires responsible entities 
to report supply chain risks to the industry.154 FERC ordered NERC and
the Critical Infrastructure Protection Committee (CIPC), “to partner with 
National Laboratory group to conduct current equipment supply chain risk
evaluation.”155 Supply chain plans must identify and assess, “BES risk
from vendor products and services resulting from procuring and installing
vendor equipment and software, and transitions between vendors.”156  FERC 
also directed NERC to require responsible entities to implement controls 
on Cyber Defense Strategies and Responsibilities for Industry, 41 N. KY. L. REV. 437, 443 
(2014).
151. Id.
152. FERC Order No. 843, supra note 57, at 4.
153. Order No. 829, Revised Critical Infrastructure Protection Reliability Standards, 
156 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,050 (2016). 
154. TOBIAS WHITNEY, NERC, CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION, SUPPLY CHAIN 
UPDATE 12(2008), https://www.nerc.com/pa/comp/Supply%20Chain%20Webinars%20DL/ 
Supply%20Chain%20Webinar.pdf [https://perma.cc/C8HL-MMTK].
155. Id. at 15. 
156. Id.
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to mitigate the risk of malicious code that could result from third-party 
transient electronic devices under Reliability Standard CIP-003-7.157 
FERC Order 843, adopted in 2018, expressed concern that CIP-003-
7 contained a reliability gap in the absence of requirements for the responsible 
entity to: (1) mitigate any malicious code found during the third-party
review(s); or (2) take reasonable steps to mitigate the risks of third party 
malicious code on its systems, if an arrangement cannot be made for the
third-party to do so.158 FERC observed that without such obligations responsible
entities could, “without compliance consequences, simply accept the risk 
of deficient third-party transient electronic device management practices.”159 
In 2018, FERC updated CIP supply chain cybersecurity standards to 
address, “four objectives set forth in Order No. 829: (1) software integrity
and authenticity; (2) vendor remote access; (3) information system planning; 
and (4) vendor risk management and procurement controls.”160  FERC  
observed that while suppliers benefit the energy sector, “the global supply 
chain also enables opportunities for adversaries to directly or indirectly affect 
the management or operations of companies that may result in risks to end
users.”161 In the 2018 Rulemaking, FERC listed examples of supply chain risks
such as, “the insertion of counterfeits, unauthorized production, tampering,
theft, or insertion of malicious software, as well as poor manufacturing 
and development practices.”162 FERC’s supply chain risk examples reflect a
hacker-focus that obscures systemic supply chain risks such as those arising
from ISP governance and net neutrality repeal. 
D. Protecting Critical Infrastructure Protection Through PPD-21, 2013 
President Obama’s 2013 Presidential Executive Order, PPD-21, directed 
federal agencies to support critical infrastructure cyber and physical security, 
consistent with CIPA’s mandates.163  PPD-21 identifies, “energy and
communications systems as uniquely critical due to the enabling functions 
157. FERC Order No. 843, supra note 57, at 39. 
158. Id. at 19. 
159. Id. at 19–20 (citing Order No. 706, 122 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,040 at P 150 (2006) (rejecting
the concept of acceptance of risk in the CIP Reliability Standards)). 
160. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Supply Chain Risk Mgmt. Reliability Standards, 
162 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,044 at P 6 (2018).
161. Id. at 2. 
162. Id.
163. Sandoval, supra note 6, at 4–5 (citing THE WHITE HOUSE, Presidential Policy
Directive—Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience (PPD-21) (Feb. 12, 2013), https://
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/02/12/presidential-policy-directive-
critical-infrastructure-security-and-resil [https://perma.cc/RB88-HZXZ]; DEPT. OF HOMELAND
SECURITY, Critical Infrastructure Sectors, https://www.dhs.gov/critical-infrastructure-sectors
[https://perma.cc/S65Y-3STL] [hereinafter PPD-21]).
122
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they provide across all critical infrastructure sectors.”164  PPD-21 specifically
designated the following sixteen sectors “critical infrastructure”: Chemical;
Commercial Facilities; Communications; Critical Manufacturing; Dams;
Defense-Industrial Base; Emergency Services; Energy; Financial Services; 
Food and Agriculture; Government Facilities; Healthcare and Public Health; 
Information Technology; Nuclear Reactors, Materials and Water; Transportation
Systems; Water and Wastewater Systems.165 PPD-21 identifies, “energy
and communications systems as uniquely critical due to the enabling functions 
they provide across all critical infrastructure sectors.”166 Accordingly, PPD-
21 directed the Secretary of Homeland Security to, “develop situational 
awareness capability for critical infrastructure, requiring action to address 
evolving threats and consequences.”167 PPD-21 requires  DHS response  to  
“evolving threats and consequences,”168 anticipating that the nature, sources, 
and results of cyber threats will change. 
In 2013, concurrent with the issuance of PPD-21, President Obama 
promulgated Executive Order 13636, Improving Critical Infrastructure 
Cybersecurity,169 which directed, “the U.S. Department of Commerce’s
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to work with
stakeholders and develop a voluntary framework for reducing cyber risks 
to critical infrastructure.”170 Executive Order 13636 requires cybersecurity
policy coordination across government agencies, cybersecurity information
sharing between the government and industry.171 It also requires, “[r]egulatory 
agencies to: assess their cybersecurity regulations against the Framework 
[for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity] once developed; and 
create a voluntary program to support adoption of the Framework.”172 
NIST’s Cybersecurity Framework set a floor for cybersecurity efforts.
Ongoing evaluation is necessary to address new cybersecurity risks such as
ISP network management practices. The FCC’s net neutrality repeal permits
ISPs to enter into deals to prioritize certain internet traffic based on opaque
paid priority deals, even if doing so slows other internet traffic. Net
164.  Sandoval, supra note 6, at 11 (citing PPD-21, supra note 163). 
165.  PPD-21, supra note 163. 
166.  Id. 
167.  Id. 
168.  Id. 
169.  78 Fed. Reg. 11739, 2013 WL 596302 (Pres.) (July 12, 2013). 
170.  NIST Cybersecurity Framework, supra note 149. 
171.  Id.; 78 Fed. Reg. 11739, 2013 WL 596302 (Pres.) (July 12, 2013). 
172.  NIST Cybersecurity Framework, supra note 149. 
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neutrality repeal is an example of an evolving threat NIST’s Cybersecurity 
Framework underestimates. 
E. NIST Cybersecurity Framework
Prior to Executive Order 13636, President Obama issued an Executive
Order in February 2013 directing NIST to create a cybersecurity framework 
to reduce cyber risks to critical infrastructure, “incorporating voluntary 
consensus standards and industry best practices to the fullest extent
possible.”173 One year later, on February 12, 2014, NIST issued the Framework 
for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity. NIST’s Cybersecurity 
Framework presents a voluntary, “risk-based approach to cybersecurity
that provides a methodology for any organization to develop an information 
security program but does not prescribe concrete security controls.”174 
NIST’s Framework defined risk management as, “the ongoing process of
identifying, assessing, and responding to risk.”175 
The NIST Cybersecurity Framework suggests a core set of activities and 
outcomes to mitigate cybersecurity threats: Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, 
Recover.176 The Framework has been widely adopted and is often cited 
as the “‘standard’ for ‘due diligence.’”177 Several ISOs and RTOs stated
in their FERC Resiliency and Reliability docket comments that they comply
with NIST’s Framework.178  Scott J. Shackelford et al.,  argue the Framework’s
widespread adoption, “is a necessary but not sufficient condition to boosting
U.S. CI protection across a range of CI providers with different threat 
profiles.”179 The Framework is process-oriented and emphasizes security 
incident detection response, and recovery.180 NIST’s Framework provides
173. The White House, Fact Sheet: Cyberspace Policy Review: Assuring a Trusted and 
Resilient Information and Communications Infrastructure (May 29, 2009), https://fas.org/ 
irp/news/2009/05/cyber-fs.html [https://perma.cc/FX33-33C4]. 
174. NIST Cybersecurity Framework, supra note 149. 
175.  Id. at 4. 
176. Id. at 3. 
177. See, e.g., Scott J. Shackelford et al., From Russia with Love: Understanding the
Russian Cyber Threat to U.S. Critical Infrastructure and What to Do About It, 96 NEB. L.
REV. 320, 330 (2017).
178. See, e.g., PJM, FERC Grid Resilience Comments, supra note 54, at 36. 
179. Shackelford et al., supra note 177, at 332–33. 
124
180. NIST Cybersecurity Framework, supra note 149. See also Scott J. Shackelford 
et. al., Bottoms Up: A Comparison of “Voluntary” Cybersecurity Frameworks, 16 U.C. DAVIS
BUS. L.J. 217, 221–22 (2016) (describing criticism of the NIST framework as reactive and 
not sufficiently proactive) (citing Taylor Armerding, NIST’s Finalized Cybersecurity Framework 
Receives Mixed Reviews, CSO (Jan. 31, 2014), http://www.csoonline.com/article/2134338/
security-leadership/nist-s-finalized-cybersecurity-framework-receives-mixed-reviews.html. For
more on the benefits of a more proactive approach to cybersecurity, see Amanda N. Craig
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“standards, guidelines, and practices to encourage CIP, mainly through 
public-private partnerships,” but does not propose sector-specific rules or
requirements.181 As noted, NIST’s Framework has been characterized as
a “gold standard” or standard for due diligence for cybersecurity practices 
“litigation or [for] a regulatory investigation.”182 Accordingly, President
Trump issued an Executive Order in 2017 requiring all federal agencies 
to comply with NIST’s Cybersecurity Framework.183  Still, NIST Framework
compliance does not provide a safe harbor to demonstrate compliance
with FERC or NERC cybersecurity responsibilities. As discussed below,
the NIST Framework may unduly focus on incidents or a cycle of repeated
attacks, and miss new threats such as those arising from the net neutrality 
repeal.
F. Cybersecurity Information Sharing and Reliability Standards
The Energy Modernization Act, subsequent NERC and FERC rules, and
federal law all permit and encourage information sharing between market 
participants about cybersecurity threats. The Cybersecurity Act of 2015
exempted from antitrust scrutiny private entity sharing about, “digital 
security risks and potential attacks.”184 This Act effectively removed legal
barriers to information sharing between competitors to promote proactive 
responses to cybersecurity threats. The Cybersecurity Act of 2015 also
encourages, “the private sector and federal government to work together 
to identify and defend against cybersecurity threats.”185 One example of 
the Act’s encouraged information sharing includes e-mail-based “NERC 
et al., Proactive Cybersecurity: A Comparative Industry and Regulatory Analysis, 52 AM. 
BUS  . L.J. 721 (2015)). 
181. Eldar Haber & Tal Zarsky, Cybersecurity for Infrastructure: A Critical Analysis, 44 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 515, 531 (2017). 
182. Scott J. Shackelford et al., When Toasters Attack: A Polycentric Approach to 
Enhancing the “Security of Things”, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 415, 442 (2017); Justin (Gus) 
Hurwitz, Cyberensuring Security, 49 CONN. L. REV. 1495, 1504–05 (2017) (characterizing 
the NIST’s process-oriented framework as the “gold-standard” model for cybersecurity). 
183. Presidential Executive Order on Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal Networks 
and Critical Infrastructure, Exec. Order No. 13,800 § 1(c)(ii), 82 Fed. Reg. 22,391, 22,391–93
(May 11, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-executive-
orderstrengthening-cybersecurity-federal-networks-critical-infrastructure/ [https://perma.cc/
8DWW-M7WS] [hereinafter President Trump Executive Order 13,800 on Cybersecurity];
William McGeveran, The Duty of Data Security, 103 MINN. L. REV. 1135, 1160 (2019). 
184. Stein, supra note 55, at 1231–32; Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. 
L. No. 114–113, 129 Stat. 2242, 2244. 
185. Kosseff, supra note 87, at 1006. 
125
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alerts” that share information among the energy sector about cyber vulnerabilities, 
threats, and attacks.
In 2017, President Trump issued an Executive Order on Cybersecurity
& Critical Infrastructure which declared, “the policy of the executive branch
to promote an open, interoperable, reliable, and secure internet that fosters 
efficiency, innovation, communication, and economic prosperity, while 
respecting privacy and guarding against disruption, fraud, and theft.”186 
Notably, neither the FCC nor FERC cited this Executive Order in the FCC’s 
Internet Freedom Order repealing net neutrality, or in the FERC Grid
Resiliency docket.  In fact, FERC continues to adopt cybersecurity standards 
that are largely divorced from other federal policies regarding internet and
ISP governance. 
For example, FERC Order 848 adopted Cyber Security Incident Reporting 
Reliability Standards in July 2018.187 These reporting requirements promote
information sharing to increase industry, security, and regulatory ability 
to detect and react to cyber incidents. As such, FERC’s reporting requirements 
have largely focused on incidents. FERC, state regulators, and the energy
sector must recognize systemic threats to cybersecurity such as those posed
by ISPs unbridled from FCC net neutrality regulation. 
G. Cybersecurity and State PUC Initiatives 
In 2016, the Michigan Public Service Commission adopted a proceeding 
on its own motion to, “review issues concerning cybersecurity and the
effective protection of utility infrastructure.”188  The State of New York’s
Reforming Energy Vision (REV) proceeding noted the, “[DOE’s] Office 
of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability implemented the Cybersecurity
for Energy Delivery Systems (CEDS) program to develop cybersecurity
solutions for energy delivery systems. It emphasizes collaboration among
governments, industry and others to address the unique environment of 
energy delivery systems.”189 REV relies on federal cybersecurity programs, 
while several other states are analyzing whether to adopt their own cybersecurity
186. President Trump Executive Order 13,800 on Cybersecurity, supra note 183. 
187. Order No. 848, Cyber Security Incident Reporting Reliability Standards, 164
F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,033 (2018). 
188. MICH. PUB. SERV. COMM’N, CASE NO. U-18203, IN THE MATTER OF REVIEW ISSUES 
CONCERNING CYBERSECURITY AND THE EFFECTIVE PROTECTION OF UTILITY INFRASTRUCTURE,
ON THE COMMISSION’S OWN MOTION (2016), 2016 WL 6996044.
189. N.Y. PUB. SERV. COMM’N, CASE 14-M-0101, PROCEEDING ON MOTION OF THE
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rules and initiatives. Accordingly, the State of Maryland in 2015 created
a Cybersecurity Council to:
[C]onduct risk assessments on local infrastructure that federal law or Executive 
Order 13636 do not cover; assist infrastructure entities not covered by Executive 
Order 13636 in complying with federal cybersecurity guidance; help private sector
cybersecurity businesses in adopting, adapting, and implementing the Framework;
and recommend strategic planning measures and any necessary legislative changes.190 
In February 2017, Idaho’s Governor issued Executive Order No. 2017-02, 
which directed state agencies to immediately adopt and implement NIST’s
Cybersecurity Framework.191 
Further, the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) issued a
staff report on cybersecurity in 2012 which emphasized that, “NERC-CIP”
primarily covers only generation and transmission assets that qualify as
“critical assets” or “critical cyber-assets.”192 Distribution level assets such 
as advanced meters and DERS, “do not fall under NERC-CIP but can have 
a major impact on grid reliability, safety and customer privacy.”193 In 2012, 
estimates ranged that, “from 80 percent to over 90 percent of grid assets
are outside NERC-CIP’s scope.”194 The CPUC’s 2012 report emphasized
that, “NERC-CIP is primarily a compliance-based policy. Compliance is
an important component of addressing cybersecurity, but it is not enough 
to ensure that the rapidly evolving risks are adequately considered and 
acted upon effectively.”195 Then in 2017, the CPUC committed to implementing 
a Staff Cybersecurity Group to address the Risk Management pillar of its
safety action plan.196 State-level cybersecurity policies should be calibrated 
to state reliability, safety, environmental, rate, and other responsibilities
for the state’s energy jurisdiction. 
Illinois Public Utilities Commission (PUC) Commissioner Sherina Maye 
Edwards observed that “many state regulators are increasing their oversight
and involvement, using stakeholder working groups, docketed cybersecurity
rulemakings, advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) deployment proceedings, 
190. MD. CODE ANN., ST. GOV’T § 9-2901 (West 2018). 
191. NIST Cybersecurity Framework, supra note 149. 
192. CPUC Staff Report, Cybersecurity and the Evolving Role of the States, supra




196. CPUC, 2017 Safety Action Plan Update, supra note 108, at 2.
127
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rate cases, audits and reporting requirements.”197 Commissioner Edwards
offered several exemplars, including the Pennsylvania PUC which adopted
rules that required its regulated utilities to develop continuity plans related
to cybersecurity, emergency response, physical security, and business.
And “[i]n 2015, the Missouri Public Service Commission opened a docket 
to examine cybersecurity and physical infrastructure security issues. It
requires verbal reporting of ‘cybersecurity or infrastructure security events 
that affect many customers, involve the release of customer proprietary
information, or pose a threat to the general public.’”198 Commissioner Edwards
also noted that, “New Jersey[’s] Board of Public Utilities recently adopted 
a set of comprehensive cybersecurity requirements for electric, natural gas 
and water/wastewater utilities . . . [which] directed [utilities] to create
cybersecurity programs that define responsibilities for cyber risk management
activities.”199 Thus, New Jersey is establishing, “procedures for identifying
and mitigating cyber risk to critical systems through risk assessments and
cybersecurity training programs.”200 In 2017, amidst the flurry of state-level 
action, the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC) 
updated its Cybersecurity Primer for state regulators.201  NARUC therein
emphasized state responsibility for energy reliability and rates, and addressing
customer consequences of cybersecurity breach.202 
State energy cybersecurity initiatives must recognize evolving vulnerabilities. 
The following section analyzes the “hacker-focus” that frames prevailing
cybersecurity paradigms. This limited lens obscures systemic cybersecurity
vulnerabilities such as ISP control of internet data passing through an ISP’s 
network. 
VI. PREVAILING CYBER THREAT PARADIGMS
A. Cybersecurity Hacker Paradigm Blinders
Cybersecurity must consider the evolving nature, type, and source of 
threats and vulnerabilities. This Article identifies the “hacker paradigm”
prevalent in cybersecurity governance and strategies as a lens that limits 
the view of cyber risks. CIP rules and the Cybersecurity Framework are 
rooted in the hacker paradigm, focusing on incident-level attackers. NIST’s 
197. Commissioner Edwards et al., supra note 20. 
198.  Id. 
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Miles Keogh & Sharon Thomas, CYBERSECURITY:APRIMER FOR STATEREGULATORS
3.0, NAT’L ASS’N OF REG. UTIL. COMM’RS (Jan. 2017), https://pubs.naruc.org/pub/66D17
AE4-A46F-B543-58EF-68B04E8B180F [https://perma.cc/W4RS-8NNT].
202. Id. at 1. 
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Cybersecurity Framework Core—Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, Recover203 
—reflects the hacker paradigm wherein a cybersecurity vulnerability is 
identified, protection measures are taken, networks are monitored, response 
is initiated, and recovery is achieved. This cycle continues for each subsequent
threat. Cybersecurity vulnerabilities created by ISP unbridled power to
manage the internet in their business interest, and to sell paid priority or 
throttle traffic, are systemic vulnerabilities created by the FCC’s shift in 
ISP governance, not threats the five-step Cybersecurity Framework Core 
can overcome.
The United States DHS’s March 2018 warning about hacker probes of 
the energy grid underscored the importance of cybersecurity to energy
reliability and national security:204 “Hacking and network intrusions are 
cyber-attacks that attempt to gain unauthorized access to an organization’s 
IT systems, network, or data. Data breaches often occur when an organization 
loses control over its confidential or sensitive data.”205 DHS warned that
hackers may act for a variety of reasons including to, “[s]teal valuable 
data, such as personal information, trade secrets, or other intellectual
property, . . .[m]isuse an organization’s systems or network for the hacker’s
own purposes, . . . [or] [s]abotage or damage an organization’s systems or
data.”206 
Because hackers often enter networks from the internet,207 poorly secured
connections may permit hacker intrusions. For example, “[i]nsiders may
inadvertently or purposely enable hacking and network intrusions by: 
Sharing their user credentials, especially those that permit remote access,
failing to protect computers, network devices, or connections, especially
those used to administer the organization’s IT systems and network.”208 
Alexandre Vernotte et al., observed that threats to electric grid load balancing
and, “the smart grid in general arise from the activities of a misbehaving 
203. NIST Cybersecurity Framework, supra note 149, at 3. 
204. US-CERT, Russian Government Cyberactivity Targeting Energy and Other 
Critical Infrastructure Sector (Alert, TA18-074A) (Mar. 16, 2018), https://www.us-cert.gov/
ncas/alerts/TA18-074A [https://perma.cc/6NGH-9AEB].
205. PRAC. L. INTELL. PROP. & TECH., CYBERSECURITY TECH BASICS: HACKING AND
NETWORK INTRUSIONS: OVERVIEW (PRAC. L. PRAC. Note Overview w-003-3498, 2019)
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or a rouge actor in combination with poor design, implementation, or 
configuration of the system that makes it vulnerable.”209 
Organizational insiders may pose cyber risks through poor practices,
fall victim to phishing or other schemes to steal credentials, or behave 
contrary to the organization’s interests. As PJM noted, insiders may “steal
or expose data” or “sabotage an organization’s resources.”210 NIST also 
reported, “cybersecurity researchers regularly show that many, if not most, 
attacks work by exploiting either or both: Individuals, using social engineering 
methods such as phishing[ and] [k]nown, but unaddressed, technical 
vulnerabilities.”211 
The GAO’s 2005 report on CIP discussed typical sources of cyber threat 
then identified by United States intelligence. These sources were categorized
as: bot-network operators (who “take over multiple systems in order to
coordinate attacks and to distribute phishing schemes,”212 spam, and malware213 
attacks); criminal groups (attacking systems for monetary gain); foreign 
intelligence services (using cyber tools for information-gathering and
espionage); hackers (described as those who “break into networks for the 
thrill of the challenge or for bragging rights in the hacker community,”
the majority of whom “do not have the requisite expertise to threaten difficult 
targets such as critical [United States] networks.”); insiders (characterized
as the “disgruntled organization insider” and outsourcing vendors and 
employees who accidentally introduce malware into systems); phishers
(attempting to steal identities or information for monetary gain); spammers
(distributing unsolicited e-mail with hidden or false information in order 
to sell products, conduct phishing schemes, distribute spyware/malware,
or attack organizations); spyware and malware authors (seeking to inject 
computer viruses and worms); terrorists (seeking to destroy, incapacitate, or
exploit critical infrastructures in order to threaten national security, cause
mass casualties, weaken the U.S. economy, and damage public morale and
confidence).214 GAO’s 2005 list recognized that “outsourcing vendors” 
could introduce malware as insiders.215 ISPs typically provide internet access, 
as few firms also act as their own ISP. 
209. Vernotte et al., supra note 3, at 2. 
210. Cybersecurity Tech Basics, supra note 205. 
211. NIST Cybersecurity Framework, supra note 149. 
212. GAO, Critical Infrastructure Protection, supra note 112, at 5 (defining phishing as
“the creation and use of e-mails and Web sites that are designed to look like those of well-
known legitimate businesses or government agencies, in order to deceive Internet users
into disclosing their personal data for criminal purposes, such as identity theft and fraud.”).
213. Id. (defining malware as “software designed with malicious intent, such as a 
virus.”).
214. Id. at 5. 
215. Id.
130
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GAO’s 2005 cybersecurity threat sources list illustrates the hacker or 
disgruntled insider paradigm prevalent today. Hackers are often portrayed
as a loner at home216—a characterization that fails to recognize the emergence
of hacker collectives. Hackers may work for not only their own motives, 
but also for economic, political, or other reasons; they may also act as part
of a criminal enterprise or even be deployed by foreign intelligence services.217 
For example, a 2017 report from the Oxford Internet Institute identified, 
“[c]yber troops,” as “government, military or political party teams committed 
to manipulating public opinion over social media.”218 
In 2005, then Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director Robert Mueller 
testified that, “although individual hackers do not pose a great threat, hackers
intent on stealing information or motivated by money are a concern.”219 
Expressing prescient concern, Director Mueller added that, “if this pool
of talent is utilized by terrorists, foreign governments or criminal organizations, 
the potential for a successful cyber-attack on our critical infrastructures is
greatly increased.”220 His informed experience and judgment foresaw the
link between hackers and foreign governments manifested just one decade
later in internet hacks designed to both interfere with the 2016 elections
and attack the United States energy sector.221 
216. See e.g., Tal Kopan, Is Trump Right? Could a 400-Pound Couch-Potato Have 
Hacked the DNC, CNN (Sept. 27, 2016), https://www.cnn.com/2016/09/27/politics/dnc-
cyberattack-400-pound-hackers/index.html [https://perma.cc/QVZ5-7JV9] (noting that in 
2016 then-candidate Donald Trump said in regards to the source of the hack into the Democratic 
National Committee that “[i]t could be Russia, but it could also be China . . . It could also 
be lots of other people. It also could be somebody sitting on their bed that weighs 400 pounds.”).
217. See e.g., Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, Pub. L. No.
115-44, Title II, 131 Stat. 886 (2017), https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-
bill/3364/text?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22sanctions%22%5D%7D&r=2 [https:// 
perma.cc/82SF-H3CS].
218. Samantha Bradshaw & Philip N. Howard, Troops, Trolls, and Troublemakers:
A Global Inventory of Organized Social Media Manipulation (Oxford Internet Institute, 
Computational Propaganda Research Project, Working Paper No. 2017.12, 2017), https:// 
comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/research/troops-trolls-and-trouble-makers-a-global-inventory-of-
organized-social-media-manipulation/ [https://perma.cc/9JB3-LV7R]. 
219. GAO, Critical Infrastructure Protection, supra note 112, at 6.
220. Id.
221. Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, Pub. L. No. 115-44, 
Title II, 131 Stat. 886 (2017) (finding “Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered an influence
campaign in 2016 aimed at the United States presidential election.”); Brad Heath, A Mountain 
of Evidence Points in One Direction: Russia Sought To Sway the 2016 US Election, USA
TODAY (Aug. 3, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2018/08/03/russian-us-election-
interference-donald-trump/878910002/ [https://perma.cc/XUR5-VXVQ] (“Prosecutors working
for Mueller offered more details on the hacking in July, when a grand jury indicted 12 
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In regards to the attack on the energy sector, “[i]n May 2017, Russian 
hackers infiltrated the business systems of [United States] nuclear power
plants and other companies in the energy sector in an effort to gather  
personnel data” that can be, “used for more targeted attempts to compromise
infrastructure, including gathering emails, communications about designs, 
security audits, poorly secured passwords, and known issues.”222  Hackers
may use such reconnaissance attacks, “to set up for future, more damaging 
attacks just based on the proprietary information they’re able to steal.”223 
This type of attack is an example of an “Advanced Persistent Threat (APT)” 
through which an attacker, “intrudes into an organization’s network . . .
and [r]emains resident and undetected for an extended period of time.”224 
APTs are particularly alarming because such attacks may steal data or spy
on an organization’s personnel or activities.225 
In regards to the election interference attacks, the United States DHS’s
Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) issued a warning on
March 16, 2018, of Russian government cyberactivity targeting energy
and other critical infrastructure sectors.226 The alert cautioned that Russian 
government actions targeted “[United States] Government entities as well
as organizations in the energy, nuclear, commercial facilities, water, aviation,
and critical manufacturing sectors,” conducting network reconnaissance
and collecting Industrial Control Systems data.227 
PJM’s comments in FERC’s Grid Resiliency docket characterized cyber-
attacks as typically originating, “from nation states, terrorists and un-attributable
threats.”228  PJM noted “many nation states have increased capability and
interest to perform cyber-attacks,” and their motives for cyber intrusions 
vary.229 Specifically, “[Critical Infrastructure] owners suffer repeated 
cyberattacks, and some electric utilities report being probed thousands of 
times each month.”230 
Russian intelligence officers for breaking into Democratic political organizations to steal 
troves of internal records that they then made public.”).
222. Andrew Moshirnia, No Security Through Obscurity: Changing Circumvention
Law to Protect Our Democracy Against Cyberattacks, 83 BROOK. L. REV. 1279, 1290–91 
(2018). 
223. Id.
224. Cybersecurity Tech Basics, supra note 205. 
225.  Id. 
226. US-CERT, supra note 204. 
227.  Id. 
228. PJM, FERC Grid Resilience Comments, supra note 54, at 21. 
229.  Id. at 22. 
230. Chung, supra note 96, at 476 n.95 (citing Scott J. Shackelford et al., Sustainable
Cybersecurity: Applying Lessons from the Green Movement to Managing Cyber Attacks, 
2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 1995, 2005–06 (2016)). 
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In addition to nation-state sponsors of cyber threats, PJM noted “[c]ertain 
actors have expressed their intentions, in recruitment videos or otherwise, 
to attack the U.S. power grid to damage and disrupt the power grid to effect 
the general population and create fear,” though their capabilities “are not 
fully known to the electricity industry, making the assessment by an RTO 
of the likelihood of a cyber-attack and its anticipated impacts more difficult.”231 
PJM reported that this, “category represents the most common form of
attacks detected on the industry systems in the form of routine reconnaissance
by likely cyber criminals searching for software vulnerabilities to exploit.”232 
FERC’s 2018 Grid Resiliency docket ordered ISOs and RTOs to report 
to FERC about several cyber security issues. These include how ISOs and
RTOs, “identify and plan for risks associated with high-impact, low-frequency 
events (e.g., physical and cyber-attacks, accidents, extended fuel supply
disruptions, or extreme weather events).”233  FERC directed ISOs and RTOs
to identify any studies, “conducted, are currently in progress, or are planned 
to be performed in the future to identify the ability of the bulk power system 
to withstand a high-impact, low-frequency event (e.g., physical and cyber-
attacks, accidents, extended fuel supply disruptions, or extreme weather 
events).”234 FERC further asked ISOs and RTOs to explain the extent to 
which each, “consider[ed] whether specific challenges to resilience, such
as extreme weather, drought, and physical or cyber threats, affect various 
generation technologies differently?”235 
CAISO characterized cyber-attacks as “manmade threats” that can “inflict
harm on the power grid,” and “occur at any time and without notice,” producing 
“unpredictable” results.236 CAISO explained, “[i]nformation security incidents
that threaten the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of CAISO’s 
systems or information may include, but are not limited to, losing grid visibility,
losing energy market systems, data disclosure, changing control variables,
losing access to critical operational systems, accessing employee data, or 
causing financial loss or manipulation.”237 
231. PJM, FERC Grid Resilience Comments, supra note 54, at 22. 
232.  Id. at 23. 
233. Id. at 21. 
234. Id. at 34. 
235. Id. at 47. 
236. CAL. INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR CORP., COMMENT LETTER IN RESPONSE TO THE
COMMISSION’S REQUEST FOR COMMENTS ABOUT SYSTEM RESILIENCY AND THREATS TO









     
      
   
    
   
 
 




    
  
  
      
  




   
    
  
   
    
 
    
   
 
 






   
    
   
  
Hacker intrusions and ISP self-interested network management exemplify 
man-made threats. PJM noted that man-made threats are “more difficult
to quantify because they don’t adhere to cyclical weather patterns and cannot
be accurately forecasted or projected. Additionally, their effects are discriminate,
often targeting the most critical infrastructure, in contrast to indiscriminate 
and more random effects associated with naturally occurring hazards.”238 
Analysis of the ISP’s role in the smart grid architecture highlight man-made
supply chain and systemic risks the FCC’s net neutrality repeal created. 
B. Supply Chain Cybersecurity Risks
Prevailing cybersecurity paradigms scrutinize the supply chain through
a hacker-focused lens as a hacker target—a means to steal credentials to
gain access to the supplier’s client.  NIST includes in supply chains firms 
or entities used to design, develop, manufacture, process, handle, and deliver
products and services to the end user.239 NIST’s Cybersecurity Framework
underscores the importance of “supply chain risk management” (SCRM)
to manage cybersecurity risks a supplier has on external parties and the 
cybersecurity effect external parties have on an organization.240 NIST identifies
a primary objective of cyber SCRM as identifying, assessing, and mitigating 
products and services that may contain potentially malicious functionality,
are counterfeit, or are vulnerable due to poor manufacturing and development 
practices within the cyber supply chain.241 
NIST emphasizes the supply chain as a source of malicious or counterfeit
code or functional vulnerability. This focus on one segment of the supply-
chain landscape misses ISP technical ability and newly acquired legal
authority to introduce functional problems with internet communication 
due to the FCC’s net neutrality repeal order.242  The first step in NIST’s
Cybersecurity Framework core is to identify cyber risks. Risk identification 
should not just look for exposure to hackers, insiders, or traditional supply 
chain failures.  Rather, risk identification must also consider systemic threats 
including those induced by United States federal policy and ISPs that supply
the energy sector with internet access.
ISPs supply last-mile broadband access to subscribers, including energy 
ecosystem participants and other critical infrastructure. An ISP that deliberately
slows or degrades signals used for energy system operation, maintenance,
238. PJM, FERC Grid Resilience Comments, supra note 54, at 20. 
239.  NIST Cybersecurity Framework, supra note 149. 
240.  Id. 
241. Id.
242. Sandoval, Net Neutrality Powers Energy and Forestalls Climate Change, supra
note 6, at 4 (“The FCC’s 2018 ‘Internet Freedom’ Order for the first time gives ISPs legal 
permission to erect toll booths between subscribers and content providers.”).
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planning, and other activities may compromise energy system functionality—a
supply chain vulnerability that requires cybersecurity vigilance and reporting.
Vernotte et al., note that smart grid energy resources and participants can
use a variety of media to communicate with the internet: “Communication 
networks between the central control systems and substations can consist 
of fibre, radio, mobile phone networks (GSM/GPRS), or Power Line 
Carrier (PLC).”243 Energy resource scheduling coordinators participating
in CAISO’s wholesale market can communicate to CAISO through the 
private Energy Communications Network (ECN) AT&T runs and may
subscribe to a private Service Level Agreement that provides Quality of 
Service (QoS) standards.244 
ECN-based communication to and from CAISO through AT&T’s 
commercial service is one example of an internet service that would have 
fallen outside of the coverage of the FCC’s net neutrality rules that 
applied to “Broadband Internet Access Services” (BIAS) offered in
the “mass market.”245 The FCC defined “mass market” BIAS to exclude,
“enterprise service offerings, which are typically offered to larger organizations 
through customized or individually negotiated arrangements, or special
access services.”246 AT&T offers access to the ECN private network for
a monthly fee that varies with the service package selected.247  CAISO reports
that connection to the ECN takes 30-45 business days.248 
CAISO also allows connection via the public internet to lessen time to 
establish communication and lower operational costs for participating energy
resources.249  Residential customers may offer their home thermostat, a
solar system, a battery, or other facilities as grid resources, accessible through
their home internet connection.  The FCC’s 2015 net neutrality rules applied
243. Vernotte et al., supra note 3, at 8. 
244. CAL. INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, SC CERTIFICATION OVERVIEW (May 4, 2018), http://
www.caiso.com/Documents/SCCertificationOverview.pdf [https://perma.cc/GQ5J-32D9]
[hereinafter CAISO, SC CERTIFICATION OVERVIEW].
245. FCC, 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 5, ¶ 189. 
246. Id. It is worth noting that FCC separates enterprise service offerings from BIAS 
yet treats them as functional equivalents to say that certain users, e.g., emergency services, 
would not be affected by the potential threats of blocking and throttling because they had
access to enterprise offerings. 
247. CAISO, SC CERTIFICATION OVERVIEW, supra note 244, at 4. 
248. Id.
249. ISO New Resource Implementation Process Enhancement, CAL. INDEP. SYS.
OPERATOR (May 18, 2017), http://www.caiso.com/Documents/ISONewResourceImplementation 
ProcessEnhancement.html [https://perma.cc/3ZYG-NPMT] [hereinafter CAISO, New Resource 
Implementation Process Enhancement].
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to “mass market” broadband internet access service such as “a service marketed
and sold on a standardized basis to residential customers, small businesses, 
and other end-user customers such as schools and libraries.”250  The 2018 
net neutrality repeal opens the door to cybersecurity vulnerabilities for energy
resources that rely on mass market broadband. The electric grid relies on and 
is connected to many resources that communicate through public, mass-
market Internet access.
Communications pathways create new opportunities but can also open 
new threat vectors. “While knowing about the components that constitute 
the smart grid is important, knowing how these components communicate
and for which purpose is essential for performing cyber security analysis, 
as data flows make for the “highway of hackers,” Vernotte et al. observed.”251 
ISPs need not hack into an energy operator’s network as they control access 
to and output from the network.  FCC allowance of unregulated paid priority 
deals opened a freeway on-ramp for paid priority deals, and ISP transactions
that favor some traffic can slow other internet traffic sharing the same
infrastructure. 
NIST’s Cybersecurity Framework recognizes the difficulty of controlling
supplier cybersecurity. Its Framework observed that it may not be possible 
to impose a set of cybersecurity requirements on the supplier.252  NIST also
promotes informed purchasing as a supply-chain cybersecurity strategy.  
NIST recommends the “objective should be to make the best buying decision 
among multiple suppliers given a carefully determined list of cybersecurity 
requirements. Often, this means some degree of trade-off, comparing multiple 
products or services with known gaps to the Target Profile,” NIST laments.253 
NIST’s Framework assumes that buyers have a choice of suppliers, or
that suppliers offer a meaningful choice. The FCC’s net neutrality repeal
order reported that in 2016, “40% of Americans had the choice of only one
provider offering high-speed internet at 25 [Megabits per second] up and
3 down, 45.2% had the choice of two, 5.9% had three, while 8.9% had none.”254 
Energy resources are often limited in the choice of communications providers 
and may have to expend substantial resources to bring communications access
to their facility. Lack of competition between ISPs255 makes it difficult to 
avoid ISP network management practices that undermine reliability by
250. FCC, 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 5, ¶ 189. 
251. Vernotte et al., supra note 3, at 8. 
252. Matthew P. Barrett, Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, 




254. FCC, Internet Freedom Order, supra note 4, ¶ 125.
255. Id. ¶¶ 125–26. 
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switching to another ISP that does not engage in paid priority or throttle
energy users who use exceed their “unlimited” internet plan. 
Hong Guo et al. modeled the effect of ISP duopoly competition on content 
providers in the absence of net neutrality rules.256 Their model revealed
that ISP duopoly competition, where content providers also compete for 
internet priority through paid priority deals, maintains ISP incentives to seek 
additional revenues from content providers to avoid being left behind in 
the queue.257 FCC’s net neutrality repeal induces ISP profit-seeking behavior
that can impact energy sector rates, reliability, and safety. Limited ISP
competition may deter substitution as a solar panel or smart thermostat cannot 
readily change ISPs to avoided harmful ISP network management practices.
FERC requires responsible entities to ensure their supply chain’s
cybersecurity, and it maintains enforcement authority to police rule compliance.258 
A power company agreed to pay a $2.7 million penalty in 2018 for violations
of NERC CIP rules after FERC determined the company “failed to properly
classify the information with the appropriate sensitivity level,” or to,
“ensure that the vendor protected the sensitive information after the data
was improperly copied from the regulated entity’s network.”259  In its analysis,
“NERC focused on the gravity of the breach, not only because it would 
have allowed physical and remote access to the company’s system, but 
also because it threatened the reliability of the entire bulk power system.”260 
FERC’s ruling against this company underscored its assessment that 
cybersecurity poses risks to the entire energy system, and thus it is not left
to business judgment, firm, or individual risk-taking. 
The above FERC ruling is just one exemplar that federal energy sector
cybersecurity obligations do not allow the energy sector to take a post 
facto approach to cybersecurity and reliability risks. The DOJ and FCC’s 
brief in defense of the FCC Internet Freedom Order’s repeal of net neutrality
rules argued to the D.C. Circuit that any harms from ISP network management, 
“are exposed and deterred by market forces, public opprobrium, and 
256. Hong Guo et al., Effects of Competition Among Internet Service Providers and
Content Providers On The Net Neutrality Debate, 41:2 MIS. Q. 353-A29 (June 2017). 
257. Id.
258. See, e.g., Legal Alert: NERC and Power Company Reach Legal Settlement on















   
   
   
      
       
  
 
     
 
     
   
 
  
   
       
    
 
     
 
    
   
    
     
   
 
  
   








enforcement of the consumer protection laws.”261 DOJ and FCC hopes for
market discipline, public scorn, and consumer protection law to restrain
harmful ISP conduct do not account for the energy sector’s duties to provide
safe and reliable service.
The FCC’s Internet Freedom Order also failed to consider the consequences 
to energy reliability and the environment from ISP-induced communications
delays. The amicus brief I co-authored with Professors Hammond, Byerly,
and Chase, my Article Net Neutrality Powers Energy and Forestalls Climate
Change, and my Reply Comments submitted in the Internet Freedom
docket, along with critical infrastructure and energy sector legal duties to provide
reliable service, reveal the arbitrary and capricious decision-making that 
formed the Internet Freedom Order, and require its vacatur and remand
to the FCC to satisfy the APA.262 As such, ISP gatekeeper access to internet 
data underscores the imperative of examining the consequences of ISP
unbridled network management practices for public safety, energy reliability,
just and reasonable rates, and achievement of environmental goals. 
C. ISPs Do Not Need to Hack to Gain Access to Data Traversing Their 
Network to Other Internet Endpoints 
ISPs need not hack to gain access to subscriber internet data. ISPs are 
tasked with transporting data to and from their subscriber to other internet
endpoints.263 Vernotte et al. placed the internet as the central component
of smart grid “architecture as it is the main intermediary to the different
stakeholders (along with fiber, GPRS networks from telecom operators).”264 
Once the traffic crosses the ISP’s network firewall, it becomes part of the
greater network under ISP control.265  The ISP controls the user’s traffic as it 
261. Brief for Respondents at 74–75, Mozilla Corp., et al. v. FCC, No. 18-1051 (D.C. 
Cir. 2018) [hereinafter Respondents’ Brief] (citing FCC, Internet Freedom Order, supra note 
4, ¶ 323). 
262. Amicus Brief, supra note 37, at 8 (citing Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2688, 
2710 (2015) (“. . . a court may uphold agency action only on the grounds that the agency
invoked when it took the action”) (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943))); 
Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1209 (2015) (quoting FCC v. Fox TV 
Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009)); Sandoval, Net Neutrality Powers Energy and Forestalls 
Climate Change, supra note 6, at 6, 73; Sandoval, Internet Freedom Reply Comments, supra
note 37, at 50–52. 
263. See Lazaro Gamio, How Data Travels Across the Internet, WASH. POST (May
31, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/national/security-of-the-internet/bgp/ [https://
perma.cc/SX3N-MTAN].
264. Vernotte et al., supra note 3, at 18. 
265. Cf. Charles Kelly & Philip Carden, Firewalls: Securing NT Networks from Internet
Intruders, IT PRO TODAY (Oct. 31, 1996), https://www.itprotoday.com/security/firewalls-
securing-nt-networks-internet-intruders [https://perma.cc/53J6-XG7C] (“[A] network firewall 
is a hardware/software barrier between a corporate network and the Internet.”). 
138
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crosses the ISP-controlled gateway to the internet.266  No software patch or 
firewall protects a user from an ISP whose job it is to transit that user’s 
content to and from the internet.267 
Suggestions to use a Virtual Private Network (VPN) to obscure the 
content of internet traffic from the user’s ISP “won’t protect you from data- 
throttling that kicks in when you’ve used too much of your monthly data
allotment.”268 When the D.C. Circuit, in USTA v. FCC, upheld the FCC’s
2015 Open Internet Order, it cited the FCC’s analysis that, “convincingly
detailed how broadband providers’ [gatekeeper] position in the market 
gives them the economic power to restrict edge-provider traffic and charge
for the services they furnish.”269 
Without legally enforceable net neutrality rules, internet subscriber cyber- 
hygiene cannot stop an ISP from blocking, throttling, disadvantaging,
interfering with, or degrading traffic that runs through the ISP’s network.
ISPs already exist inside the internet network.  Thus the FCC’s net neutrality
rule repeal initiated a zero-day cyber vulnerability for the energy sector’s
reliability. 
Kristen E. Eichensehr pointed out that zero-day vulnerabilities present, 
“national security risks if a foreign government discovers and exploits it
against, for example, [United States] critical infrastructure.”270 Paid priority 
accounts may become a hacker target as favored messages are accelerated,
and other traffic may be slowed to accommodate those with priority.271 
Launching paid priority accounts, which impair other traffic during times 
of likely heavy load, such as hot days or extreme weather events, compounds
reliability risks to the energy sector. 
The FCC’s net neutrality repeal allows ISPs to sell priority to some users, 
even if doing so degrades other traffic, and to block, throttle, degrade,
disadvantage, or interfere with traffic, as long as the ISP discloses that it 
266. Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 646 (“[T]here appears little dispute that broadband
providers have the technological ability to distinguish between and discriminate against 
certain types of Internet traffic.”).
267. See Tyson, supra note 30. Cf. Vernotte et al., supra note 3, at 20 (noting that an 
energy smart grid cybersecurity, “mechanism can be structural/physical e.g., a more advanced 
network segregation, and/or software based, e.g., a more frequent patching strategy.”).
268. How to Stop ISP Throttling, PIXEL PRIVACY, https://pixelprivacy.com/resources/
stop-isp-throttling/ [https://perma.cc/AZN7-XU8E]. 
269. Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d at 646. 
270. Kristen E. Eichensehr, Public-Private Cybersecurity, 95 TEX. L. REV. 467, 484 
(2017).
271. Sandoval, Internet Freedom Reply Comments, supra note 37, at 55. 
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engages in prioritization agreements.272 I previously warned in Internet
Freedom docket Reply Comments that paid priority would, “allow ISPs 
to ‘deprioritize’ the signals of other Americans to speed ahead those who 
pay for Internet priority.”273  The FCC’s Internet Freedom Order permits
ISPs to manage internet traffic in their own business interest with no internet 
user safeguards.274 
Guo et al. analyze paid priority in a market with duopoly ISP competition 
and competing content providers vying for internet bandwidth.275  Under
net neutrality rules that prohibit paid priority, ISPs charge consumers fees
for internet access, “which are their only revenue source. In the packet
discrimination regime, in addition to fixed fees . . . from consumers,” they
observe that, “ISPs may also charge the [Content Providers] usage-based
fees . . ., respectively, for preferential delivery of their content.”276  “In
other words, ISPs have two revenue sources in the packet discrimination 
regime: Internet access fees from consumers and preferential delivery fees
from CPs.”277 
Guo et al. then explained, “[w]ithout net neutrality regulation, the competing
ISPs still have the incentive to charge CPs for preferential delivery, and 
in the presence of CP competition, they have the ability to induce CPs to 
pay for packet prioritization.”278 Their model found that, “some advantaged
CPs may benefit from paid prioritization because such arrangements further
enforce their dominance in the content market. Paid prioritization, however, 
always hurts the disadvantaged CPs.”279 Guo et al.’s model illustrates that
without enforceable net neutrality rules, ISPs in duopoly local markets can
use their gatekeeper position to obtain revenue from content providers to 
avoid data queuing delays due to ISP network management practices.280 
This model made no assumptions about the content being sent through
the internet. Neither does this model analyze whether the ISP subscriber
sending or receiving internet content has any legal duties it executes in part 
through the use of internet services. The internet’s historical “best efforts” 
272. See FCC, Internet Freedom Order, supra note 4, ¶¶ 2–4, 220 (repealing FCC
rules adopted in 2015 that prohibited ISPs from blocking, throttling, or paid prioritization
of Internet traffic except for limited reasonable network management justifications); cf.
FCC, 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 5, ¶¶ 215–16. 
273. See Sandoval, Internet Freedom Reply Comments, supra note 37, at 27. 
274.  FCC, Internet Freedom Order, supra note 4, ¶¶ 2–4, 220. 
275.  Guo et al., supra note 256, at 358. 
276.  Id. 
277. Id.
278. Id. at 367. 
279. Id.
280. Id. at 361. 
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treatment of internet traffic is agnostic to packet content, sender, or recipient.281 
Discriminatory preference for some data packets based on paid priority
thwarts “best efforts” for all internet data packets. 
ISP Comcast argued for repeal of the paid priority ban arguing that doing so
would allow it to sell priority to latency-sensitive applications such as signing
for the hearing impaired or autonomous vehicles.282 AT&T argued that
the eliminating paid priority ban would allow it to, “begin implementing 
isolated paid-prioritization arrangements to support [QoS] for unusually
latency-sensitive applications, such as high-definition videoconferencing 
or massively multiplayer online gaming (MMOG).”283 
In April 2019 ISP Cox launched a $15 a month “priority routing” service
it claims will offer Internet gamers a speed and latency advantage.284  Cox
contends that this service “does not alter speed in any way nor does it
prioritize any traffic over others on our network”285—a description met 
with technical doubt. Cox announced this limited trial in Arizona, but it
did not disclose any methods it will deploy to measure whether other internet 
traffic is degraded or affected by the video-gamer priority routing service. 
I previously cautioned that an, “ISP’s priority deal with a video game
provider—whether foreign or domestic—could impact a range of 
281. FTC, BROADBAND CONNECTIVITY COMPETITION POLICY, at *2, 2007 WL 2506639
(Traditionally, data traffic has traversed the Internet on a “first-in-first-out” and “best-
efforts” basis); FCC, 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 5, at 83 n.148 (concluding ISPs 
have incentives to use their gatekeeper power in the Internet to extract tolls on Internet
users, citing Mozilla’s comments that paid priority “represents a visceral deviation from 
the end-to-end, best efforts history of the Internet, meaning that as a practical matter, it’s 
impossible to understand ex ante the full effects and potential negative externalities that 
could arise.”). 
282. Comments of Comcast Corporation, In the Matter of Restoring Internet Freedom, 
WC Docket No. 17-208, at 56 (July 17, 2017), https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/107171777114654/ 
2017-07-17%20AS-FILED%20Comcast%202017%20Open%20Internet%20Comments%
20and%20Appendices.pdf [https://perma.cc/MY2Z-UM64]; Jacob Kastrenakes, Comcast 
Says It Should Be Able to Create Internet Fast Lanes for Self-Driving Cars, THE VERGE
(July 17, 2017), https://www.theverge.com/2017/7/17/15985114/comcast-paid-prioritization- 
autonomous-cars [https://perma.cc/5RW3-D68C].
283. Comments of AT&T Services Inc., In the Matter of Restoring Internet Freedom, 
17-108, at 365 (July 17, 2017), https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/10717906301564/AT%26T%20
Internet%20Freedom%20Comments.pdf [https://perma.cc/DT5S-RB5Y].
284. Karl Bode, This ISP Is Offering a ‘Fast Lane’ for Gamers. . .For $15 More Per









    
    
  
     
 
   
 
    
    
  




    
  
     
     
    
    
  
   
 
      
    
 
 
    
   
   
    
    
   
   
       
   
  
  
   
 
   
communications to and from the subscriber’s account. The ISP’s priority
transmission of the video game may delay the grid operator’s or utility’s
signal to a demand response aggregator, and the energy resource’s reply.”286 
ISP paid priority deals with other parties, “may delay a demand response 
communication with an Internet-connected thermostat or a DER, or a DER’s 
response to a request to provide voltage support. Such conduct undermines 
electric reliability for the sake of the ISP’s profit and the video game’s
benefit.”287 
Paid priority purchasers may not reveal their motives, affiliations, or true
identities to ISPs, as “[t]he FCC Order imposes no limits on who—foreign 
or domestic—could buy paid priority.”288 Similar to the Russian use 
of Facebook to perpetrate election interference in 2016 and, as reported
by Facebook in June 2018, for the United States mid-term elections,289 the
ISP need not be aware of or sympathetic to the buyer’s motives for paid
priority to cause harm.
The DOJ and FCC argued in Respondents’ brief defending the FCC’s 
Internet Freedom Order that the FCC, “reasonably ‘determined that replacing
the prohibitions on blocking and throttling with a transparency rule
implements a lower-cost method of ensuring’ that any harms ‘are exposed
and deterred by market forces, public opprobrium, and enforcement of the
consumer protection laws.’”290 Respondents’ brief argued that the FCC’s
transparency rule provided appropriate “light-touch” regulation, preferable to
net neutrality rules.291 
Nick Feamster argued that net neutrality repeal may provide opportunities to
offer service level guarantees to internet users, including non-commercial
users.292 Feamster hoped that FCC network management disclosure rules
would provide transparency into ISP practices to allow for informed
consumer decision-making and monitoring.293 
286. Sandoval, Net Neutrality Powers Energy and Forestalls Climate Change, supra
note 6, at 47. 
287. Id.
288. Id. at 4.
289. Sara Frier, Facebook Finds Ongoing Evidence of Election Interference, 
BLOOMBERG (July 31, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-07-31/facebook-
finds-ongoing-evidence-of-election-interference (“Facebook said it notified the U.S.
government and deleted dozens of accounts and pages from people using false identities,
who were coordinating events and stirring up political unrest.  The campaign is similar to 
the one Russia-linked groups ran around the 2016 presidential elections, though the company
doesn’t know who’s behind it this time.”). 
290. Respondents’ Brief, supra note 261, at 74–75. 
291. Id. at 95. 
292. Richard Bennett, What’s the Deal with Software-Defined Networking?, HIGH 
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I previously discussed the limited disclosures the FCC’s transparency 
rule requires: “Tracking the words of the FCC’s required disclosure, an 
ISP’s terms of service could state that it engages in a ‘practice that directly
or indirectly favors some traffic over other traffic, including through use 
of techniques such as traffic shaping, prioritization, or resource reservation, 
in exchange for consideration, monetary or otherwise.’”294  Notably, “FCC’s
2018 Order does not require ISPs to disclose the parties to or terms of paid 
priority transactions, the execution of such deals, or their consequences. Neither
does the FCC’s Order require ISPs to get their subscriber’s consent to paid 
priority deals.”295 Any disclosures ISPs engage in (e.g., paid priority, traffic
shaping), “does not inform consumers, content providers, or regulators of 
priority deals, or when and how the ISP will launch priority or degrade other 
service.”296 
The FCC’s limited transparency and disclosure rules contribute to “market
opacity and lack of transparency about buyer and seller behavior,” both of
which are hallmarks of a zero-day cybersecurity vulnerability.297  Mailyn
Fidler observed that zero-day “[v]ulnerabilities are most exploitable if kept
secret. Zero-days are discovered and not made, so there is no guarantee someone 
in possession of a vulnerability is the only person who knows about it. The
value of secrecy complicates efforts to control the zero-day trade because it
contributes to market opacity and lack of transparency about buyer and 
seller behavior.”298 Information about zero-day vulnerabilities is valuable
and may create opportunities and markets for its trade.299 Lack of FCC disclosure
requirements for paid priority deal terms, execution, or their consequences 
for other internet users creates a secrecy characteristic of zero-day
cybersecurity vulnerability information which should not be ignored.
Responsible entity energy operators and regulators cannot rely on limited 
disclosures that an ISP may engage in, for paid priority or other traffic shaping, 
or resource reservation techniques to ensure that energy signals are not
294. Sandoval, Net Neutrality Powers Energy and Forestalls Climate Change, supra
note 6, at 41 (citing FCC, Internet Freedom Order, supra note 4, ¶¶ 216, 220). 
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Fidler, supra note 2, at 410. 
298.  Id. at 409–10. 
299. Id. at 410 (“Zero-days are traded in three markets . . . the ‘white market’ 
encompasses sales of vulnerabilities between zero-day vulnerability hunters and software 
vendors or third-party clearinghouses. The ‘black market’ describes interactions where the 
buyer or the seller has criminal intent. The ‘gray market’ involves interactions between
vulnerability sellers and government agencies, conducted as legal business deals.”).
143
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subject to ISP disadvantage or interference. The FCC’s ISP transparency
rules are inadequate to protect energy grid reliability.
Neither the energy sector, regulators, nor others with public safety duties 
should be faced with the Hobson’s choice of paying ISPs for protection 
against the ISP’s own degradation of internet traffic, or risking the consequences 
of paid priority degradation. Unwinding dependence on mass-market internet
services is inconsistent with the energy sector’s distributed nature that 
harnesses the public internet to seed the smart grid. Forcing energy market
participants to pay for private line, non-mass market communications services
such as the ECN private line used to communicate with CAISO raises costs
and introduces market entry delays.300 Paying ISPs for internet priority or
safeguards from paid priority delays increases energy costs thereby undermining
efforts to adopt just and reasonable rates as required by federal and state
statutes. Respondents’ brief to the D.C. Circuit in the net neutrality appeal 
argued that paid priority could facilitate entry of small “edge providers” 
(i.e., small internet content providers).301 However, Respondents neither
offered an analysis to support this belief, nor considered the range of “edge 
providers,” such as energy operators, their suppliers, regulators, and consumers,
who all provide internet content and act to varying degrees as “edge
providers.” So long as blocking and throttling do not require reasonable 
network management justifications, any edge provider like an energy provider 
may be throttled and thereby forced into a prioritization arrangement to
provide reliable service to utility customers. This is a frightening reality 
we can no longer ignore.
Neither Respondents’ brief nor the Internet Freedom Order analyzed 
small energy resources and other energy market participants who use the
internet to carry out duties imbued with cybersecurity and reliability
responsibilities. Paid priority must be addressed as it can undermine the 
functionality of communications-enabled smart inverters connected to the
internet and raise costs for meeting reliability and cybersecurity rules.
A “utility or energy market participant who enters a paid priority deal
with an ISP may risk allegations that such a deal makes them a party to
energy market manipulation.”302 An energy operator that contracts with an 
ISP to prioritize its traffic risks disadvantaging other energy resources
ranging from energy generators to rooftop solar panels, behind-the-meter
batteries, or even electric substations that use the same ISP and internet
physical and network resources. Such deals could not only raise costs for
300. CAISO, SC CERTIFICATION OVERVIEW, supra note 244, at 4. 
301. Respondents’ Brief, supra note 261, at 69 (citing FCC, Internet Freedom Order, 
supra note 4, ¶¶ 133, 255). 
302. Sandoval, Net Neutrality Powers Energy and Forestalls Climate Change, supra
note 6, at 52. 
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other energy market participants, but they could also reduce reliability and 
public safety.
Additionally, “ISP priority for its own energy management signals over 
those of independent resources could be subject to a FERC market 
manipulation investigation under the FPA.”303 CAISO requires energy 
generators to communicate every four seconds, a standard NERC notes is 
common for many energy resources.304 Internet priority given to one
resource risks slowing other resources and communication to other internet- 
connected devices used in the energy ecosystem.
I emphasized in comments to the FCC’s 2014 Open Internet docket and
in the Internet Freedom docket that: 
FERC forbids “anticompetitive conduct and conduct that threatens market transparency”
because it “undermine[s] confidence in the energy markets and damage[s] consumers
and competitors. Such conduct might involve the violations of rules designed to
limit market power or to ensure the efficient operation of regulated markets.” A 
FERC market participant who bargains to get better Internet speeds or lower prices
than its competitors may be engaging in a practice that threatens market transparency
and violates market rules.305 
Even if FERC were to find market manipulation due to paid internet priority
agreements, any rate refund would only compensate for rates higher than 
those which are “just and reasonable.”306 FERC’s refund process does not
“provide a remedy for harms to safety, reliability, or environmental harm 
from having to call on more or build more [greenhouse gas]-emitting
peaker plants.”307 
Neither does the ability to use private lines or commercial Internet services 
secure all energy utility, ISO or RTO, or energy resource communications. 
303. Id. (citing In re Enron Corp., 326 B.R. 257, 264 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) (noting
that FPA, 16 U.S.C § 824(e), “provides FERC with broad remedial authority to address
anticompetitive behavior” supporting FERC’s authority to order disgorgement of money
in excess of just and reasonable rates upon a finding of market manipulation during the 
California Energy crisis of 2000 to 2001)). 
304. N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., BALANCING AND FREQUENCY CONTROL 13 (2011),
https://www.nerc.com/docs/oc/rs/NERC%20Balancing%20and%20Frequency%20Contr
ol%20040520111.pdf [https://perma.cc/4LJ2-ZM4G].
305. Catherine J.K. Sandoval, Written Statement of Commissioner Catherine J.K. 
Sandoval Before the Congressional Forum on Net Neutrality, Hosted by Congresswoman
Doris O. Matsui, at 16 (Sept. 24, 2014) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter Commissioner Sandoval
2015 Open Internet Ex Parte Comments].
306. Sandoval, Net Neutrality Powers Energy and Forestalls Climate Change, supra
note 6, at 52.
307. Id.
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The 1995 National Science Foundation decision to lift restrictions on the 
internet to access to “support research and education in and among academic 
institutions in the U.S. by providing access to unique resources and the 
opportunity for collaborative work” opened the internet to commercial
use, increasing its reach and range of applications.308 The internet allows
every user to communicate with any other user, increasing the network’s
utility and value. The distributed energy ecosystem embeds the internet’s 
network. Distributed energy networks require that all parts of the system,
from generators to customers—including customers who may sometimes
act as generators—regulators, suppliers, and others—can reliably communicate. 
IoT proliferation illustrates the distributed energy ecosystem’s dependence
on an open and neutral internet. “We used to think of the home as the grid
edge where people consumed electricity but did not produce it. Dr. Mahmoud
Daneshmand observed the smart grid era is pushing sensors and, thus, 
visibility, into the distribution system, where the grid presumably ‘ends.’”309 
“[D]igitization and internet of things” are fundamental to smart grid operation, 
and will be “even more so in the future,” Vernotte et al. observe.310  The
smart grid “enables a home or a building to serve as an energy generator,
or to decrease or shift energy on demand to aid the grid, save money, prevent
blackouts, and protect the environment by reducing [greenhouse gas]
emissions.”311 “The need to protect open and neutral Internet access for the
energy sector is commensurate with the distributed energy ecosystem’s
reach,” my 2018 Article argued.312 
“For utilities with millions of customers such as Southern California 
Edison (SCE), an investor-owned electric utility (IOU) regulated by the 
CPUC, with over 4.9 million customer connections, negotiating Internet 
access agreements with multiple ISPs to reach their 14 million customers
would be costly, risky, and fraught with uncertainty,” my comments to the
FCC’s 2014 and 2018 net neutrality proceedings observed.313 Energy reliability, 
safety, just and reasonable rates, and achievement of environmental objectives 
to forestall climate change depends on all of us—energy sector customers
308. Jane K. Winn, Crafting A License to Know from A Privilege to Access, 79 WASH. L.
REV. 285, 297 (2004). 
309. Sandoval, Net Neutrality Powers Energy and Forestalls Climate Change, supra
note 6, at 18 (citing Dr. Mahmoud Daneshmand, Big Challenges for Big Data in the Smart 
Grid Era, ECN MAG. (Apr. 4, 2017), https://www.ecnmag.com/blog/2017/04/big-
challenges-bigdata-smart-grid-era [https://perma.cc/4CTG-YLCC]). 
310. Vernotte et al., supra note 3, at 2. 
311. Sandoval, Net Neutrality Powers Energy and Forestalls Climate Change, supra
note 6, at 18. 
312. Id.
313. Sandoval, Internet Freedom Reply Comments, supra note 37, at 50–51 (citing 
Commissioner Sandoval 2015 Open Internet Ex Parte Comments, supra note 305, at 2, 3). 
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and generators, researchers, regulators, suppliers, public safety personnel,
and others—not just on entities that can afford or access a commercial internet 
connection. The ability to use mass market internet services protected by
enforceable net neutrality rules such as those adopted in the FCC’s 2015 
Open Internet Order is crucial to energy sector reliability, safety, the 
environment, national security, and our democracy. 
If a responsible entity in the energy sector detected a third-party slowing 
energy internet signals, delaying system communications, and causing
some latency-sensitive or data-rich communications to fail due to delays,
they should call Homeland Security and the FBI, and notify the industry
via a NERC Alert. DHS and the FBI would coordinate to identify the perpetrator
and stop the throttling and traffic degradation. The United States Attorneys’
Office would determine if the perpetrator could be prosecuted for 
cybercrimes or for sabotage of the energy system. The hacker paradigm 
obscures the risks of paid priority, throttling, or blocking behavior by ISPs 
authorized by the FCC’s repeal of net neutrality rules. 
Under FERC cybersecurity rules, responsible entities must ensure supply- 
chain cybersecurity. ISPs are a key energy sector supplier. Responsible 
entities are accountable to FERC rules for ISP cybersecurity including ISP- 
induced cyber vulnerabilities. FERC’s grid reliability and resiliency docket 
should analyze ISP contracts and conduct.  States and localities with
responsibility for energy providers and resources must also act to ensure
that ISP conduct does not undermine energy reliability and resiliency. The 
Energy-Internet nexus underscores the importance of aligning ISP governance 
with energy reliability and cybersecurity duties, and the energy system’s
interconnected nature makes communications failures with energy resources
a reliability and safety issue for the entire grid—not just for the energy
resource or ISP subscriber. 
VII. THE ENERGY-INTERNET NEXUS: GRID COMMUNICATIONS ENABLE 
RELIABILITY, RESOURCE, AND ENVIRONMENTAL GOALS 
AT JUST AND REASONABLE RATES 
A. The Energy-Internet Nexus 
As the GAO reported in 2005, more grid functions are being executed
through ICT, a trend which will likely grow. Those communications functions 
are not just done through closed proprietary, utility-owned networks or
commercial plans. Increasingly, energy communications use the internet
for some or all of the transport path. 
147
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As noted by the GAO, “[s]ince the early 1990s, increasing computer 
interconnectivity—most notably growth in the use of the Internet—has 
revolutionized the way that our government, our nation, and much of the 
world communicate and conduct business.”314 In 2017, Rafael Leal-Arcas
observed that, “[a]n Internet for energy interconnects the energy network
with the Internet, allowing units of energy (locally generated, stored, and 
forwarded) to be dispatched when and where it is needed.”315 Leal-Arcas’s
observation does not describe a separate “Internet for energy,” but instead
it emphasizes the centrality of the internet to energy management. The 
GAO’s 2005 Cybersecurity Report noted, “[w]hile the benefits have been
enormous, this widespread interconnectivity also poses significant risks
to the government’s and our nation’s computer systems and, more importantly, 
to the critical operations and infrastructures they support.”316 
The Energy-Internet nexus has grown as electric grid planning, operation, 
resource dispatch, control, and maintenance increasingly depend on the 
internet. This is a natural growth because reliable communications are 
essential to the integration of renewables, demand response, and other 
resources. As the grid edge blurs to include behind the meter resources such
as batteries, smart thermostats, and rooftop solar, many of which are connected 
to residential Wi-Fi, home and business, governance of mass-market internet
connections has become critical to protecting electric reliability and deploying 
climate change solutions. 
B. Electric Grid Functions, Management, Oversight, and Planning 
Increasingly Rely on Communications and Information 
Technology, Including the Internet 
1. Electric Grid Regulators Rely on the Internet 
The internet is crucial to the electric grid’s daily function, as well as to 
the natural gas system that supplies electric plants and natural gas consumers.
Regulators including ISOs and RTOs that oversee the BES under FERC 
jurisdiction rely on the internet to ensure grid reliability and cybersecurity.
CAISO, for example, uses, “the Alert, Warning, & Emergency (AWE) Tool 
as needed to issue Emergency notifications. Subscribers receive these alerts
314. GAO, Critical Infrastructure Protection, supra note 112, at 1.
315. Rafael Leal-Arcas, Sustainability, Common Concern, and Public Goods, 49 
GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 801, 877 n.379 (2017) (citing Internet of Energy for Electric Mobility, 
INTERNET OF ENERGY, http://www.artemis-ioe.eu/ [https://perma.cc/E8PU-6Q4T]).
316. GAO, Critical Infrastructure Protection, supra note 112, at 1.
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via email and the ISO Today app.”317  “NERC Alerts” depend on the internet
to send emails to “[n]otify the entire industry of an alert via email within minutes” 
about cybersecurity vulnerabilities.318 
CAISO also uses the public internet for energy dispatch communications to
scheduling coordinators, “representing any generation or participating loads 
within the ISO control area or planning to import generation at the ISO
control area interties.”319 These scheduling coordinators (SC) are the only 
entities, “authorized to transact business directly with the ISO.”320 In regards
to the importance of the internet to CAISO operations, many CAISO products 
and services require use of web-based applications to submit bids, receive 
market information, track grid status information, and take part in market
simulations.321 
SCs must decide whether to establish and maintain communications 
with CAISO through the ECN private network run by AT&T for a monthly 
fee, with a connection initiation time of 30–45 business days.322  CAISO
also allows SCs to communicate through the public internet with, “little 
or no cost for setup and maintenance and minimal setup time.”323  CAISO
noted, “[i]f the internet carrier selected by an SC has an availability issue,
it may affect the SC’s ability to communicate with the ISO.”324 Moreover,
CAISO imposes no service quality standards on the scheduling coordinator’s
use of the public internet for communication.  CAISO, SCs, market participants,
and others must recognize the risks to energy reliability net neutrality repeal 
triggers. 
317. CAL. INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, REAL-TIME COMMUNICATIONS GUIDELINES, PROCEDURE 
5110, at 8 (2018), https://www.caiso.com/Documents/5110.pdf [https://perma.cc/RG5G-
9VZA].
318. Todd Thompson & Chris Lada, NERC Alert System, Overview, N. AM. ELECTRIC 
RELIABILITY CORP. 6 (2010), https://www.npcc.org/Library/Workshops/20100921TFIS 
T06.pdf [https://perma.cc/5E57-LMCS].
319. CAL. INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, 10.5 SYSTEMS ACCESS INFORMATION FOR MARKET
PARTICIPANTS 10 (Feb. 1, 2019), http://www.caiso.com/Documents/SystemAccessInformation 
_MarketParticipants.pdf [https://perma.cc/F7UU-YEVR].
320. CAL. INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, SC CERTIFICATION OVERVIEW, supra note 244, at 1.
321. See CAL. INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, 10.5 SYSTEMS ACCESS INFORMATION FOR
MARKET PARTICIPANTS (Feb 1, 2019), http://www.caiso.com/Documents/SystemAccess 
Information_MarketParticipants.pdf. 
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2. The Electric Grid’s Distributed Nature and Distributed Energy 
Resources Rely on the Internet to Achieve Service, Cost, 
and Environmental Goals 
a. Grid Resource Telemetry Increasingly Depends on the Internet 
To promote renewable and DER integration as well as lower cost and 
market entry barriers, CAISO created options for participating energy 
generators to use the internet for grid operations telemetry. CAISO requires
that generating units and load participants, such as those authorized to
dispatch power or to provide load shifting resources such as demand response, 
“must establish and maintain a data processing gateway between plant 
facilities and the ISO energy management system for the purpose of  
generation control and monitoring.”325 
CAISO requires, “direct telemetry of participating generators and load by
installing a remote intelligent gateway (RIG) for generating units providing
regulation energy or a data processing gateway (DPG) or other ISO-approved
technology for resources providing non-regulation ancillary services or
supplemental energy.”326  RIGs work in real time to enable CAISO, “to
collect data and distribute supervisory control commands to and from
generators as well as transfer this data to and from multiple central monitoring 
and supervisory control sites.”327 CAISO requires data encryption and controls
data delivery media to ensure “that a [p]articipating [g]enerator reliably 
receives ISO [supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA)] system
instructions according to their participation agreements.”328 
In 2016, while the FCC’s net neutrality rules were in force, CAISO began
allowing participating generators to communicate telemetry through the
internet using designated programs to promote security.329  In 2017, CAISO
authorized the company Dispersive Technologies to provide connectivity 
at the resource owner’s site to CAISO’s EMS.330 This option allows
communication using, “an Internet Service Provider broadband connection 
(Ethernet, DSL, cellular IP, satellite IP, or wireless) as the local access to
325. Metering and Telemetry Ensure Accurate Revenue Accounting, Metering and
Telemetry Are Mandatory Tools for Ensuring Accurate Revenue Accounting and ISO 





BUSINESS PRACTICE MANUAL FOR DIRECT TELEMETRY, supra note 36, at 21.
Id.
329. Assigned Commissioner’s Ruling Entering Workshop Report into the Record 
and Seeking Comment (R.13-12-011), CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N (Oct. 26, 2016), at Attach
B, CAISO Presentation, at slide 5 [hereinafter CPUC, Assigned Commissioner’s Ruling 
R.13-12-011].
330. CAISO, New Resource Implementation Process Enhancement, supra note 249. 
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the public internet. There is no need for resource owners to maintain digital
certificates or provision T1 lines for ECN connectivity.”331 
Dispersive Technologies described itself as an, “Internet-based, software- 
defined network for use by California’s energy grid operator to efficiently
and effectively connect entities using real-time devices to the grid’s energy
management system.” Dispersive Technologies’ software-defined network
(SDN) requires “only a standard broadband connection to the public [i]nternet,” 
making it “easier and less expensive to install than other networks. A utility
or cogeneration plant can deploy it in days rather than weeks.”332 
Lowering operational and entry costs is critical to enabling dispatch of 
renewable energy resources. Energy market resources must bid and compete 
on costs to obtain dispatch orders. The Supreme Court explained in FERC 
v. Electric Power Supply Ass’n that grid operators, “accept the generators’ 
bids in order of cost (least expensive first) until they satisfy the LSEs’ [load 
service entity such as a utility] total demand.”333 Reducing costs to acquire
and maintain communications channels suitable to CAISO standards facilitates
renewable generation deployment and achievement of environmental goals, 
including climate change solutions.
Regarding its decision to authorize a public internet connection for 
participating generators, CAISO reported that “[o]ver time, the reliability
of the public [i]nternet has improved but cyber threat to public networks 
has increased.”334 CAISO reported that Dispersive Technologies features
an “integrated firewall” to protect field assets and ensure “highly secure
communications.”335 As discussed above in section V(c), firewalls may protect
against hackers but will not block ISP network management techniques 
for internet traffic crossing their network.
331. Dispersive Technologies and California ISO Launch First Software-Defined 





333. FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 763 (as revised Jan. 28,
2016) (citing Order No. 745, Demand Response Compensation in Organized Wholesale 
Energy Markets, 134 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61187 (2011). See e.g., Market Processes and Products, 
CAL. INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, http://www.caiso.com/market/Pages/MarketProcesses.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/GCV2-XUAB] (describing CAISO market using bids to meet energy needs). 
334. BUSINESS PRACTICE MANUAL FOR DIRECT TELEMETRY, supra note 36. 








   
   
    
    
 
 








    
       
    
    
     
 
   
 
 
   
  






   
   
   
b. The Internet Enables Demand Response, Load Reduction 
and Shifting as an Energy Resource 
In 2016, FERC approved a new type of ISO market participant called a 
Distributed Energy Resource Aggregator (DERA).336 CAISO allows DERS
and DERAs to participate in its wholesale energy market through the energy
resources they control or aggregate through contracts. “Distributed energy
resource providers are market participants who own or operate an aggregation 
of distributed energy resources in order to participate in the wholesale
market.”337 
CAISO reported that prospective DERA market participants sought the
public internet instead of the ECN to provide telemetry to CAISO and reduce 
barriers to entering ISO markets.338 CAISO allows DERAs to connect to 
its grid operations through the public internet using the Dispersive Technology 
SDN.339 
c. Four Second Grid Communications: Telemetry Requirements 
in the CAISO Market 
CAISO imposes speed requirements on participating generator telemetry 
to ensure grid visibility, dispatch, reliability, and control. Under CAISO 
rules, a “[p]articipating [g]enerator must be able to accept and begin processing 
direct digital control (DDC) signals (Set Points) within the ISO time standard 
(two-second maximum from ISO’s EMS to output of the Real-Time Device)”.
This“two-second maximumincludesany Generator or third-party communication 
equipment located between the ISO and the Participating Generator.”340 
Further, “the plant controller must receive the signal from the Real-Time
Device within the ISO time standard (an additional two seconds from output 
of the Real-Time Device to plant controller).”341  These time signals and “time
standards also apply in the return direction, resulting in a total maximum 
of eight seconds, round trip, for the signal to travel from the ISO EMS to 
the plant controller and back.”342 
CAISO’s two-second time standard for participating generators for the 
sending or receiving of signals (that is, four-seconds per completed dispatch
and receipt) allows grid visibility, and the ability to initiate grid controls 
if needed. Participating generators may be located on a residential or
336. BUSINESS PRACTICE MANUAL FOR DIRECT TELEMETRY, supra note 36. 
337.  Distributed Energy Resource Provider, supra note 335. 
338.  BUSINESS PRACTICE MANUAL FOR DIRECT TELEMETRY, supra note 36. 
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commercial rooftop and connected to that user’s Wi-FI, which runs on the 
public internet. Energy generators may be located at a solar “farm,” a plot 
of land with a cluster or solar panels and controls, a parking lot, or other urban, 
suburban, or rural location. The distributed location of energy resources
illustrates the imperative of addressing ISP network management practices to
protect energy reliability and cybersecurity. 
d. Seconds Count for Grid Communications, Reliability, and Safety 
NERC noted that most, “SCADA systems poll sequentially for electric 
system data, with a typical periodicity of four seconds.”343  In the CAISO 
market, “DER facilities larger than 1 MW in size must communicate 3 data
points with the utility every 4 seconds: voltage, real power, and reactive 
power.”344 “Facilities larger than 9.9 MWs must communicate every 4
seconds the three data points above, as well as the following statuses: plant 
on, plant off, and circuit breaker status.”345 Data can be transported to the
utility or grid operator over various media that in 2016 ranged, “from plain 
old telephone lines to Voice Over Internet Protocol or cellular services.”346 
Communications provide visibility into grid assets and enable control 
measures that can prevent localized or cascading outages. NERC determined
that lack of visibility contributed to the 2011 cascading blackout that began
in Arizona, spread to northern Mexico, and then blacked out all of San Diego 
and Imperial counties, as generators tripped off and load leaned on other 
sites.347 A line worker’s error in Arizona caused a line in Imperial County,
California to overload and seek an alternate route for power in San Diego.  
“IID’s 42 kv system started to collapse within 40 seconds of initial 500 kv 
line trip.”348 Within eleven minutes of the error in Arizona and cascading 
blackouts, protection breakers in front of the San Onofre Nuclear Power 
plant disconnected when it sensed a surge in load.349 This grid separation 
343. N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., BALANCING AND FREQUENCY CONTROL, supra 
note 304. 
344. See CPUC D.16-12-047, supra note 26, at 18. 
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. W. ELEC. COORDINATING COUNCIL (WECC), MODULE 9: PRINCIPLES OF POWER
SYSTEM OPERATION 135 (June 2015), https://www.wecc.biz/Administrative/=INTRO_MOD 
_9-Grid%20Ops=rev2015-June.pdf [https://perma.cc/J88J-E9YT] (noting lack of information
sharing between entities contributed to cascading outage and loss of load). 
348. Id. at 138. 
349. Id. at 141. 
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prevented the great Western blackout from spreading into Orange County, 
Los Angeles, and beyond. Increased communication and visibility would
have helped to prevent this cascading outage from spreading into San
Diego County and other regions.
e. Grid Communications Including Fault Detection Relayed Through 
the Internet to Protect Reliability and Public Safety 
The CPUC Water-Energy Nexus December 2016 decision noted that
under then-existing standards, “many DER assets connected to the distribution 
grid sized at 99 MW, aggregated together, do not currently communicate 
with the utility or California Independent System Operator (CAISO) at all, 
which masks generation and load.”350 In “grid fault situations, facilities
trip off, but load remains. As the grid comes back online, there may be
large power swings to consider and manage for the safety of communities 
and the grid. Today that management is largely done by controls on the electric
grid, rather than through communications signals.”351 
CPUC’s decision concluded that, “[e]nabling communications that provide 
visibility would offer much-needed information about load conditions. 
Communications-based controls would reduce risks and costs associated 
with such events.”352 At the CPUC’s October 26, 2016 Water-Energy-
Telecommunications Nexus workshop, participants discussed communications 
requirements for energy resources and their grid consequences.  Energy
generators and major facilities such as substations must have a “Class A
telecom signal” used for the, “direct transfer trip protection scheme” that 
maintains electric system safety and reliability.353  Class A signals must “work 
before, during, and after a fault.”354 “Propagation delay of the Class A telecom
signal of 5-10 cycles is tolerable though grid stability can be impacted by
less than 3 cycles.”355 
The United States electric grid operates at 60Hz (Hertz) or 60 cycles per
second.356 Applying the math, 5–10 cycles normally travels the electric grid 
operating at 60 cycles per second in less than one-quarter of a second.  
Communications delays exceeding 5–10 cycles may trip off energy resources 
350. CPUC D.16-12-047, supra note 26, at 18–19. 
351.  Id. at 19. 
352. Id.
353. CPUC, Assigned Commissioner’s Ruling R.13-12-011, supra note 329, at 3.
354.  Id. 
355. Id.
356. 60 Hz, POWER SYS. CONTROLS, https://www.pscpower.com/60hz/ [https://perma. 
cc/5LXL-AKL4]. A 60Hz electrical system means that it does 60 cycles of frequencies per
second. Marshall Brain, How Power Grids Work, CLARK SCI. CTR., http://www.science.
smith.edu/~jcardell/Courses/EGR220/ElecPwr_HSW.html [https://perma.cc/85Y4-K8G4].
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to protect grid safety.  Similarly, SCADA systems require prompt and consistent 
communications, and “SCADA at the transmission system requires 3–5
seconds communications of signals. SCADA at the distribution level 
require less than 30 second communications.”357 
Communications promote reliability, safety, just and reasonable rates, 
and achievement of environmental goals, each of which is mandated by
California law and other state law. The CPUC emphasized that, “California
Public Utilities Code [s]ection 451 commands us to ensure water and energy
service that is safe and reliable, at just and reasonable rates. That helps achieve 
our goals of protecting the public and environment.”358 CPUC observed
that, “[t]elecommunications service is critical to doing so now, and will be
even more critical in the future.”359 These observations also hold true for
FERC-jurisdictional, as well as other state-regulated energy resources.
f. Communications-Enabled Smart Inverters Provide Visibility and 
Enable Grid Control and DER Dispatch 
In 2011 California Governor Brown called for the implementation of  
12,000 MW of “localized electricity generation” to help the State reach its 
goal to acquire 33 percent of its energy from eligible renewable energy resources 
by 2020.360 The California Energy Commission (CEC) and CPUC expressed
concern that, “[h]igh penetrations of these DER systems, located within 
distribution grids which were designed only for handling customer loads, 
could adversely affect California utility operations.”361  The CEC and CPUC 
worked together with a public working group including technical experts 
to develop strategies and protocols to facilitate DER integration critical to 
achieving renewable energy goals.
Inverters are used to produce Alternating Current (AC) power used in the 
United States electric grid from resources such as wind and solar photovoltaic 
(PV) systems that produce Direct Current (DC) power.362 Hydroelectric
357. CPUC, Assigned Commissioner’s Ruling, R.13-12-011, supra note 329, at 3.
358.  Id. at 17–18. 
359. Id. at 18. 
360. Candidate DER Capabilities: Recommendations for Updating Technical Requirements 
in Rule 21 (R.11‐09‐011), CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, V. 15, at 2 (May 22, 2013). 
361. Id. 
362. Alternate Decision Instituting Cost Certainty, Granting Joint Motions To Approve 
Proposed Revisions to Electric Tariff Rule and Providing Smart Inverter Development A 
Pathway Forward for Pacific Gas and Electric Company, Southern California Edison
Company, and San Diego Gas & Electric Company (D.16-06-052), CAL. PUB. UTIL.
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and biomass generating units, which produce AC power, do not require 
inverters.363 The CPUC reported that as of June 2016 in California, “about
90% of small scale renewable generation is connected to the distribution 
grid through inverters.”364 
Inverters typically have limited communications functionality,
communicating only a stop or go signal for energy exports from a solar or
wind energy resource. Software applications control most inverters, “and
therefore many of their electrical characteristics can be modified through
software settings.”365 Thus, “[t]hese software applications can cause the
inverters to change the real power output, voltage levels, power factor, and other 
electrical characteristics, and can be used to improve the power system 
efficiency.”366 
Communications-enabled smart inverters provide visibility and control 
that foster reliability, safety, and renewable resource deployment. In its 2016
Long-Term Reliability Assessment, NERC noted many utilities “lack sufficient
visibility” of DERs.367 Lack of visibility results in “lack of situational
awareness,” a term NERC defines as, “‘ensuring that accurate information
on current system conditions is continuously available to operators.’”368 
CPUC observed that visibility gained “in person if needed, and control, 
through grid protections from faults if not through communications, is
critical to maintaining electric safety.”369 “The difference between the
current grid and the future grid with smart inverters used for hyper local 
grid protection is an infusion of communications.”370 
Communications capable inverters, “can respond to occasional commands 
to override or modify their autonomous actions by utilities and/or retail
energy providers (REPs).”371  Because “DER systems can be designed 
COMM’N (June 23, 2016), http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/publisheddocs/published/g000/m164/k376/ 
164376491.pdf [hereinafter CPUC D.16-06-052]. 
363. Id.
364. Id. 
365. Id. at 3–4. 
366. Id. at 4.
367. N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., 2016 LONG-TERM RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT, 
at vii. (Dec. 2016), http://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/ 
2016%20Long-Term%20Reliability%20Assessment.pdf [https://perma.cc/S5NE-TN4W].
368. FERC, DISTRIBUTED ENERGY RESOURCES, TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR
THE BULK POWER SYSTEM (Docket No. 18-10-000), at 12 (Feb. 2018), https://www.ferc.gov/ 
CalendarFiles/20180215112833-der-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y4G2-WW2X] (quoting
N.AM.ELEC.RELIABILITY CORP.,REAL-TIME TOOLS SURVEY ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
STAFF REPORT 3 (Executive Summary) (2008), https://www.nerc.com/comm/OC/Realtime%
20Tools%20Best%20Practices%20Task%20Force%20RTBPTF%2020/Real-Time%20Tools 
%20Survey%20Analysis%20and%20Recommendations.pdf [https://perma.cc/P349-DDBL]). 
369. CPUC D.16-12-047, supra note 26, at 19. 
370. Id. at 19. 
371. Id.
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to include sensors that monitor local conditions of voltage levels, frequency 
deviations, and temperature, and can receive emergency commands and 
pricing signals,” DER systems may, “modify their power and reactive power 
output.”372 Communications capabilities can be added to inverters, which
allows settings to be updated as needed, or permits scheduling updates on 
a daily, weekly, and seasonal timeframe.373 
I authored an Interconnection Decision in June 2016 as a CPUC
Commissioner which adopted a process that set a schedule for smart inverter 
communications and functionality protocols to promote renewable integration.374 
As of November 2017, California required smart inverters and pledged 
communications protocols would become mandatory for smart inverters 
in California  in early 2019, just  six  months after the adoption of  
communications standards.375 
The CPUC allows smart inverters to communicate through a variety of 
media including “cellphone channels, AMI networks, private utility networks, 
communications network of their choice and the Internet.”376 Solar resources 
may utilize the internet, VPN, or a to communicate with data centers for 
data exchange, financial risk assessment, grid operations, SCADA, regulatory
reporting, and other applications.377 
Commonly, solar resources at residential and business properties use
the premise’s Wi-Fi to connect the inverter to the internet, enabling solar 
panel monitoring.378 An inappropriately secured inverter presents a cyber 
risk for the facility owner that could undermine grid reliability, particularly if
372. CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, APPENDIX A, REDLINE EDITS CORRESPONDING TO
COMMENTS OF THE DIVISION OF RATEPAYER ADVOCATES, CANDIDATE DER CAPABILITIES:




374. CPUC D.16-06-052, supra note 362, at 41. 
375.  Id. at SIWG Rule 21 Phase 2 Recommendations for the CPUC 1–2. 
376. Id. at SIWG Rule 21 Phase 2 Recommendations for the CPUC 5. 
377. PRESENTATION, SUNSPEC ALL., INFORMATION STANDARDS FOR DISTRIBUTED
ENERGY 5 (Oct. 2015), https://sunspec.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/SunSpecESNAOpen
MeetingOct13.pdf [https://perma.cc/CE75-6GL9].
378. Scott Partlin, 3 Ways on How to Communicate with a Solar Inverter, SMA
CORPORATE BLOG 3 (Apr. 6, 2015), https://www.sma-sunny.com/en/3-ways-on-how-
to-communicate-with-a-solar-inverter/ [https://perma.cc/Q789-9QZP].
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multiple solar resources were compromised.379  Joel B. Eisen & Felix
Mormann observed that “[m]any DERs and devices that control them will 
be located at customer sites with little or no computer security and with 
owners who have minimal or no cybersecurity expertise.”380 
Net neutrality repeal compounds DER cyber vulnerability. If DER 
communications are delayed due to an ISP’s traffic management policies 
or paid priority with other internet users, then grid reliability, safety, and 
renewable dispatch can be undermined. 
VIII. TESTING THE GRID FOR COMMUNICATIONS-INDUCED FAULTS AND 
CASCADING FAILURES 
A. Electric Trips 
The electric grid interconnects to and depends on a range of distributed
energy resources to support its ability to serve energy load while reducing 
the grid’s carbon emissions. This interconnected design also makes the electric
grid vulnerable to outages that may cascade across the grid in seconds.  
Benjamin Schäfer et al. observed that individual electric line overloads 
that trip outages can take place in seconds.381 For example, the 2006 European 
blackout left fifteen million European households without power.382  The
European Commission attributed the blackout’s origin to E.ON Netz, the 
electricity transmission system operator in Northern Germany, which switched
off a high voltage line to let a ship pass underneath the line.383 The EC found
that E.ON Netz did not have proper security procedures and lacked, “the
full technical tools to verify that the system operated within the security 
limits.”384 
This incident led to “overloading of lines and finally to splitting of the
Union of Co-ordination of Electricity Transmission network into three zones:
379. William Westerhof, How to Protect Your Solar Inverter From Hackers, SOLAR
QUOTES BLOG 2 (Feb. 19, 2018), https://www.solarquotes.com.au/blog/solar-inverter-
security-hackers/ [https://perma.cc/ZUP9-LZDH]. 
380. Joel B. Eisen & Felix Mormann, Free Trade in Electric Power, 2018 UTAH L.
REV. 49, 112. 
381. Benjamin Schäfer et al., Dynamically Induced Cascading Failures in Power Grids,
9:1975 NATURE COMM. 1, 2 (2018), https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-018-04287-
5.pdf [https://perma.cc/437Y-CY97]. 
382. UNION FOR THE COORDINATION OF TRANSMISSION OF ELEC., FINAL REPORT,
SYSTEM DISTURBANCE ON 4, NOVEMBER 2006, at 5–6 (2006), https://www.entsoe.eu/fileadmin/ 
user_upload/_library/publications/ce/otherreports/Final-Report-20070130.pdf [https://perma.cc/
YNS6-Y6W6].
383. Press Release, European Commission, Blackout of November 2006: Important




SANDOVAL5.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/12/2019 9:48 AM      
 
   
  
    
   
    
   
   
 
  






        
     
   
   
    
  
  
    




   
    
  
  
    
   
   
  
   
  
   
[VOL. 10: 91, 2018–19] Cybersecurity Paradigm Shift 
SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE & ENERGY LAW 
West, East and South-East. The Western zone lacked power and the Eastern
zone had too much power.”385 During this event, “33 high-voltage transmission
lines tripped within a time period of 1 min and 20 s, with 30 of those lines
failing within the first 19 s[econds].”386 Similarly, the U.S. electric grid is 
designed to trip facilities to prevent imbalances that could lead to electrical 
overload, fires, electrocution, and other dangers. In the CAISO grid, “[i]f 
voltage goes below 80% everything trips off within 2 seconds.”387 
B. Modeling Internet-Induced Electricity Outages 
ICT can help reduce the risk of grid fluctuations that exceed the grid’s 
tolerance and time levels.388 At the same time, electric grid internet use
introduces cybersecurity vulnerabilities. Juan Hoyos, Mark Dehus, and 
Timothy X Brown argue the “transition from analog to digital data acquisition
allows the power industry to innovate with new communications technologies 
and protocols” while posing, “new cybersecurity problems that can affect
the stability and reliability of the power grid.”389 
Hoyos, Dehus, and Brown modeled a hack on the Generic Object Oriented
Substation Events (GOOSE) protocol, which is used in the electric industry 
to distribute event data across electric substation networks.390 GOOSE’s
main purpose is to carry vital information (alarms, status, and control) between
devices. This is important because “[a]ny alteration of these values could
can cause an automation breakdown, causing a circuit breaker to miss an
operation, bypassing interlocks, or causing physical damages in the field
devices like power transformers or circuit breakers.”391 “A GOOSE attack
that appears to change the values of generation levels could produce voltage
dips, frequency excursions, and cascading problems throughout the Western 
Electricity Coordinating Council . . . region.”392 
385. Id.
386. Schäfer et al., supra note 381, at 2. 
387. CPUC, Assigned Commissioner’s Ruling R.13-12-011, supra note 329, Attach. 
A, at 6.
388. Schäfer et al., supra note 381, at 2 (noting that cascading events will become 
more likely in the future due to increasing load and additional fluctuations in the grid).
389. Juan Hoyos, Mark Dehus, Timothy X Brown, Exploiting the GOOSE Protocol: 




391. Id. at 1510. 
392. Id.
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Hoyos, Dehus, and Brown conducted an, “ethical demonstration of security 
vulnerability in the Digital Energy Laboratory at the University of Colorado
Boulder, with details of the equipment and scripts intentionally omitted.”393 
Their simulated hack enabled malware to control certain substation equipment 
that, “has the potential to cause outages that range from a single feeder on 
up.”394 They recommend several security measures and emphasized “it is 
of vital importance that the configuration of the network switch and routers 
be permitted just for trusted traffic and users inside the substation network.”395 
Chih-Che Sun et al. developed and simulated an energy grid cyber-attack 
at Washington State University’s (WSU) Smart City Testbed. In one 
demonstration, “attackers are assumed to have the knowledge to access
multiple substation communication systems. By capturing and analyzing 
unencrypted GOOSE packets, attackers are able to modify and resend
them to trip circuit breakers in targeted substations.”396  “In the first attack
scenario, attackers’ targets are substations 38, 35, 33 and 32 since these 
substations connect to generation sources. The attack starts at t [time] =5
s[econds], and the targets are compromised one by one every 5 s[econds].”397 
Then, “[o]nce the last targeted substation (i.e., substation 32) is compromised, 
this power system collapses due to insufficient power generation.”398  Next,
“[a]fter 4 generators are disconnected from the power grid, cascading events 
are triggered. Finally, a wide area power outage is caused by the coordinated
cyber-attacks.”399 
ISOs also use grid simulators to analyze the “impact of data feed losses,
data corruption, and dispatcher tool functionality” and to identify potential
vulnerabilities.400 PJM studies have focused on, “identifying vulnerabilities
such as the loss of a substation or common mode outages such as the loss
of generation fed from common gas infrastructure”401 PJM has not studied
“the effects associated with the loss of multiple substations or critical system 
components as could be contemplated in a coordinated physical attack” or
in a coordinated cyber-attack.402 This Article recommends ISOs, energy 
sector participants, and state PUCs should conduct simulations of ISP-
induced signal degradations or delays to determine their effect on grid
reliability and renewable integration. 
393. Id.
394. Id. at 1512. 
395. Id.
396. Sun et al., supra note 92, at 54. 
397.  Id. 
398. Id.
399. Id.
400. PJM, FERC Grid Resilience Comments, supra note 54, at 19. 
401.  Id. at 35–36. 
402. Id.
160
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IX. NET NEUTRALITY REPEAL UNDERMINES PUBLIC SAFETY AND 
ENERGY RELIABILITY 
A. The DOJ’s and FCC’s Defense of its Failure to Consider Public
Safety in the Net Neutrality Repeal Mischaracterizes the  
Record and Overlooks the FCC’s Statutory Duties 
The DOJ’s and FCC’s brief defending the FCC’s Internet Freedom Order
against appeal represented to the D.C. Circuit that, “Petitioners did not  
raise any issues in this proceeding that were distinct to public safety.”403 
Respondents’ mischaracterize the record in the Internet Freedom docket.  
My search of the FCC’s Electronic Comments Filing System (ECFS) for
the Internet Freedom docket found 417 filings that mention “public safety”
in that proceeding’s record.404 
Respondents overlook the fact that the Internet Freedom Order dismissed 
my comments expressing concern about the consequences of paid priority
for national security, public safety, and critical infrastructure including energy.
In a footnote the FCC derisively stated “[n]or do we think we need to address 
assertions that paid prioritization would endanger [United States] national 
security as they are vague and lack any substantiation whatsoever.”405 
My Internet Freedom docket Reply Comments cited federal and state 
law duties to protect critical infrastructure including the energy sector,
CIPA, PPD-21, President Trump’s 2017 Executive Order on Cybersecurity,
and the Countering America’s Adversaries with Sanctions Act (finding that
the Russians used the internet to interfere with United States elections) as
statutes that require the FCC to consider the impact of net neutrality repeal
on public safety and critical infrastructure including the energy sector.406 
In the Internet Freedom docket, I filed my 2014 testimony to a Congressional
Democratic Committee hearing about the importance of net neutrality
403. Respondents’ Brief, supra note 261, at 96. 
404. ECFS Search for filings with the term in full text “lack of competition,” for
Rulemaking 17-108, conducted on Oct. 27, 2018, https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/search/filings? 
proceedings_name=17-108&q=%22public%20safety%22&sort=date_disseminated, DESC. 
405. FCC, Internet Freedom Order, supra note 4, at n.943. 
406. See Critical Infrastructures Protection Act of 2001 (CIPA), Pub. L. 107-56, tit. 
X, § 1016, 115 Stat. 272, 400; PPD-21, supra note 163; Exec. Order No. 13800, 82 Fed. Reg.
22391, § 2(d) (May 16, 2017); President Trump Executive Order 13,800 on Cybersecurity, 
supra note 183; Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, Pub. L. No.








    
   
  
  
   
 
   
    
     








       
 
    
    





   
    
     
   
 
     
  
     
        
  
  
    
      
  
to critical infrastructure including energy, which emphasized federal and 
state energy reliability and safety duties that could be compromised by
blocking, throttling, paid priority, and “minimum speed” requirements.407 
That testimony, “discussed in detail why individualized bargaining proposals 
[for minimum Internet speeds or paid priority] endanger critical infrastructure, 
which relies on the open Internet for services such as energy demand response
to prevent electrical blackouts.”408 
The 2015 Order considered critical infrastructure sector needs in rejecting 
proposals to allow paid priority or individualized negotiations for fast internet
access with a “minimum speed” guaranteed.409 The FCC’s 2015 decision
to reject paid priority cited my comments submitted when I served as a CPUC
Commissioner, which asserted that paid priority would increase “barriers
to adopting Internet-based applications,” such as Internet-enabled demand
response deployed to “prevent power blackouts, forestall the need to build 
fossil-fueled power plants, promote environmental sustainability, and
manage energy resources.”410 
Government Petitioners challenging the FCC’s Internet Freedom Order
as arbitrary and capricious under the APA highlighted the importance of
net neutrality to public safety, critical infrastructure, and energy reliability.
The Government Petitioners’ brief argued that “[i]nstant communication 
between customers, suppliers, energy generators, contractors, regulators, 
and safety personnel is essential to maintaining a safe and reliable grid,
and must thus remain free from blocking or delay due to throttling or
deprioritization.”411 Government Petitioners also cited my comments about 
the importance of the open internet to energy resource management and
reliability: “California has relied on demand response services offered by 
utilities and third parties to directly balance load, manage congestion, and 
407. Letter from Catherine J.K. Sandoval, Commissioner, California Public Utilities 
Commission, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, F.C.C., GN Docket No. 14-28, 10-127, Attach.
at 14 (filed Oct. 14, 2014) [hereinafter Commissioner Sandoval, Ex Parte Letter].
408. Commissioner Sandoval 2015 Open Internet Ex Parte Comments, supra note 305,
at 59 n.266. 
409. FCC, 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 5, at 49; id. at n.254 (citing Commissioner 
Sandoval Ex Parte Letter, supra note 407, Attach. at 14 (“[A]ny of the minimum level of
access standards the FCC proposes would be insufficient to support the needs of a diversity 
of Internet users including Critical Infrastructure.”)). 
410. Id. at 6 (citing FCC, 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 5, at 55 n. 291. See also
FERC v. Electric Power Supply Ass’n., 136 S. Ct. 760, 768–69, as revised (Jan. 28, 2016)
(“Wholesale demand response . . . pays consumers for commitments to curtail their use of
power, so as to curb wholesale rates and prevent [electric] grid breakdowns.”)). 
411. Brief for Government Petitioners at 24, Mozilla Corp., et al. v. FCC, Case No.
18-1051 (D.C. Cir. Court of Appeals) (Nov. 27, 2018) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 5195c; Sandoval,
Internet Freedom Reply Comments, supra note 37, at 47). 
162
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satisfy state and federal reliability standards.”412 They emphasized that other
states, such as Massachusetts, have demand response programs and would 
be equally affected by net neutrality repeal.413 
The CPUC’s Internet Freedom docket comments emphasized that:
“States have independent and primary authority, under both energy and
telecommunications law, which is to say under both the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC) and FCC regulatory regimes, to ensure 
the safety of the energy and communications infrastructure.”414  The CPUC
cited the Energy Policy Act of 2005 which provides, “it shall not ‘be construed 
to preempt any authority of any State to take action to ensure the safety,
adequacy, and reliability of electric service within that State, as long as 
such action is not inconsistent with any reliability standard.’”415 
The CPUC also emphasized that under California Public Utilities Code 
Section 451, California utilities have an obligation, “to protect the safety
and health of the public.”416 The CPUC added that, “without non-discriminatory
rules, providers of emergency services or public safety agencies might 
have to pay extra for their traffic to have priority. If states, cities, and counties 
were required to pay for priority access, their ability to provide comprehensive, 
timely information to the public in a crisis could be profoundly impaired.”417 
CPUC’s comments in the Internet Freedom docket also emphasized, 
“[p]rotection of public safety” as “a core exercise of a state’s police powers.”418 
CPUC noted as examples of its exercise of police power the rules CPUC
adopted to ensure the safety of all poles and conduit in California by 
promulgating rules related to overhead electric and communications facilities 
(General Order 95) as well as underground electric and communications 
facilities (General Order 128). The CPUC underscored the, “FCC cannot 
diminish this state police power to protect public safety and welfare,
412. Id. at 24 (citing Sandoval, Internet Freedom Reply Comments, supra note 37, at
47).
413. Id. at 25 (see, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 25, § 21(b) (2019) (mandating energy
efficiency plans that include demand response programs); Rockland Elec. Co., Case No.
ER16060524 (N.J. Bd. of Pub. Util., Aug. 23, 2017). 
414. CPUC, Comments, In the Matter of Restoring Internet Freedom, supra note 110,
at 4–5. 
415. Id. at n.9.
416. Id. at 5. 
417. Id. at 29. 
418. Id. at 5. 
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notwithstanding whether it reclassifies BIAS, or otherwise attempts to 
preempt state action regarding utility poles.”419 
Although the CPUC cited utility pole regulation as an example of state 
responsibility under the state police power, its citations to federal and state
authority and concern for public safety are not limited to utility poles. CPUC’s 
comments emphasized the state’s responsibility for “to ensure the safety 
of the energy and communications infrastructure.”420 The CPUC also
emphasized that, “a free and open [i]nternet is critical to areas such as energy, 
education, medicine, and public safety.”421 As CPUC’s comments 
demonstrated, the energy sector’s distinct public safety concerns about 
net neutrality repeal arise from federal statutory duties to ensure energy 
reliability and cybersecurity, as well as state duties to ensure safe, reliable
service, at just and reasonable rates, and compliance with environmental
mandates. 
The CPUC also expressed concern that, “as the 2015 Open Internet Order
discusses, the absence of strong anti-discriminatory rules could undermine
critical infrastructure and public safety.”422 Each paragraph CPUC cited 
from the FCC’s 2015 Open Internet Order adopting net neutrality rules 
referenced, as a basis for adopting those rules, my comments filed in the Open 
Internet proceeding, as well as the comments of other parties.423 
Santa Clara County informed the FCC through an ex parte letter filed 
in December 2017 that, “[s]ince 2010, [Santa Clara] County has invested 
heavily in developing and implementing systems that provide key public 
health, welfare, and safety services to the local community over the internet,
and has current plans to implement many more such systems.”424 The
419. Id.
420. Id.
421. Id. at 27. 
422. 
150).
Id. (citing See, e.g., FCC, 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 5, ¶¶ 114, 126, 
423.  FCC, 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 5, ¶ 114 n.254; id. ¶ 126 n.291. See e.g., 
Commissioner Sandoval, Ex Parte Letter, supra note 407, at 2 (asserting that paid prioritization 
undermines public safety and universal service, and increases barriers to adopting Internet-
based applications such as Internet-enabled demand response communications electric and 
gas utilities use to prevent power blackouts, forestall the need to build fossil-fueled power 
plants, promote environmental sustainability, and manage energy resources); FCC, 2015
Open Internet Order, supra note 5, ¶ 150, n.355 (citing Commissioner Sandoval, Ex Parte 
Letter, supra note 407, at 14 (asserting the commercial reasonableness rule would deter
investment and Internet applications, such as Internet-enabled “Smart beds,” which read a
patient’s vital signs and send aggregated data on available beds to mass casualty and disaster
planners who use this information to determine which hospital has an available bed in a
burn unit)).
424. Letter from James R. Williams, County Counsel, Santa Clara County, Office of 
the County Counsel, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, Ex Parte Letter, Restoring Internet
Freedom WC Docket No. 17-108, at 1 (Dec. 6, 2017), https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/12079423
164
SANDOVAL5.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/12/2019 9:48 AM      
 
   
  
     
  
   
 
      
      
 
   
    
 
  
       
    
 
   
       
  
   
  
 




   
   
   
      
        
      
 
     
 
     
 
   
    
  
   
  
   
[VOL. 10: 91, 2018–19] Cybersecurity Paradigm Shift 
SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE & ENERGY LAW 
County explained that public safety depends on community access to an
open and neutral internet: “The County’s and County Fire’s newly implemented, 
internet-based services depend, in many cases, on community members’ 
access to broadband internet on nondiscriminatory terms—in other words,
they depend on net neutrality principles like those articulated in the Net
Neutrality Rules.”425 The County further explained that, “[i]f traffic to and
from these systems is blocked, delayed, or subjected to paid prioritization 
schemes or other discriminatory practices, the County’s and County Fire’s 
ability to effectively provide services to the community would be significantly 
weakened.”426 These services are provided pursuant to Santa Clara County’s
governmental duties, which it largely fulfills through the internet.427
The County emphasized that post-facto enforcement through other laws 
would be insufficient to protect distinct public safety obligations and needs: 
“Because many of these systems are used in emergency situations and to 
protect health and safety, after-the-fact action to address internet service 
provider (ISP) practices is insufficient to address the harm that the County,
County Fire, and the community, are likely to suffer.”428  Santa Clara County
offered its virtual Emergency Operations Center as an example, explaining 
the Center is, “used by the County and County Fire to coordinate crisis response 
[and] relies on contributors’ access to the internet on nondiscriminatory
terms. Interference with this system would cause irreversible damage.”429
The Alarm Industry Association and alarm company ADT also submitted 
comments in the Internet Freedom docket. They expressed concerns that 
20842/2017.12.06%20-%20Comment%20of%20County%20of%20Santa%20Clara%20and
%20Santa%20Clara%20County%20Central%20Fire%20Protection%20District.pdf [https://
perma.cc/2WVS-2XPY] [hereinafter, Santa Clara County Internet Freedom ex parte].
425. Id.
426. Id.
427. Id. at 6 (“Under California’s emergency management framework, the County
Office of Emergency Services (OES) is the lead emergency management agency for the
entire Santa Clara County Operational Area (Op Area).”). California’s Standardized Emergency
Management System (SEMS), CA Code of Regulations (CCR) Title 19, section 2401, 
provides the state’s emergency management framework. See CPUC D.16-12-066, Decision on
Rural Call Completion Issues, Other Call Completion Issues and Call Initiation Issues Including
Lack Of 911 Access and Dial Tone,  at 73, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N (Dec. 1, 2016), 
http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M171/K301/171301678.pdf.
(noting that SEMS divides by governmental level responsibility for incident command). 
See id. at 74 (citing CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 19, § 2403(b) (2016) (“There are five designated
levels in the SEMS organization: field response, local government, operational area, 
regional, and state. Each level is activated as needed.”).
428. Santa Clara County Internet Freedom ex parte, supra note 424, at 2.
429. Id.
165
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paid priority would interfere with public safety. The Alarm Industry
Communications Committee observed that, through paid-priority, ISPs who 
compete with the association’s members can deprioritize, degrade, or interrupt 
alarm transmissions, “running contrary to the Commission’s statutory obligation 
to promote network development to support public safety.”430  The Alarm
Industry Association emphasized, “[i]n emergency situations, seconds could 
mean the difference between life and death.”431 State and local laws impose
legal obligations on the alarm industry through service standards, including a
maximum transmission time for an alarm signal to travel from the premises
to the central monitoring station.432 The ability to comply with state, local, 
and federal legal obligations to protect public safety, life, and limb, can be 
compromised by the ISP paid priority, throttling, blocking, and network
management practices the FCC’s Internet Freedom Order authorized.
Given the multitude of comments from various industries impacted by
the evolving net neutrality rules, the D.C. Circuit should take a dim view
of the DOJ’s and FCC’s mischaracterization of the record in the Internet
Freedom docket. Public safety, energy reliability mandates, and environmental 
risks consequent from the net neutrality repeal were raised in the record and
cited by the FCC’s 2015 Open Internet Order as reasons for adopting net
neutrality rules.433 The APA requires the FCC to explain its divergence from
the agency’s prior decision.434 Moreover, the FCC is statutorily mandated to
consider public safety in its decision-making, and to articulate its consideration 
of those issues.435 
Verizon’s July 2018 interference with the Santa Clara County Fire 
Protection District’s internet use during an active firefight provides an
example of ISP exercise of throttling power presaged by Santa Clara 
County’s December 2017 ex parte comments. The 2015 Open Internet
Order would have enabled the Fire District to file a complaint with the
FCC arguing Verizon violated net neutrality rules applicable to mass-
430. Alarm Industry Communications Committee, Reply Comments, Restoring Internet
Freedom WC Docket No. 17-108, at 5 (Aug. 30, 2017), https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/10830023 
2601598/AICC.NN%20Reply%20Comments.v6-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/TW86-YJ4R].
See also ADT, Reply Comments Restoring Internet Freedom WC Docket No. 17-108, at 
3–4 (Aug. 30, 2017), https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/filing/10830125808530 [https://perma.cc/
UN8U-MHY3].
431. Alarm Industry Communications Committee, Reply Comments, supra note 430, at 5.
432. Id.
433. 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 5, ¶¶ 114 n.254, 126 n.291, 150 n.355. 
434. Amicus Brief, supra note 37, at 5 (citing Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 135 
S. Ct. 1199, 1209 (2015) (quoting FCC v. Fox TV Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009) 
(“the Commission failed to explain its departure from its previously expressed views,
rendering its decision ‘arbitrary and capricious’ and contrary to law”).
435. Id. at 4 (citing Nuvio Corp. v. FCC, 473 F.3d 302, 307 (D.C. Cir. 2006). See also 
Sandoval, Internet Freedom Reply Comments, supra note 37, at 47.
166
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market Internet services (if used by the Fire District) by slowing the unit’s 
Internet speeds to act “more like an AOL dial up modem from 1995,” no
longer supporting “a modern broadband internet connection,” and “hampering 
operations for the assigned crew.”436  “The 2015 Order shielded emergency
responders using mass-market [i]nternet services through ex ante rules 
and an ex post enforcement process rooted in FCC jurisdiction.”437  This
legal shield also protected the energy sector and other critical infrastructure 
from ISP blocking, throttling, paid priority, and unreasonable interference 
or disadvantages. To the extent emergency responders use services not
subject to the 2015 Order, the FCC should examine whether repeal of all 
net neutrality rules and the FCC’s abdication of jurisdiction over ISPs is 
sufficient to protect government and emergency services, and critical
infrastructure. 
B. ISP Verizon Throttled the Santa Clara County Fire Protection 
District’s Internet Use During California’s Largest  
Firefight: Public-Safety Zero-Day Vulnerability 
In July 2018, while the Santa Clara County, California Fire Protection 
District (Fire District) was fighting the Mendocino Complex Fire—which 
evolved into California’s largest fire438—Verizon throttled the unit’s “unlimited”
data plan once the Fire District used 25 gigabits of data that month.439 
Verizon slowed the Fire District’s internet speeds to act “more like an AOL 
dial up modem from 1995,” no longer supporting “a modern broadband
internet connection,” and “hampering operations for the assigned crew.”440 
Fire District personnel reported, “the department Verizon device is experiencing 
speeds of 0.2Mbps/0.6Mbps, meaning it has no meaningful functionality.”441 
Government Petitioners reported Verizon, “did not cease throttling even 
when informed that this practice threatened public safety.”442  The amicus
brief I co-filed with Professors Hammond, Chase, and Byerly in support 
436. Amicus Brief, supra note 37, Add. 2–4. 
437. Id. at 11. 
438. Top 20 Largest California Wildfires, CAL. DEP’T OF FORESTRY & FIRE PROT. 
(Mar. 14, 2019), https://www.fire.ca.gov/communications/downloads/fact_sheets/Top20_ 
Acres.pdf [https://perma.cc/W7TF-5DR7]. 
439. Amicus Brief, supra note 37, at 11 (citing Brief for Gov’t Petitioners, supra note 
411).
440. Id. (citing Brief for Gov’t Petitioners, supra note 411, Add. 11).
441. Amicus Brief, supra note 37, at 11. 
442. Id. at 23. 
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of Petitioners in the net neutrality appeal observed, “the ISP would not have
slowed had the user been watching an ISP’s ‘zero-rated’ entertainment video
exempt from ISP data caps.”443 
The CPUC’s Water-Energy-Telecommunications Nexus Decision discussed
modern firefighters’ reliance on real-time geographic information system 
(GIS) mapping to monitor fires and coordinate emergency response, track
information, and save lives.444 As such, “[n]et neutrality repeal left public
safety agencies unable to rely upon GIS and other Internet applications 
that require more bandwidth than an email, software updates, or cached 
video.”445 
Fire fighters should not have to fight a fire like its 1995, let alone 1895. 
The internet is one of the most transformational firefighting tools deployed in
the past half century. ISP-induced dial-up speeds rob fire-fighters, all of
the agencies with whom they coordinate, and the public of the ability to
use high-speed internet applications to more effectively fight, detect, and 
escape fires and protect public safety.
C. ISPs Have Not Promised to Forswear from Throttling or Paid
Priority that Effects the Distributed Energy Ecosystem
and Energy Reliability 
After Petitioners’ brief appealing the Open Internet Order disclosed
Verizon’s throttling of the Fire Protection District’s internet speed during
the Mendocino Complex Fire, Verizon publicly promised not to slow the
data of first responders on the West Coast and Hawaii.446 Verizon then
promised, “in the event of another disaster, it will lift restrictions on public 
safety customers, providing full network access.”447 Notably, Verizon’s
promise is triggered only, “in the event of another disaster.” Verizon does 
not define who will determine whether a disaster exists or the time frame 
after disaster declaration that it will lift restrictions on “public safety
customers.” Verizon also failed to define who qualified as a “public safety
customer.” Are energy utilities public safety customers when they support 
fire-fighters by managing energy resources during a fire fight? Are energy
utilities, resources, regulators, and the distributed energy ecosystem “public 
443. Amicus Brief, supra note 37, at 12. 
444. See CPUC D.16-12-047, supra note 26, at 33–34. 
445. Amicus Brief, supra note 37, at 12. 
446. Wendy Davis, Verizon Promises to Stop Throttling First Responders, MEDIA 
POST (Aug. 24, 2018), https://www.mediapost.com/publications/article/324091/verizon-
promises-to-stop-throttling-first-responde.html [https://perma.cc/L559-LNU4].
447. Verizon Statement on California Wildfire and Hurricane Lane in Hawaii, VERIZON
(Aug. 24, 2018), https://www.verizon.com/about/news/verizon-statement-california-wildfires- 
and-hurricane-lane-hawaii [https://perma.cc/5YVK-AZ3U].
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safety customers” at all times or only during designated emergencies?
Verizon’s press release promise does not protect daily operation or 
management for critical infrastructure sectors including energy and water.
Verizon’s institutional focus on “public safety customers” ignores the 
role of the public in protecting public safety. The internet’s distributed nature 
allows the public to post videos of fires, including fire escape routes. These 
videos can be life-saving for neighbors and first responders. Flood monitoring 
through internet-enabled river gauges and public posting of videos that inform 
flood protection districts, first responders, and communities of flood dangers 
protect life and property. The distributed energy network relies on all of 
its users, suppliers, researchers, public safety, regulators, and the public  to  
achieve energy reliability, public safety, and environmental goals. Verizon’s 
promise not to throttle “public safety” agencies in a disaster failed to recognize 
that community internet access is key to public safety.
The DOJ and FCC Internet Freedom appeal brief argued that ISPs will
quickly respond to problems, citing as an example, Verizon’s pledge not to
throttle Public Safety customers after disclosure of its dramatic slowing of
the Fire District during a major firefight.448 The FCC argued to the D.C.
Circuit that ISPs have no business incentives to “intentionally impair public 
safety,” because doing so will result in “public opprobrium” and “fierce 
consumer backlash.”449 
The FCC’s reliance on post facto solutions after the customer publicly 
reveals ISP network management interference leaves customers, public safety,
and energy reliability exposed to ISP conduct. For the energy sector, throttling, 
paid priority that degrades other users, intentional interference or disadvantage,
blocking, or other preferential ISP practices thwart vital energy operations,
reliability, and public safety. Whether the ISP’s goal was to “intentionally 
impair public safety” does not excuse the FCC, ISPs, the federal government, 
or energy regulators from turning a blind eye to the public safety consequences
of such actions.
PPD-21 directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to “develop situational
awareness capability for critical infrastructure, requiring action to address 
evolving threats and consequences.”450 ISP reservation of contractual rights
to engage in such conduct based on the FCC’s net neutrality repeal leave critical
448. Respondents’ Brief, supra note 261, at 95. 
449.  Id. at 95 (citing FCC, Internet Freedom Order, supra note 4, ¶¶ 264, 323). 
450. 
169
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infrastructure including the energy sector vulnerable to the consequences 
of ISP throttling and traffic interference.
ISPs have not promised to abstain from thwarting energy ecosystem 
participants. No public promises have been made to responsible entities 
in the energy system, nor to those who use the public internet for energy 
system functions such as DERAs, market bidders, ISOs, or energy consumers.
D. ISP Contractual Reservation of Network Management Rights 
Highlight Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities 
ISP Contracts including their Terms of Service reveal that many prominent
ISPs reserved rights to engage in paid priority or manage internet traffic 
in a manner that may pose reliability and cybersecurity risks.  The FCC
characterized Verizon’s throttling of the Fire District as a single incident 
Government Petitioners highlighted to illustrate net neutrality repeal’s public 
safety risks.451 Respondent’s brief underscored that, “numerous [broadband 
providers], including the four largest fixed [providers], have publicly committed
not to block or throttle the content that consumers choose.”452  Verizon’s
citation of its contract plans and network management practices in the midst 
of its insistence that the Santa Clara Fire District had to pay $2.00 a month 
more and switch to a new play to restore internet speeds underscore that
ISP contracts document cyber vulnerabilities. 
Government Petitioners’ net neutrality appeal brief attached the Declaration 
of Santa Clara County Fire Protection District Chief Anthony Bowden,
including emails to and from Verizon as the Fire District sought to end the
throttling during the firefight. An email from Silas Buss of Verizon to Santa
Clara fire officials emphasized, “[i]n short, Verizon has always reserved 
the right to limit data throughput on unlimited plans. All unlimited data 
plans offered by Verizon have some sort of data throttling built-in, including
the $39.99 plan” that Santa Clara subscribed to through its government
account.453  The Fire District and Verizon went back and forth with emails
and calls for several days as Verizon insisted that the Fire District had to 
switch to a different plan for $2.00 a month more, or a more expensive 
plan.454 
A brief examination of ISP publicly-available contract terms for internet
use reveals ISP’s reservations of rights that pose cybersecurity vulnerabilities.455 
451. Respondents’ Brief, supra note 261, at 94. 
452. Id. at 72 (citing FCC, Internet Freedom Order, supra note 4, ¶ 264). 
453. Government Petitioners Addendum, Brief for Gov’t Petitioners, supra note 411,
Declaration of Fire Chief Anthony Bowden, Add. 8.
454. Id. (citing Declaration of Fire Chief Anthony Bowden, Add. 10–11).
455. Thanks to my research assistant, Luke Batty, Santa Clara Law third year student, for
his research on ISP contract terms regarding network management promises and policies. 
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Verizon’s network management policies states that it does not block or
throttle lawful content but prioritizes under reasonable network management. 
Verizon also offers prioritization under Dedicated Access plans.456  The
FCC’s 2015 Open Internet Order’s excluded network management done 
in the ISP’s business interests from the reasonable network management
exception to net neutrality rules.457 The 2018 Internet Freedom Order removed
that restriction, allowing ISPs to manage the internet in their business interest.458 
Comcast, according to their Network Management practices page, states 
that, “Comcast does not discriminate against lawful internet content, applications,
services or non-harmful devices.”459 In its Network Management Disclosure,
Comcast contends it does not participate in blocking, throttling, affiliated 
prioritization, or paid prioritization.460 
Comcast announced in June 2018 that, “it no longer needs to throttle 
speeds for heavy internet users, ending a network-management technique 
it has been using since 2008.”461  Comcast also emphasized that it, “reserve[s] 
the right to implement a new congestion management system if necessary
in the performance of reasonable network management and to maintain a
good broadband internet access service experience for our customers, and 
will provide updates here as well as other locations if a new system is 
implemented.”462 Comcast’s explicit reservation of rights to return to throttling
traffic of “heavy” internet users, as Comcast may define that, underscores 
the need for responsible entities and energy regulators to take action to
ensure such throttling does not compromise the communication or function 
of energy signals. 
456. Network Management, VERIZON, https://www.verizon.com/about/our-company/
network-management#does-verizon-block-throttle-or-modify-any-specific-protocols [https://
perma.cc/S3W9-TNR7].
457. See FCC, 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 5, ¶¶ 215–16 (providing network 
management must be “primarily motivated by a technical network management justification 
rather than other business justifications.”).
458. FCC, In the Matter of Restoring Internet Freedom, supra note 4, ¶ 220.
459. Learn About Our Network Management Practices, COMCAST, https://www.xfinity.
com/support/articles/network-management-information [https://perma.cc/J4SF-5E2Z].
460. Xfinity Internet Broadband Disclosures, COMCAST, https://www.xfinity.com/
policies/Internet-broadband-disclosures [https://perma.cc/E68R-37TX].
461. Liam Tung, Comcast: We’ve Stopped Throttling Speeds for Heavy Internet












   




    
    
 
     
     
   
     
 
    






   
  
 
   
 
   
    
 
   
  
    
   
Similarly to Comcast, Charter claims it does not block or throttle lawful 
content but makes no promises regarding not engaging in paid prioritization.463 
AT&T also claims it does not block or throttle lawful content, nor engage 
in affiliated or paid prioritization.  AT&T states that prioritization may occur 
in a reasonable network management situation and it will prioritize 
communications related to emergencies, national security, public safety,
and law enforcement. However, AT&T also claims that they may have differing
rates, deals, and speeds individually negotiated at points of interconnection.464 
T-Mobile stated it will engage in content-agnostic throttling in furtherance
of reasonable network management. T-Mobile offers prioritization plans
based on the customer, who may purchase a prioritized data plan to receive 
priority during high-traffic and engage in zero-rating programs music and
video platforms. Content providers are not charged to be zero-rated, but 
they must meet certain criteria.465 
Verizon, Comcast, AT&T, and Charter all phrased their network management 
practices in terms of what it “does not” do, indicating that is a current
practice which may change. Comcast is the only one of these ISPs that states 
it does not engage in paid priority. As with Comcast’s reservation of rights 
to return to throttling customers who use large amounts of data, its paid 
priority policy may change. These ISP policy statements are insufficient
to assure the distributed energy ecosystem that the ISP will not slow, degrade,
or interfere with traffic essential to energy reliability and renewable energy
resources.
The 2018 Internet Freedom Order cited ISP promises to refrain from 
“blocking or throttling lawful Internet conduct” and “existing consumer
protection and antitrust laws” as sufficient to protect consumers from gatekeeper
abuse.466 The FCC noted, “that if an ISP ‘failed to disclose blocking, throttling, 
or other practices that would matter to a reasonable consumer, the FTC’s 
deception authority would apply.’”467  The FTC has discretion to bring cases
or not. If an ISP’s promises do not create a mismatch to its practices, the 
463. Network Management Practices, CHARTER, https://www.spectrum.com/policies/
network-management-practices.html [https://perma.cc/E9FC-EKJV].
464. Network Practices, AT&T (2019), http://about.att.com/sites/broadband/network
[https://perma.cc/YZ6B-PL4Q]. 
465. T-Mobile Terms & Conditions, T-MOBILE, https://www.t-mobile.com/templates/
popup.aspx?PAsset=Ftr_Ftr_TermsAndConditions [https://perma.cc/P77H-ETXP]; Policies 
Open Internet, T-MOBILE, https://www.t-mobile.com/responsibility/consumer-info/policies/
internet-service [https://perma.cc/V4TS-XQ4S]; T-MOBILE, CONTENT PROVIDER TECHNICAL 
REQUIREMENTS FOR BINGE ON, https://www.t-mobile.com/content/dam/tmo/en-g/pdf/Binge
On-Video-Technical-Criteria-March-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/NZZ7-WQL9]. 
466. Sandoval, Net Neutrality Powers Energy and Forestalls Climate Change, supra
note 6, at 63. 
467. FCC, Internet Freedom Order, supra note 4, ¶ 141 (footnotes omitted).
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case may not fall with the FTC Act’s deceptive conduct proscriptions.468 
The Internet Freedom Order also fails to discuss the legal principle that 
antitrust and unfair competition law remedy only injuries to competition, 
a limitation highlighted in my August 2017 Reply Comments to the FCC.469 
X. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
A. Simulation of ISP-Induced Delay or Signal Degradation 
and Failure to Execute 
To test the consequences of communications delays or failures due to ISP 
throttling, paid priority, or other traffic management manipulation, this 
Article suggests that RTOs, ISOs, states, FERC, and state PUC jurisdictional
energy sector participants run grid simulations with national laboratories 
or university labs such as WSU’s Smart City Testbed. As part of the California 
Energy Systems for the 21st Century (CES-21) initiative directed by the CPUC, 
a model of the California grid substation was created at the Idaho National 
Laboratory (INL).470 This model allows, “real-world trials of advanced 
software intended to find dangerous hidden malware and trigger immediate 
countermeasures at computer speeds.”471 Simulations at the INL or other
labs would create information and insights into ISP-induced risks for grid
reliability and renewable integration. Such simulations should be promptly
initiated under existing grid reliability and cybersecurity programs.
Simulations should test whether ISP-induced internet communication 
delays or failures trip off energy facilities, cause voltage fluctuations or other
issues, local or cascading outages. Simulations should also test the length
of delays that trigger grid or facility anomalies. Tests should examine whether
concentration of internet communication delays compromises grid function.
468. Catherine J.K. Sandoval, Disclosure, Deception, and Deep-Packet Inspection: 
The Role of the Federal Trade Commission Act’s Deceptive Conduct Prohibitions in the
Net Neutrality Debate, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 641, 645 (2009). 
469. Sandoval, Net Neutrality Powers Energy and Forestalls Climate Change, supra
note 6, at 63 (citing Sandoval, Internet Freedom Reply Comments, supra note 37, at 34
(citing Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 334 (1990); Brunswick 
Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl–O–Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977) (holding an antitrust plaintiff
must prove injury which reflects the anticompetitive effect either of the alleged violation
or of anticompetitive acts made possible by the alleged violation of antitrust laws).
470. Peter Behr, Cyberdefenses Put to Test at Computer Speed, E&E NEWS (Oct. 18, 
2017), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060063877 [https://perma.cc/7P7H-D866]. 
471. Id.
173





      
  
 





   
       
   
  
 
    
    
       
   
  





   
 
 
     
       
      
    
         
 
Moreover, CAISO should work with national labs to simulate the effect
of ISP-induced signal delays on grid communication using the Dispersive
Technologies SDN, and other protocols used to communication with CAISO.
Simulations should evaluate the effect of ISP network management delays
on demand response and other actions that depend on prompt communication. 
The CAISO market depends on bids sent via the internet. Simulations
should model ISP-induced delays on bids for the CAISO market, costs, 
dispatch, and achievement of environmental goals. 
B. State and FERC/NERC Data Requests and Cybersecurity Reliability 
Rules for Energy Entities Under Their Jurisdiction 
State PUCs should initiate proceedings to examine reliability, safety, rate, 
environmental, and cybersecurity vulnerabilities created by ISP contracts,
statements, conduct, and the FCC’s Internet Freedom Order. State PUCs 
should also use record inspection authority to require entities under their 
jurisdiction to disclose ISP offers or requests for payment for priority or
QoS guarantees for mass market internet access and make such information 
public. State PUCs have the legal right to obtain and review utility records and
can bring to light such offers to entities under their jurisdiction in order to
protect safety, reliability, the public and the environment.472 
State energy sector regulators should initiate proceedings to examine 
cybersecurity requirements for distribution-level energy resources. These
proceedings should consider whether to require energy utilities and entities
under their jurisdiction to limit contracts to ISPs that observe net neutrality in
order to promote grid reliability in the distributed energy ecosystem.
On the federal level, FERC should evaluate net neutrality repeal as 
a reliability and cybersecurity issue in its Grid Resilience Docket No.
AD18-7-000. FERC-jurisdictional responsible entities must analyze and 
address ISP network management contracts and conduct and the FCC’s net 
neutrality repeal as a cybersecurity vulnerability.  ISOs and RTOs should 
engage in the same analysis, focusing on the integration of energy resources, 
visibility, and management of the energy load that relies on mass-market 
internet access.  These steps are necessary to protect energy reliability,
cybersecurity, and public safety.
472. See e.g., CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 701 (2019) (“The commission may supervise 
and regulate every public utility in the State and may do all things, whether specifically 
designated in this part or in addition thereto, which are necessary and convenient in the
exercise of such power and jurisdiction.”); id. § 313 (2019) (authorizing CPUC to require 
data and records from an entity under its jurisdiction); id. § 314 (2019) (providing CPUC
with inspection rights for entities under its jurisdiction). 
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C. Conclusion 
The FPA imposes mandatory reliability and cybersecurity duties on the 
energy sector. State law imposes duties for entities under public utility
jurisdiction to provide safe, reliable, service at just and reasonable rates, 
and many states require the energy sector to comply with environmental
mandates to combat climate change.  These legal duties do not permit the 
energy sector to rely on market incentives or public opprobrium in response 
to reports of ISP throttling, to address the consequences of net neutrality 
repeal on energy reliability and cybersecurity.
The repeal of net neutrality protections poses a zero-day cybersecurity 
vulnerability for critical infrastructure including the energy sector, as well 
as other internet users. The lack of restrictions on who can buy paid priority, 
and absence of safeguards for other internet users from traffic degradation,
underscore paid priority’s risks. Energy sector participants and regulators 
must consider the specter that foreign adversaries will accelerate their messages
and degrade other internet transmissions through paid priority. The energy
sector must address this supply-chain vulnerability under FERC and NERC
rules, and state laws that require safe and reliable services.
The prevailing cybersecurity “hacker paradigm” has obscured the risks
ISPs pose to cybersecurity. ISPs need not hack into a network because ISPs
control traffic as it transits their network. Users cannot erect a firewall against
their own ISP or address ISP network management practices through security
patches. ISPs thus have “gatekeeper” power to control traffic crossing
its network.  This role underscores the importance of governance structures,
including enforceable legal rules to cabin internet user vulnerabilities to
ISP conduct and contracts. 
The contract model has provided limited protection, particularly for non- 
commercial users of mass-market internet access services who lack power
to negotiate ISP contract terms. Limited choice between ISPs constrains 
the ability of consumers to circumvent this issue by shopping. The model 
run by Guo et al. shows that if allowed to charge for paid priority, ISPs 
facing duopoly competition can use their gatekeeper position to obtain 
revenue from content providers to avoid data queuing delays due to ISP 
network management practices.473 Even if new ISP networks were built
or offered through leased facilities, time delays to switch (assuming the 
new network observed net neutrality) do not resolve daily, immediate 
473. Guo et al., supra note 256, at 2.
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communications needs for energy resources required within two seconds, 
for a four second roundtrip for CAISO market participants.474 
The FCC and DOJ argued to the D.C. Circuit in support of the FCC’s 
Internet Freedom Order that, “the issues State Petitioners raise about government 
services are issues that apply to all edge providers, public and private.”475 
These statements fail to recognize the duties imposed on the FERC-jurisdictional 
energy sector to provide reliable service at just and reasonable rates.  Nor 
did respondents recognize state law duties for utilities to provide safe reliable 
service, at just and reasonable rates, and comply with environmental goals 
for the energy sector.
The FCC’s and DOJ’s arguments—that “[b]ecause Petitioners did not
raise any issues in this proceeding that were distinct to public safety, there
was no need for the Order to separately discuss public safety”—distort 
the record before the FCC in the Internet Freedom proceeding. The CPUC’s
comments, Santa Clara County’s ex parte letter, the alarm industry, my
comments, and over 400 comments submitted to FERC raised public safety
issues triggered by net neutrality repeal. 
Respondents’ brief to the D.C. Circuit effectively condones ISP delay of 
public safety internet traffic, including energy sector signals. Respondents
relied on public scorn, post facto antitrust and consumer protection laws, 
and market forces to protect against ISP interference with internet traffic.
This view is inconsistent with public safety and critical infrastructure laws
and legal duties. Neither the FCC nor DOJ address the absence of any remedy
under antitrust, unfair competition, or consumer protection laws for non-
competition harms such as harms to public safety, national security, energy 
reliability, just and reasonable rates, and achievement of environmental
solutions that combat climate change.476 
These arguments reveal the “cat video paradigm” through which the 
federal government assumes all internet traffic is not important and can 
tolerate delays or degradation, even to the point where it does not function.  
The FCC’s failure to consider public safety and critical infrastructure issues
addressed by the 2015 Open Internet Order and the Internet Freedom record 
indicate the Internet Freedom Order is arbitrary and capricious under the APA,
and should therefore be vacated and remanded to the FCC for reconsideration.
474. N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., BALANCING AND FREQUENCY CONTROL, supra
note 304, at 13. 
475. Respondents’ Brief, supra note 261, at 95. 
476. See Sandoval, Internet Freedom Reply Comments, supra note 37, at 33 (“ISP
self-regulation, antitrust, and unfair competition laws are insufficient to address these threats
and offer no remedy for harms to democracy or national security.”); Sandoval, Net Neutrality 
Powers Energy and Forestalls Climate Change, supra note 6, at 63 (“The Internet Freedom
Order fails to discuss the legal principle that antitrust and unfair competition law remedy
only injuries to competition . . . .”). 
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The energy sector, FERC, NERC, and state PUCs should participate in
an appeal of the FCC’s Internet Freedom Order. If the Order is remanded 
to the FCC, then the aforementioned entities should file comments informing 
the FCC about the energy sector’s use of the internet, as well as reliability
and cybersecurity needs and implications of net neutrality repeal for those
duties. 
State regulators should initiate proceedings to examine the need for
distribution level cybersecurity standards. These state-level proceedings 
should analyze the impact of net neutrality repeal on energy sector reliability,
cybersecurity, safety, just and reasonable rates, and the accomplishment
of environmental goals. 
State and federal regulators, ISOs, RTOs, and the energy sector should
partner with national and university laboratories to simulate the effect of
internet delays and degraded communications on the electric grid and on
renewable integration.  Tests on grid models as suggested by this Article can
simulate ISP network management on grid assets and function, providing 
information to protect grid reliability and promote alignment of ISP and 
energy sector governance. 
The distributed energy ecosystem requires an open and neutral internet to 
support reliability and environmental sustainability. State and federal energy 
sector reliability duties therefore require prompt action to avoid the zero-
day cybersecurity vulnerability triggered by the FCC’s net neutrality repeal 
from cascading into energy reliability issues that compromise safety, just 
and reasonable rates, and achievement of climate change solutions.
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